905 resultados para Communication of technical information
Resumo:
Drawing on Social Representations Theory, this study investigates focalisation and anchoring during the diffusion of information concerning the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), the particle accelerator at the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN). We hypothesised that people focus on striking elements of the message, abandoning others, that the nature of the initial information affects diffusion of information, and that information is anchored in prior attitudes toward CERN and science. A serial reproduction experiment with two generations and four chains of reproduction diffusing controversial versus descriptive information about the LHC shows a reduction of information through generations, the persistence of terminology regarding the controversy and a decrease of other elements for participants exposed to polemical information. Concerning anchoring, positive attitudes toward CERN and science increase the use of expert terminology unrelated to the controversy. This research highlights the relevance of a social representational approach in the public understanding of science.
Resumo:
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.
Resumo:
This paper studies the determinants of school choice, focusing on the role of information. Weconsider how parents' search efforts and their capacity to process information (i.e., tocorrectly assess schools) affect the quality of the schools they choose for their children. Usinga novel dataset, we are able to identify parents' awareness of schools in their neighborhoodand measure their capacity to rank the quality of the school with respect to the officialrankings. We find that parents education and wealth are important factors in determiningtheir level of school awareness and information gathering. Moreover, these search effortshave important consequences in terms of the quality of school choice.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Healthcare professionals regularly read the summary of product characteristics (SmPC) as one of the various sources of information on the risks of drug use in women of childbearing age and during pregnancy. The aim of this article is to present an overview of the teratogenic potential of various antiepileptic drugs and to compare these data with the information provided by the SmPCs. METHODS: A literature search on the teratogenic risks of 19 antiepileptic agents was conducted and the results were compared with the information on the use in women of childbearing age and during pregnancy provided by the SmPCs of 38 commercial products available in Switzerland and Germany. RESULTS: The teratogenic risk is discussed in all available SmPCs. Quantification of the risk for birth defects and the numbers of documented pregnancies are mostly missing. Reproductive safety information in SmPCs showed poor concordance with risk levels reported in the literature. Recommendations concerning the need to monitor plasma levels and possibly perform dose adjustments during pregnancy to prevent treatment failure were missing in five Swiss and two German SmPCs. DISCUSSION: The information regarding use in women of childbearing age and during pregnancy provided by the SmPCs is heterogeneous and poorly reflects the current state of knowledge. Regular updates of SmPCs are warranted in order for these documents to be of reliable use for health care professionals.
Resumo:
The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.
Resumo:
In this paper, we design the optimal contract when two agents can collude under asymmetric information. They have correlated types, produce complementary inputs and are protected by limited liability. Therefore, a joint manipulation of reports allows them to internalize informational and productive externalities. We show that by taking advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information, even though they collude, the principal can achieve the outcome without collusion regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation. In particular, the principal can implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-proof way while this is impossible if collusion occurs under complete information.
Resumo:
In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.
Resumo:
This note offers an analytical framework aimed at explaining how individual agents purposefully act with the goal of managing the value of their information sets. Agents undertake a process of private accumulation of information, which takes into account the non-rival nature of this peculiar entity. Non rivalry introduces an externality that might trigger long-term endogenous fluctuations. The dynamics of interaction, namely the possibility of entering or exiting the group to which the individuals belong, wil l determine time trajectories for the information flows that are unique for the specific conditions of interaction that are being considered at a given momentEste artigo apresenta uma estrutura analítica que tem por objetivo explicar como é que os agentes individuais atuam, de modo intencional, com o propósito de gerir o valor da informação que detêm. Os agentes prosseguem um processo de acumulação privada de informação, o qual toma em consideração a natureza não rival desta entidade que detém características específicas. A não rivalidade introduz uma externalidade que pode despoletar flutuações endógenas de longo prazo. A dinâmica de interação, nomeadamente a possibilidade de entrar ou sair do grupo a que os indivíduos pertencem, vai determinar a formação de trajetórias no tempo para os fluxos de informação, as quais são únicas para as condições particulares de interação que estão a ser consideradas num determinado momento.
Resumo:
Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.
Resumo:
Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.
Resumo:
A number of geophysical methods, such as ground-penetrating radar (GPR), have the potential to provide valuable information on hydrological properties in the unsaturated zone. In particular, the stochastic inversion of such data within a coupled geophysical-hydrological framework may allow for the effective estimation of vadose zone hydraulic parameters and their corresponding uncertainties. A critical issue in stochastic inversion is choosing prior parameter probability distributions from which potential model configurations are drawn and tested against observed data. A well chosen prior should reflect as honestly as possible the initial state of knowledge regarding the parameters and be neither overly specific nor too conservative. In a Bayesian context, combining the prior with available data yields a posterior state of knowledge about the parameters, which can then be used statistically for predictions and risk assessment. Here we investigate the influence of prior information regarding the van Genuchten-Mualem (VGM) parameters, which describe vadose zone hydraulic properties, on the stochastic inversion of crosshole GPR data collected under steady state, natural-loading conditions. We do this using a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) inversion approach, considering first noninformative uniform prior distributions and then more informative priors derived from soil property databases. For the informative priors, we further explore the effect of including information regarding parameter correlation. Analysis of both synthetic and field data indicates that the geophysical data alone contain valuable information regarding the VGM parameters. However, significantly better results are obtained when we combine these data with a realistic, informative prior.