Representing Autoepistemic Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Autoepistemic Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial set of axioms if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meaning of that initial set of sentences. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and unlike the original Autoepistemic Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of modal expressions thus allowing the derivation of quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan formula and its converse hold.

A Note On Quasi-Lindelöf Spaces

Петра Г. Стайнова - Квази-линдельофовите пространства са въведени от Архангелски като усилване на слабо-линдельофовите. В тази статия се разглеждат няколко свойства на квази-линдельофовите пространства и се правят сравнения със съответни ре- зултати за линдельофовите и слабо-линдельофовите пространства. Дадени са няколко примера, включително на слабо-линдельофово пространство, което не е квази-линдельофово; на пространство, което е топологично произведение на две линдельофови, но не е дори квази-линдельофово, и на пространство, което е квази-линдельофово, но не Суслиново. Накрая са поставени няколко отворени въпроси.

Dense Subdifferentiability and Trustworthiness for Arbitrary Subdifferentials

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 49J52, 49J50, 58C20, 26B09.

Axiomatic Districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the \optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Tőkeallokációs módszerek és tulajdonságaik a gyakorlatban (Methods of capital allocation and their characteristics in practice)

A pénzügyekben mind elméletileg, mind az alkalmazások szempontjából fontos kérdés a tőkeallokáció. Hogyan osszuk szét egy adott portfólió kockázatát annak alportfóliói között? Miként tartalékoljunk tőkét a fennálló kockázatok fedezetére, és a tartalékokat hogyan rendeljük az üzleti egységekhez? A tőkeallokáció vizsgálatára axiomatikus megközelítést alkalmazunk, tehát alapvető tulajdonságok megkövetelésével dolgozunk. Cikkünk kiindulópontja Csóka-Pintér [2010] azon eredménye, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómái, valamint a tőkeallokációra vonatkozó méltányossági, ösztönzési és stabilitási követelmények nincsenek összhangban egymással. Ebben a cikkben analitikus és szimulációs eszközökkel vizsgáljuk ezeket a követelményeket. A gyakorlati alkalmazások során használt, illetve az elméleti szempontból érdekes tőkeallokációs módszereket is elemezzük. A cikk fő következtetése, hogy a Csóka-Pintér [2010] által felvetett probléma gyakorlati szempontból is releváns, tehát az nemcsak az elméleti vizsgálatok során merül fel, hanem igen sokszor előforduló és gyakorlati probléma. A cikk további eredménye, hogy a vizsgált tőkeallokációs módszerek jellemzésével segítséget nyújt az alkalmazóknak a különböző módszerek közötti választáshoz. / === / Risk capital allocation in finance is important theoretically and also in practical applications. How can the risk of a portfolio be shared among its sub-portfolios? How should the capital reserves be set to cover risks, and how should the reserves be assigned to the business units? The study uses an axiomatic approach to analyse risk capital allocation, by working with requiring basic properties. The starting point is a 2010 study by Csoka and Pinter (2010), who showed that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are not compatible with some fairness, incentive compatibility and stability requirements of risk allocation. This paper discusses these requirements using analytical and simulation tools. It analyses methods used in practical applications that have theoretically interesting properties. The main conclusion is that the problems identified in Csoka and Pinter (2010) remain relevant in practical applications, so that it is not just a theoretical issue, it is a common practical problem. A further contribution is made because analysis of risk allocation methods helps practitioners choose among the different methods available.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

Tőkeallokáció nem likvid portfóliók esetén (Risk capital allocation in case of illiquid portfolios)

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid portfóliók esetén is el lehet várni. Így mérve a kockázatot, ismertetünk a kockázatelosztásra vonatkozó két kooperatív játékelméleti cikket. Az első optimista, eszerint mindig létezik stabil, az alegységek minden koalíciója által elfogadható, általános módszer a kockázat (tőke) elosztására. A második cikk pesszimista, mert azt mondja ki, hogy ha a stabilitás mellett igazságosak is szeretnénk lenni, akkor egy lehetetlenségi tételbe ütközünk. / === / Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to fi nancial risk. We argue that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are valid for illiquid portfolios as well. Then, we present the results of two papers on allocating risk measured by a coherent measure of risk. Assume a bank has some divisions. According to the fi rst paper there is always a stable allocation of risk capital, which is not blocked by any coalition of the divisions, that is there is a core compatible allocation rule (we present some examples for risk allocation rules). The second paper considers two more natural requirements, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribution to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should allocate them the very same risk capital. Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allocated risk capital should not decrease either. However, if risk is evaluated by any coherent measure of risk, then there is no risk allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity, we encounter an impossibility result.

Determinisztikus és valószínűségi elosztási eljárások (Deterministic and probabilistic rationing methods)

Az életben számtalan olyan esettel találkozunk, amikor egy jószág iránti kereslet meghaladja a rendelkezésre álló kínálatot. Példaként említhetjük a kárpótlási igényeket, egy csődbement cég hitelezőinek igényeit, valamely szerv átültetésére váró betegek sorát stb. Ilyen helyzetekben valamilyen eljárás szerint oszthatjuk el a szűkös mennyiséget a szereplők között. Szokás megkülönböztetni a determinisztikus és a sztochasztikus elosztási eljárásokat, jóllehet sok esetben csak a determinisztikus eljárásokat alkalmazzák. Azonban igazságossági szempontból gyakran használnak sztochasztikus elosztási eljárásokat is, mint például tette azt az Egyesült államok hadserege a második világháború végét követően a külföldön állomásozó katonáinak visszavonásakor, illetve a vietnami háború során behívandó személyek kiválasztásakor. / === / We investigated the minimal variance methods introduced in Tasnádi [6] based on seven popular axioms. We proved that if a deterministic rationing method satisfies demand monotonicity, resource monotonicity, equal treatment of equals and self-duality, than the minimal variance methods associated with the given deterministic rationing method also satisfies demand monotonicity, resource monotonicity, equal treatment of equals and self-duality. Furthermore, we found that the consistency, the lower composition and the upper composition of a deterministic rationing method does not imply the consistency, the lower composition and the upper composition of a minimal variance method associated with the given deterministic rationing method.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph buyers are connected with sellers only, we show that Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.

Páros összehasonlításon alapuló pontozási eljárások monotonitása: önkonzisztencia és önkonzisztens monotonitás. Adalékok a pontozási eljárások axiomatikus tárgyalásához = Monotonicity of paired comparison-based ranking methods: self-consistency and self-consistent monotonicity. Contributions to an axiomatic analysis of scoring methods

A cikk a páros összehasonlításokon alapuló pontozási eljárásokat tárgyalja axiomatikus megközelítésben. A szakirodalomban számos értékelő függvényt javasoltak erre a célra, néhány karakterizációs eredmény is ismert. Ennek ellenére a megfelelő módszer kiválasztása nem egy-szerű feladat, a különböző tulajdonságok bevezetése elsősorban ebben nyújthat segítséget. Itt az összehasonlított objektumok teljesítményén érvényesülő monotonitást tárgyaljuk az önkonzisztencia és önkonzisztens monotonitás axiómákból kiindulva. Bemutatásra kerülnek lehetséges gyengítéseik és kiterjesztéseik, illetve egy, az irreleváns összehasonlításoktól való függetlenséggel kapcsolatos lehetetlenségi tétel is. A tulajdonságok teljesülését három eljárásra, a klasszikus pontszám eljárásra, az ezt továbbfejlesztő általánosított sorösszegre és a legkisebb négyzetek módszerére vizsgáljuk meg, melyek mindegyike egy lineáris egyenletrendszer megoldásaként számítható. A kapott eredmények új szempontokkal gazdagítják a pontozási eljárás megválasztásának kérdését. _____ The paper provides an axiomatic analysis of some scoring procedures based on paired comparisons. Several methods have been proposed for these generalized tournaments, some of them have been also characterized by a set of properties. The choice of an appropriate method is supported by a discussion of their theoretical properties. In the paper we focus on the connections of self-consistency and self-consistent-monotonicity, two axioms based on the comparisons of object's performance. The contradiction of self-consistency and independence of irrel-evant matches is revealed, as well as some possible reductions and extensions of these properties. Their satisfiability is examined through three scoring procedures, the score, generalised row sum and least squares methods, each of them is calculated as a solution of a system of linear equations. Our results contribute to the problem of finding a proper paired comparison based scoring method.

Axiomatic districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

On the additivity of preference aggregation methods

The paper reviews some axioms of additivity concerning ranking methods used for generalized tournaments with possible missing values and multiple comparisons. It is shown that one of the most natural properties, called consistency, has strong links to independence of irrelevant comparisons, an axiom judged unfavourable when players have different opponents. Therefore some directions of weakening consistency are suggested, and several ranking methods, the score, generalized row sum and least squares as well as fair bets and its two variants (one of them entirely new) are analysed whether they satisfy the properties discussed. It turns out that least squares and generalized row sum with an appropriate parameter choice preserve the relative ranking of two objects if the ranking problems added have the same comparison structure.

A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence

A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.

'That Puissant City': John Milton's Roman Sojourns 1638-1639

John Milton’s sojourns in Rome (1638-9) are attested by his comments in Defensio Secunda, by the minutes of the English College, by Latin encomia which he received from Roman academicians, and, not least, by his Latin letter to Lucas Holstenius (19/29 March 1639), and several Latin poems which he composed in the course of his residency in the capital city: Ad Salsillum, and three Latin epigrams extolling the praises of the virtuosa soprano, Leonora Baroni. Read together, these texts serve to reveal much about Milton’s participation in, and reaction to, the ‘Puissant City’, (History of Britain, Bk 2).

The present monograph presents fresh evidence of Milton's integration into the academic and cultural life of seventeenth-century Rome. It argues that his links with two Roman academies: the Accademia dei Fantastici and Accademia degli Umoristi constitute a sustained participation in an academic community paralleling that of his independently attested performance in Florentine academies (on which I have published extensively). It also investigates his links with Alessandro Cherubini, David Codner, Giovanni Batista Doni, and the Baroni circle hymned in three published anthologies.

Chapter 1: Milton and the Accademia dei Fantastici investigates the cultural climate surrounding Milton's Ad Salsillum by examining two of that academy's publications: the Poesie dei Signori Accademici Fantastici di Roma (Rome, 1637) and the Academia Tenuta da Fantastici a. 12 di Maggio 1655 (Rome, 1655), the latter celebrating the creation of Fabio Chigi as Pope Alexander VII on 5 April 1655. Read in a new light, Milton’s self-fashioning, it is argued, takes its place not only alongside Salzilli’s encomium in Milton's honour, and his Italian sonnets in the 1637 Poesie, but also in relation to other poems in that collection, and the academy's essentially Catholic eulogistic trend. The chapter also provides fresh evidence of Salzilli’s survival of the illness described in Milton’s poem by his epistolary correspondence with Tomaso Stigliani.

Chapter 2: Milton and the Vatican argues for links between Milton’s Latin letter to Holstenius and a range of Holstenius’ published works: his edition of the axioms of the later Pythagoreans gifted by him to Milton, and his published neo-Platonic works. This is achieved by mutual appropriation of Similitudes in a series of Miltonic similes, the anabasis/katabasis motifs in a reworking of the Platonic theory of the transmigration of souls, and allusion to etymological details highlighted in Holstenius’ published editions. The chapter also reveals Milton’s alertness to typographical procedures and, by association, to Holstenius’ recent role (1638) as Director of the press of the Biblioteca Vaticana.

Chapter 3: Milton and the Accademia degli Umoristi argues for Milton’s likely participation in this Roman academy, as suggested by his links with its members. His three Latin epigrams in praise of Leonora Baroni, the only female member of the Umoristi, have hitherto been studied in relation to the 1639 Applausi in her honour. In a new reading, Milton, it is suggested, invokes and interrogates Catholic doctrine before a Catholic audience only to view the whole through the lens of a neo-Platonic Hermeticism (by echoing the phraseology of the sixteenth-century Franciscan Hannibal Rosselli) that refreshingly transcends religious difference. Crucially, the hitherto neglected L’Idea della Veglia (Rome, 1640) includes further encomiastic verse, sonnets to, and by Leonora, and details of the conversazioni hosted by her family at the precise time of Milton’s Roman sojourns. Milton may well have been a participant. The chapter concludes in an assessment of his links with the youthful prodigy Alessandro Cherubini, and of his audience with Francesco Barberini.

Chapter 4: Milton at a Roman Opera analyses the potential impact of ‘Chi Soffre, Speri’, which he attended on 18/28 February 1639, mounted by Francesco Barberini to inaugurate the recently completed theatre of the Palazzo Barberini. A detailed analysis of the opera's libretto, music, and theatricality casts a backward glance to Milton's Comus, and a forward glance to Paradise Lost. It also assesses Milton’s musical interests at this time, as attested by his links with Doni, and his purchase of works by Monteverdi and others.

Chapter 5: Milton’s English Connections in Rome develops the work of Miller and Chaney by investigating Milton’s co-diners at the English College in Rome on 30 October 1638, and by analysing his links between David Codner (alias Matteo Selvaggio), and the family of Jane Savage, Marchioness of Winchester, lamented by Milton in 1631. It also assesses his potential relations with the Englishman Thomas Gawen, who ‘accidentally sometimes fell into the company of John Milton’ (Antony Wood).