Fate of the children of Usnach [manuscript] /

Binding: Contemporary Niger morocco; gold-stamped title on front board; leather clasps; stamped on inside of back board "C. & C. McLeish".

[Catalogues of sales]

Description based on: 6th Oct. 1975/7th Oct. 1975.

Bibliothek ... Wilhelm v. Bode ... Als anhang beiträge aus anderem privatbesitz: Geschichte der kunst aller zeitalter u. kulturgebiete veröffentlichungen von museums-, und privatsammlungen, quellenschriften, kunstzeitschriften werke anderer wissensgebiete schöne literatur ... Versteigerung ... 29. november 1921 und folgende tage ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Remarks upon the auction systems, as practised in New-York: to which are added numerous facts in illustration.

Mode of access: Internet.

The ruinous tendency of auctioneering, and the necessity of restraining it for the benefit of trade,

Mode of access: Internet.

Le trésor de la curiosité : tiré des catalogues de ventes de tableaux, dessins, estampes, livres, marbres, bronzes, ivoires, terres cuites, vitraux, médailles, armes, porcelaines, meubles, émaux, lacques et autres objets d'art /

Mode of access: Internet.

Catalogue des tableaux anciens des écoles espagnole, italienne, flamande & hollandaise : composant la galerie de M. Le Mis. de Salamanca, vente en son Hôtel, à Paris, rue de la Victoire, 50, les lundi 3, mardi 4, mercredi 5 et jeudi 6 juin a deux heures précises; Charles Pillet, commissaire-priseur.

Mode of access: Internet.

Catalogue of the first portion of the famous stock of the late Mr. W.J. Leighton ... .

Bound with: Catalogue of the second portion ... (1919), Catalogue of the third portion ... (1919), Catalogue of the fourth portion ... (1920), Catalogue of the fifth portion ... (1921), Catalogue of the sixth portion ... (1922), Catalogue of the seventh & final portion ... (1923).

Book auction records.

Title varies slightly.

Essays on Procurement, Scoring Auction, and Quality Manipulation Corruption

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Nonparametric Identication and Structural Estimation of Auction Models

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Multi-threaded Communicating Agents in Qu-Prolog

In this tutorial paper we summarise the key features of the multi-threaded Qu-Prolog language for implementing multi-threaded communicating agent applications. Internal threads of an agent communicate using the shared dynamic database used as a generalisation of Linda tuple store. Threads in different agents, perhaps on different hosts, communicate using either a thread-to-thread store and forward communication system, or by a publish and subscribe mechanism in which messages are routed to their destinations based on content test subscriptions. We illustrate the features using an auction house application. This is fully distributed with multiple auctioneers and bidders which participate in simultaneous auctions. The application makes essential use of the three forms of inter-thread communication of Qu-Prolog. The agent bidding behaviour is specified graphically as a finite state automaton and its implementation is essentially the execution of its state transition function. The paper assumes familiarity with Prolog and the basic concepts of multi-agent systems.

Decentralised supply chain formation:a belief propagation-based approach

Decentralised supply chain formation involves determining the set of producers within a network able to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem is frequently tackled using auctions and negotiations. In this paper we show how it can be cast as an optimisation of a pairwise cost function. Optimising this class of functions is NP-hard but good approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP). Here we detail a LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralised message-passing between potential participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known double-auction method and an optimal centralised technique, showing several improvements: it obtains better solutions for most networks that admit a competitive equilibrium Competitive equilibrium as defined in [3] is used as a means of classifying results on certain networks to allow for minor inefficiencies in their auction protocol and agent bidding strategies. while also solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions.

Decentralized supply chain formation using max-sum loopy belief propagation

Supply chain formation is the process by which a set of producers within a network determine the subset of these producers able to form a chain to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem has been tackled in a number of ways, including auctions, negotiations, and argumentation-based approaches. In this paper we show how this problem can be cast as an optimization of a pairwise cost function. Optimizing this class of energy functions is NP-hard but efficient approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using loopy belief propagation (LBP). Here we detail a max-sum LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralized message-passing between supply chain participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known decentralized double-auction method and an optimal centralized technique, showing several improvements on the auction method: it obtains better solutions for most network instances which allow for competitive equilibrium (Competitive equilibrium in Walsh and Wellman is a set of producer costs which permits a Pareto optimal state in which agents in the allocation receive non-negative surplus and agents not in the allocation would acquire non-positive surplus by participating in the supply chain) while also optimally solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.