Exploring the contradictions between Brazil’s role in the global climate change regime and its position in regional environmental governance.

Similar to other developing countries Brazil’s position on climate change emphasises national sovereignty and the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. However, in recent years Brasilia has also announced voluntary reductions in carbon emissions, making Brazil one of the leading emerging countries in its approach to climate change, while enhancing its international reputation and legitimacy. Compared to its neighbours Brazil has older and more developed domestic environmental institutions and movements. Yet, Brazil’s global leadership on climate change does not translate into a similar role in regional environmental governance. In the 2000s Argentina and Uruguay became embroiled in a bitter environmental conflict involving a shared natural resource, the Uruguay River. Brazil not only refused to mediate, but also kept it out of regional forums insisting on the conflict’s bilateral nature. Furthermore, Mercosur’s environmental agenda has progressively become eroded while Brazilian-led Unasur lacks an institutional framework dedicated to environmental concerns. This indicates that environmental concerns are far more important for Brazil’s global image than for its role as a regional leader. It also highlights the limited scope of the climate change negotiations which focus narrowly on reducing carbon emissions, without taking wider concerns over energy generation or environmental and social justice into account. Brazil has promoted hydropower generation, portrayed as “clean” energy. Yet, these projects have sparked strong domestic and regional civil society opposition due to their social and environmental costs which make it difficult for Brazil to claim a regional leadership role on environmental concerns.

Reconciling History and International Law: Territorial and Maritime Claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea

High-ranking Chinese military officials are often quoted in international media as stating that China cannot afford to lose even an inch of Chinese territory, as this territory has been passed down from Chinese ancestors. Such statements are not new in Chinese politics, but recently this narrative has made an important transition. While previously limited to disputes over land borders, such rhetoric is now routinely applied to disputes involving islands and maritime borders. China is increasingly oriented toward its maritime borders and seems unwilling to compromise on delimitation disputes, a transition mirrored by many states across the globe. In a similar vein, scholarship has found that territorial disputes are particularly intractable and volatile when compared with other types of disputes, and a large body of research has grappled with producing systematic knowledge of territorial conflict. Yet in this wide body of literature, an important question has remained largely unanswered - how do states determine which geographical areas will be included in their territorial and maritime claims? In other words, if nations are willing to fight and die for an inch of national territory, how do governments draw the boundaries of the nation? This dissertation uses in-depth case studies of some of the most prominent territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia to argue that domestic political processes play a dominant and previously under-explored role in both shaping claims and determining the nature of territorial and maritime disputes. China and Taiwan are particularly well suited for this type of investigation, as they are separate claimants in multiple disputes, yet they both draw upon the same historical record when establishing and justifying their claims. Leveraging fieldwork in Taiwan, China, and the US, this dissertation includes in-depth case studies of China’s and Taiwan’s respective claims in both the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Evidence from this dissertation indicates that officials in both China and Taiwan have struggled with how to reconcile history and international law when establishing their claims, and that this struggle has introduced ambiguity into China's and Taiwan's claims. Amid this process, domestic political dynamics have played a dominant role in shaping the options available and the potential for claims to change in the future. In Taiwan’s democratic system, where national identity is highly contested through party politics, opinions vary along a broad spectrum as to the proper borders of the nation, and there is considerable evidence that Taiwan’s claims may change in the near future. In contrast, within China’s single-party authoritarian political system, where nationalism is source of regime legitimacy, views on the proper interpretation of China’s boundaries do vary, but along a much more narrow range. In the dissertation’s final chapter, additional cases, such as South Korea’s position on Dokdo and Indonesia’s approach to the defense of Natuna are used as points of comparison to further clarify theoretical findings.

The New Silk Road, a Glimpse to China's Regime?

China's Silk Road Economic Belt plan is a part of One Belt, One Road initiative that aims to create trade routes from China all the way to Europe. Despite the potential benefits, there are also problems along the way. In this research I am examining the adverse effects of one part of the Silk Road Economic Belt with my focus on Xinjiang Uyghur minority and their rights and Central Asian regional stability. Moreover, I suggest that China's past commitments in the international society as well as her actions in relations to the undertaking can give an insight into a regime where China would be the dominant power in international society. I have used qualitative analysis to study the topics. My most important methodological tools to examine the topics are as follows. I utilise conceptual analysis to borrow concepts from international relations field. I use method of situation analysis when I am describing the current circumstances in China's Xinjiang and Central Asia. Inductive analysis is the overall method since I suggest that the content I have examined could give an insight to how China regards and relates to international law in the future. Moreover, my theoretical framework of the research sees international law as a tool that a state can use to gain more power but at the same time international law restricts state's behaviour. Based on the findings of this research, in case of Xinjiang the New Silk Road is likely to worsen Uyghurs situation because of Beijing's worries and harsh actions to prevent any disturbance. However, the New Silk Road could bring stability and maintain regional security in Central Asia when the states could see it beneficial to unite for cooperation which can result with greater benefits. China's potential future regime will emphasize sovereignty and non-interference to states’ domestic matters. Moreover, there will be no room for minority rights in China's concept of human rights. Human rights are meant to protect rights of masses but are of secondary importance since development and security will be more important goals to pursue. In the field of cooperation, China is increasingly using multilateral forums to discuss the matters but reserves bilateral negotiations for executing the plans.

Obligation des États de coopérer en droit international des cours d’eau transfrontaliers : état du droit et étude du cas Chinois

Le principe de coopération est considéré depuis longtemps comme l’une des pierres angulaires du droit international, toutefois, l’existence d’une obligation de coopérer en droit international reste encore controversée. Les ressources en eau, à cause de leur fluidité et de leurs multiples usages, démontrent toujours l’interdépendance humaine. En matière de cours d’eau transfrontaliers, la Convention de New York inclut explicitement dans son texte l’obligation générale de coopérer comme l’un de ses trois principes fondamentaux. Il nous incombe alors de voir quelle obligation de coopérer les États souverains s’imposent dans leurs pratiques ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous procédons tout d’abord à une étude positiviste du contenu normatif de l’obligation de coopérer. Nous constatons que l’incorporation de la notion de l’obligation de coopérer dans le principe de la souveraineté est une tendance manifeste du droit international qui a évolué du droit de coexistence composé principalement des règles d’abstention, au droit de coopération qui comporte essentiellement des obligations positives de facere, dont la plus représentative est l’obligation de coopérer. Néanmoins, il n’existe pas de modèle unique d’application pour tous les États, chaque bassin disposant de son propre régime coopératif. Pour mesurer l’ampleur des régimes coopératifs, nous étudions cinq paramètres : le champ d’application, les règles substantielles, les règles procédurales, les arrangements institutionnels et le règlement des différends. Quatres modèles de coopération ressortent : le mécanisme consultatif (l’Indus), le mécanisme communicateur (le Mékong), le mécanisme de coordination (le Rhin) et le mécanisme d’action conjointe (le fleuve Sénégal). Pour ce qui est de la Chine, il s’agit de l’État d’amont en voie de développement le plus important dans le monde qui a longtemps été critiqué pour son approche unilatérale dans le développement des eaux transfrontières. Nous ne pouvons pas cependant passer sous silence les pratiques de coopération qu’elle a développées avec ses voisins. Quelle est son interprétation de cette obligation générale de coopérer ? Notre étude des pratiques de la Chine nous aide, en prenant du recul, à mieux comprendre tous les aspects de cette obligation de coopérer en droit international. Afin d’expliquer les raisons qui se cachent derrière son choix de mode de coopération, nous introduisons une analyse constructiviste qui est plus explicative que descriptive. Nous soutenons que ce sont les identités de la Chine qui ont déterminé son choix de coopération en matière de cours d’eau transfrontaliers. Notre étude en vient à la conclusion que même s’il y a des règles généralement reconnues, l’obligation de coopérer reste une règle émergente en droit international coutumier. Ses modes d’application sont en réalité une construction sociale qui évolue et qui peut varier énormément selon les facteurs culturels, historiques ou économiques des États riverains, en d’autres mots, selon les identités de ces États. La Chine est un État d’amont en voie de développement qui continue à insister sur le principe de la souveraineté. Par conséquent, elle opte pour son propre mécanisme consultatif de coopération pour l’utilisation des ressources en eau transfrontalières. Néanmoins, avec l’évolution de ses identités en tant que superpuissance émergente, nous pouvons probablement espérer qu’au lieu de rechercher un pouvoir hégémonique et d’appliquer une stratégie unilatérale sur l’utilisation des ressources en eau transfrontalières, la Chine adoptera une stratégie plus coopérative et plus participative dans l’avenir.

Regime jurídico do alojamento local: a problemática dos imóveis arrendados de particulares e dos respetivos rendimento não declarados

Dissertação de Mestrado, Fiscalidade, Escola Superior de Gestão, Hotelaria e Turismo, Universidade do Algarve, 2016

Une analyse du processus de justice transitionnelle au Pérou à la lumière du Droit international

Le droit international, notamment le droit international des droits de l’homme, a établi des obligations étatiques pour affronter les défis des sociétés en transition : la recherche de la vérité autour des crimes du passé, la poursuite et la sanction pénale aux auteurs de ces crimes, et la réparation aux victimes. Les limitations politiques, sociales et juridiques de la justice transitionnelle sont énormes et elles représentent de grands défis pour les États et pour la communauté internationale en général. Cette recherche a pour but l’analyse du processus de la justice transitionnelle au Pérou après le conflit armé interne et le régime autoritaire de l’ex-présidente Alberto Fujimori à la lumière du droit international. L’étude conclut que le Pérou a accompli les obligations imposées par le droit international en utilisant une approche intégrale de la justice de transition. Néanmoins, il reste encore quelques défis à surmonter liés aux facteurs politiques et sociaux de la réalité péruvienne.

Une analyse du processus de justice transitionnelle au Pérou à la lumière du Droit international

Le droit international, notamment le droit international des droits de l’homme, a établi des obligations étatiques pour affronter les défis des sociétés en transition : la recherche de la vérité autour des crimes du passé, la poursuite et la sanction pénale aux auteurs de ces crimes, et la réparation aux victimes. Les limitations politiques, sociales et juridiques de la justice transitionnelle sont énormes et elles représentent de grands défis pour les États et pour la communauté internationale en général. Cette recherche a pour but l’analyse du processus de la justice transitionnelle au Pérou après le conflit armé interne et le régime autoritaire de l’ex-présidente Alberto Fujimori à la lumière du droit international. L’étude conclut que le Pérou a accompli les obligations imposées par le droit international en utilisant une approche intégrale de la justice de transition. Néanmoins, il reste encore quelques défis à surmonter liés aux facteurs politiques et sociaux de la réalité péruvienne.

WIPO and the Reinforcement of the Nagoya Protocol: Towards Effective Implementation of an Access and Benefit Sharing Regime for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge Associated with Genetic Resources

Traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources (TKaGRs) is acknowledged as a valuable resource. Its value draws from economic, social, cultural, and innovative uses. This value places TK at the heart of competing interests as between indigenous peoples who hold it and depend on it for their survival, and profitable industries which seek to exploit it in the global market space. The latter group seek, inter alia, to advance and maintain their global competitiveness by exploiting TKaGRs leads in their research and development activities connected with modern innovation. Biopiracy remains an issue of central concern to the developing world and has emerged in this context as a label for the inequity arising from the misappropriation of TKaGRs located in the South by commercial interests usually located in the North. Significant attention and resources are being channeled at global efforts to design and implement effective protection mechanisms for TKaGRs against the incidence of biopiracy. The emergence and recent entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol offers the latest example of a concluded multilateral effort in this regard. The Nagoya Protocol, adopted on the platform of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), establishes an open-ended international access and benefit sharing (ABS) regime which is comprised of the Protocol as well as several complementary instruments. By focusing on the trans-regime nature of biopiracy, this thesis argues that the intellectual property (IP) system forms a central part of the problem of biopiracy, and so too to the very efforts to implement solutions, including through the Nagoya Protocol. The ongoing related work within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), aimed at developing an international instrument (or a series of instruments) to address the effective protection of TK, constitutes an essential complementary process to the Nagoya Protocol, and, as such, forms a fundamental element within the Nagoya Protocol’s evolving ABS regime-complex. By adopting a third world approach to international law, this thesis draws central significance from its reconceptualization of biopiracy as a trans-regime concept. By construing the instrument(s) being negotiated within WIPO as forming a central component part of the Nagoya Protocol, this dissertation’s analysis highlights the importance of third world efforts to secure an IP-based reinforcement to the Protocol for the effective eradication of biopiracy.

International human resource management in the introductory HRM course

This paper explores the extent to which students in the introductory HRM course in US institutions are likely to be exposed to information on international and cross-cultural aspects of HRM. Two methods are used: (1) an analysis of international content in fifteen popular introductory HRM textbooks and (2) a survey of professors teaching introductory HRM. The vast majority of responding instructors said their classes got some exposure to international issues in HRM, and most introductory texts included some relevant content. Critiques of international boxed features and dedicated IHRM chapters are provided, and suggestions for improving the quality and depth of IHRM content in introductory textbooks are made.

High body mass index is not a barrier to physical activity: Analysis of international rugby players' anthropometric data

Recent data indicate that levels of overweight and obesity are increasing at an alarming rate throughout the world. At a population level (and commonly to assess individual health risk), the prevalence of overweight and obesity is calculated using cut-offs of the Body Mass Index (BMI) derived from height and weight. Similarly, the BMI is also used to classify individuals and to provide a notional indication of potential health risk. It is likely that epidemiologic surveys that are reliant on BMI as a measure of adiposity will overestimate the number of individuals in the overweight (and slightly obese) categories. This tendency to misclassify individuals may be more pronounced in athletic populations or groups in which the proportion of more active individuals is higher. This differential is most pronounced in sports where it is advantageous to have a high BMI (but not necessarily high fatness). To illustrate this point we calculated the BMIs of international professional rugby players from the four teams involved in the semi-finals of the 2003 Rugby Union World Cup. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) cut-offs for BMI, approximately 65% of the players were classified as overweight and approximately 25% as obese. These findings demonstrate that a high BMI is commonplace (and a potentially desirable attribute for sport performance) in professional rugby players. An unanswered question is what proportion of the wider population, classified as overweight (or obese) according to the BMI, is misclassified according to both fatness and health risk? It is evident that being overweight should not be an obstacle to a physically active lifestyle. Similarly, a reliance on BMI alone may misclassify a number of individuals who might otherwise have been automatically considered fat and/or unfit.