El concepto de asimilación cultural en la Política Migratoria de Francia. Un análisis desde la migración proveniente de la región del Magreb (2007-2012)

El presente estudio de caso busca determinar el rol que desempeñó el concepto de asimilación cultural en la formulación de la política migratoria francesa durante el periodo presidencial de Nicolás Sarkozy. Ante el surgimiento de una política rígida y vertical hacia los grupos inmigrantes presentes en Francia, se cuestiona la coherencia y eficacia de dichas medidas no sólo en torno a la adecuada regulación e integración de los inmigrantes magrebíes -y por extensión de otros grupos- sino en tanto el asimilacionismo ha sido constantemente asociado con el extremismo de diversos grupos políticos. En este sentido, se hace el análisis de algunas de las acciones discursivas de Sarkozy ante este tema, utilizando la técnica propuesta por Teun van Dijk. Este ejercicio permitió determinar que el modelo de asimilación cultural de los migrantes del Magreb habría direccionado parcialmente la formulación de la política migratoria de Francia, durante el periodo 2007-2012.

La transformación de los grupos armados ilegales en Argelia, un desafío en materia de seguridad y defensa para Francia. (2007-2013)

Este estudio de caso busca evaluar las consecuencias de la transformación de los grupos armados ilegales en Argelia para la seguridad y defensa francesa. Se analiza y explica cómo a raíz del cambio de denominación del GIA al GSPC, y este último al actual AQMI, el gobierno francés ha modificado su perspectiva sobre las amenazas hacia su Estado, conllevando a que las herramientas para la protección de su seguridad nacional presenten cambios con el objetivo de contrarrestar esos nuevos escenarios de inseguridad. Para ello se expondrán autores como Walter Laqueur Mohammed Ayoob y Barry Buzan con el fin de establecer un contexto teórico que permita avanzar hacia el objetivo de esta investigación, el cual se centra en demostrar el cambio de la política de seguridad y defensa de Francia a partir de los grupos armados ilegales en Argelia durante el periodo de 2007 a 2013.

La cooperación hacia Mauritania y la externalización del control migratorio español como mecanismos de securitización de la política migratoria española hacia Mauritania (1996 - 2013)

La llegada masiva de migrantes irregulares provenientes del África sub-sahariana ha sido un fenómeno que ha afectado en términos económicos, sociales, políticos y culturales, a los países que conforman la Unión Europea. Es así como los países más afectados por este tipo de migración (España, Grecia e Italia) han pedido a los demás miembros de la Unión adoptar una política conjunta y armonizada con el fin de solucionar la problemática migratoria irregular. No obstante, la cooperación, como acción unilateral, ha resultado ser el mecanismo más efectivo, en especial el caso español, para contener y externalizar los controles del movimiento migratorio irregular subsahariano en países como Mauritania, como resultado de un proceso de securitización de la migración irregular al interior de España a comienzos del siglo XX.

En attendant Sarko? France’s mainstream Right and Centre, 2012-2014

In winning the municipal elections of March 2014, France’s mainstream opposition – the Centrists and the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) – benefited not only from the unpopularity of the Left in power, but also from its own (partial) reconstruction. The Centrists had reorganised; the UMP had reaffirmed its right-wing programme and drawn strength from the opposition social movements launched in 2013. The European elections of 2014, however, demonstrated the limitations of this reconstruction. Their weak institutionalisation – the original sin of France’s Right and centre-Right – left internal ideological differences and (above all) personal rivalries unchecked within both forces. These tensions were compounded, in the UMP, by a series of financial scandals. At their heart was former president Nicolas Sarkozy, still the activists’ darling, ever more clearly a candidate for 2017, but also more hobbled by judicial investigations.

The Discursive double game of EMU reform: the clash of titans between French White Knight and German Iron Lady. Paper presented at the 9th Biennial Conference European Community Studies Association–Canada (ECSA-C), Ottawa, Ontario, April 27-28, 2012

From the Introduction. In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German “engine” of Europe had come to an end. The political legitimacy of French-German initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult. This is largely due to these countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices....the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken in 2012 before the French Presidential elections. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic corpus of press conferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is complemented by a number of press interviews including some given by their respective Finance Ministers) and important speeches in that same period of time.

The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? : explaining the decline in support for the war in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany /

Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war.

The far right vote in France:from consolidation to collapse?

The presidential and legislative elections of 2007 are widely seen to have marked the end of the far right as a major political force in France. How could this occur only five years after Le Pen’s qualification for the presidential run-off, and with his party seemingly in the ascendant? This article discusses recent fluctuations in far-right electoral performance in France. It focuses largely on the presidential elections of 2002 and 2007, re-examining the (supposed) upswell of far-right support in 2002 and its (supposed) subsidence in 2007. Both elections require nuanced interpretation. Both confounded poll predictions, which in 2007 failed to measure the effect of Sarkozy’s hard-right campaign and, crucially, the extent to which the border between “mainstream right” and “far right” had shifted since 2002. This allowed Sarkozy to drain part of Le Pen’s electorate, and raises questions over the longer-term impact of Le Pen and the FN on the political agenda in France.

Leadership and style in the French Fifth Republic:Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency in historical and cultural perspective

This article contributes to the body of the developing theoretical research in leadership and presidential studies by adding analysis of what I have termed ‘comportmental style’ as a factor in leader/follower relations. Within institutionalism and the wider structure/agency debate in political science, one of the challenges as regards the study of leadership is to identify factors that offer scope to or else militate against leaders’ performance. The comportmental style of Nicolas Sarkozy (President of the French Republic 2007–2012), deployed in the context of the – changing – institution of the presidency, was a major factor in his extreme unpopularity, and contributed to his defeat in 2012. What this tells us about the nature of the changing French presidency and the role of style will be discussed in the conclusion.

Being impolite while pretending to be polite. The rupture of politeness conventions in electoral debates

This paper is a part of a larger research that pursues a global understanding of impoliteness in face-to-face electoral debates. That research distinguishes three essential axes, three complementary analytical perspectives: functional strategies of impoliteness, linguistic-discursive mechanisms to implement them and social impacts of impolite acts. In this frame, the present work develops an in-depth analysis of a special category of mechanisms, namely the rupture of politeness conventions, a subgroup within postliteral implicit mechanisms. This subgroup acquires its identity by the fact of carrying out a linguistic action that is conventionally associated with a polite attitude, but doing it in a rhetorically insincere way: the consequence is that apparent politeness becomes impoliteness. Relevant aspects in the characterization of ruptures are isolated and, on this basis, it is developed a detailed analysis of three specific kinds of mechanisms in which ruptures take shape: using ironic statements, developing different forms of overpoliteness and adopting a falsely collaborative attitude toward the interlocutor. The analysis of that group of mechanisms takes into account, simultaneously, the other two axes of the main research, strategies and social impacts.