The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

Excess entry, ambiguity seeking and competence: An experimental investigation

Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.

Vector competence of Culex quinquefasciatus Say, 1823 exposed to different densities of microfilariae of Dirofilaria immitis (Leidy, 1856)

The metropolitan region of Recife, Brazil is endemic for Dirofilaria immitis and has an environment favorable to the development of Culex quinquefasciatus. The goal of this study was to evaluate the vector competence of the Cx. quinquefasciatus RECIFE population for D. immitis transmission. A total of 2,104 females of Cx. quinquefasciatus RECIFE population were exposed to different densities of D. immitis microfilariae blood meals, ranging from 1,820 to 2,900 mf/ml of blood, in a natural membrane apparatus. The results showed a variation between 92.3% and 98.8% of females fed. The exposure of the Cx. quinquefasciatus RECIFE population to different densities of microfilariae did not influence the mortality of the mosquitoes. Infective larvae from D. immitis were observed in the Malpighian tubules beginning on the 12th day, whereas larvae were observed in the head and proboscis beginning on the 13th day following infection. The vector efficiency index (VEI) presented by the mosquitoes ranged from 7.8 to 56.5. The data demonstrates that the Cx. quinquefasciatus RECIFE population has great potential for the transmission of D. immitis, as it allowed the development of the filarid until the infectious stage at the different densities of microfilariae to which it was exposed.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

Assédio Moral e Sexual nas Relações de trabalho: Os factores que potenciam o assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho e as atitudes das pessoas perante tal fenómeno. Caso Enapor

Esta pesquisa monográfica, ora apresentada, visa analisar e compreender os factores que os funcionários da ENAPOR percepcionam como estando na origem do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, bem como as atitudes dos mesmos perante o fenómeno. Os aspectos apresentados derivam de interpretações feitas durante a investigação sobre a temática em estudo, assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, tendo como bases as autoras BARRETO (2000) e FREITAS (2001). Estas são as autoras nas quais pretendemos centralizar, mas, outras abordagens teóricas darão suporte a esta nossa investigação. Pretendemos estudar o tema com base na análise documental, Pesquisas na Internet e aplicação das entrevistas aos directores e outros funcionários de outro escalão. A escolha destas duas autoras como suportes teóricos para esta pesquisa tem a ver, sobretudo, com o facto de elas estarem intrinsecamente relacionadas com os objectivos que norteiam a nossa investigação. Utilizaremos também como suporte teórico as contribuições de outros autores em relação à problemática do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalhos. As mesmas razões apresentadas nos parágrafos anteriores em relação às outras contribuições teóricas dos outros autores também se aplicam de forma específica a este autor. Para uma análise aprofundada desta pesquisa, recorreu-se ao método qualitativa para a análise de resultados, utilizando como instrumentos de recolha dos dados a entrevistas. Esta pesquisa monográfica está estruturada em cinco capítulos: no primeiro capítulo, uma reflexão sobre a definição do objecto de estudo e da metodologia; no segundo, assédio moral e sexual; no terceiro, temos as estratégias, motivos que encoraja a pratica do assédio, as atitudes e as politica de prevenção. No quarto, capítulo procede-se à apresentação, análise e interpretação dos resultados obtidos, por último, as principais conclusões a que se chegou nesta pesquisa e as considerações finais do mesmo.

Regulation of c-fos expression by RNA polymerase elongation competence.

The molecular mechanisms underlying transcription elongation and their role in gene regulation are poorly characterized in eukaryotes. A number of genes, however, have been proposed to be regulated at the level of transcription elongation, including c-myc, c-fos and c-myb. Here, we analyze the control of transcription elongation at the mouse c-fos gene at the nucleotide level in intact cells. We find that RNA polymerases are engaged in the promoter-proximal part of the gene in the absence of gene activation signals and mRNA synthesis. Importantly, we determine that the engaged RNA polymerases originate from a continuous initiation of transcription which, in the absence of gene activation signals, terminate close to the promoter. We also observe that the c-fos gene presents an active chromatin conformation, with the promoter and upstream regulatory sequences constitutively occupied by proteins, accounting for the continuous initiation of RNA polymerase complexes. We propose that activation of c-fos gene expression results primarily from the assembly of elongation-competent RNA polymerases that can transcribe the complete gene. Our results suggest that the engaged RNA polymerases found downstream of a number of other eukaryotic promoters may be associated with transcription termination of elongation-incompetent polymerases in the absence of activating signals.