Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary - July 1, 2003, thru June 30, 2004

A summary of the 12 regularly scheduled lettings and three emergency/special lettings held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2004.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary - July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005

A summary of the regularly scheduled lettings and emergency/special lettings held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005.

Department of Transportation, A Review of Selected Service Contracts, July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2004

Other Audit Reports

Iowa Division of Labor, January 2006

This is an informational newsletter and stat card about the happenings in the Division of Labor.

Iowa Division of Labor Contractor Registration Program Brochure, 2006

Frequently asked questions and answers regarding the Division of Labor Contractor Registration Law in Iowa.

Iowa Division of Labor Quarterly Newsletter, April 2006

Iowa Division of Labor Quarterly Newsletter

A sequential model for older workers' labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers'(50-64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50-64 age range and none in the 30-49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.

The Labor Market Effects of Technology Shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technology shocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin (unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemployment in terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustments occur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along the intensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separation rate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutral shocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of a sharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in the job finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked. Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemployment and output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility. This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction, while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growth model.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Expansion of undergraduate courses in nursing: dilemmas and contradictions facing the labor market

We sought to analyze, from the perspective of professors and students, the reasons and consequences of the expansion of undergraduate courses in nursing, discussing the dilemmas and the contradictions confronting the labor market. It was a qualitative study with data obtained from focus groups, conducted in 18 undergraduate nursing courses in the state of Minas Gerais, during the period of February to October of 2011. The narratives were submitted to critical discourse analysis. The results indicated that the education of the nurse was permeated by insecurity as to the future integration into the labor market. The insecurity translates into dilemmas that referred to employability and the precariousness of the working conditions. In this context, employment in the family health strategy emerges as a mirage. One glimpses the need for a political agenda with the purpose of discussion about education, the labor market and the determinants of these processes.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary, July 1, 2005 thru June 30, 2006

Pursuant to the Code section 307.12(14)the DOT is providing the summary of contracts let from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2006.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.