The First Privatization Policy in a Democracy: Selling State-Owned Enterprises in 1948-1950, Puerto Rico

In the 1940s, when the Governor of Puerto Rico was appointed by the US President and the Puerto Rican government was answerable only to the US Federal government, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was established on the island. Public services such as water, transportation and energy were nationalized, and several new manufacturing SOEs were created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, and clay products. These enterprises were created and managed by government-owned corporations. Later on, between 1948 and 1950, under the island’s first elected Governor, the government sold these SOEs to private groups. This paper documents both the creation and the privatization of the SOE sector in Puerto Rico, and analyzes the role played by ideology, political interests, and economic concerns in the decision to privatize them. Whereas ideological factors might have played a significant role in the building of the SOE sector, we find that privatization was driven basically by economic factors, such as the superior efficiency of private firms in the sectors where the SOEs operated, and by the desire to attract private industrial investment to the Puerto Rican economy.

Svenska fåglar efter naturen och på sten ritade af M. och W. von Wright.

Nimekkeen alkuperäinen kirjoitusasu: Svenska foglar

Mission and development : Finnish Pentecostal, Lutheran and Orthodox mission agencies in development work in Kenya 1948 - 1989

År 1974 började den finska regeringen kanalisera pengar för utvecklingssamarbete genom medborgarorganisationer. Tre år senare och fram till år 1988 beviljade regeringen ett speciellt anslag specifikt för missionsorganisationers utvecklingsprojekt. De finska pingstvännerna, lutheranerna och de ortodoxa utvidgade samtliga sitt sociala arbete i Kenya med statens stöd. Deras projekt var likadana: alla byggde läroanstalter, utvecklade Kenyas hälsoservice och sysselsatte kenyaner. Olikheterna mellan pingstvännerna, lutheranerna och de ortodoxa blev tydliga genom diverse problem som de mötte inom ramen för utvecklingssamarbetet. Den finska pingströrelsen bestod av självständiga församlingar, och pingstvännerna måste omvandla sin takorganisation, Suomen Vapaa Ulkolähetys, så att utvecklingsprojekt blev en viktig gren av dess verksamhet. Lutheranerna som till en början hade sänt missionärer för att arbeta i den kenyanska kyrkans tjänst började i medlet av 1970-talet i ökande grad bygga sociala anstalter med statens pengar. Ett problem var att statens stöd varade endast för en begränsad tid och att den lutherska kyrkan i Kenya inte hade råd att överta dessa anstalter och täcka deras löpande kostnader i framtiden. De finska ortodoxa, för sin del, igångsatte sociala projekt i samarbete med de ortodoxa i Kenya. Under några år fick de dock lära sig att de inte kunde driva självständiga utvecklingsprojekt i Patriarkens i Alexandria maktsfär. Den finska ortodoxa missionen blev tvungen att underkasta sig ärkebiskopen i Nairobi. År för år beviljade den finska regeringen större anslag för missionsorganisationernas utvecklingsprojekt och statens ansvar för kostnaderna ökade från 50% till 60% år 1984. Intressant nog mottog både lutheranerna och de ortodoxa mindre statliga pengar för utvecklingssamarbete år 1989 än 1984. Däremot växte pingstvännernas utvecklingssamarbete i Kenya under hela 1980-talet. Eftersom pingstvännerna inte ville använda sina medlemmarnas pengar (som var avsedda för missionsverksamhet) till sociala projekt täckte de sin andel i utvecklingskostnaderna med pengar från utanförstående. Pingstvännerna utvecklade en omfatttande komersiell och även industriell verksamhet för att samla in pengar för sina utvecklingsprojekt.

L'Univers (1867)

Périodicité : Quotidien (1867-1914) ; Hebdomadaire (1917-1919)

Exiles and Constituents: Baltic Refugees and American Cold War Politics, 1948- 1960

This dissertation explores the complicated relations between Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian postwar refugees and American foreign policymakers between 1948 and 1960. There were seemingly shared interests between the parties during the first decade of the Cold War. Generally, Eastern European refugees refused to recognize Soviet hegemony in their homelands, and American policy towards the Soviet bloc during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to undermine the Kremlin’s standing in the region. More specifically, Baltic refugees and State Department officials sought to preserve the 1940 non-recognition policy towards the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. I propose that despite the seemingly natural convergence of interests, the American experiment of constructing a State-Private network revolving around fostering relations with exile groups was fraught with difficulties. These difficulties ultimately undermined any ability that the United States might have had to liberate the Baltic States from the Soviet Union. As this dissertation demonstrates, Baltic exiles were primarily concerned with preserving a high level of political continuity to the interwar republics under the assumption that they would be able to regain their positions in liberated, democratic societies. American policymakers, however, were primarily concerned with maintaining the non-recognition policy, the framework in which all policy considerations were analyzed. I argue that these two motivating factors created unnecessary tensions in American policy towards the Baltic republics in the spheres of psychological warfare as well as exile unity in the United States and Europe. Despite these shortcomings, I argue that out of the exiles’ failings was born a generation of Baltic constituents that blurred the political legitimacy line between exiles who sought to return home and ethnic Americans who were loyal to the United States. These Baltic constituents played an important role in garnering the support of the United States Congress, starting in the 1950s, but became increasingly influential after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, despite the seemingly less important role Eastern Europe played in the Cold War. The actions of the Baltic constituents not only prevented the Baltic question from being forever lost in the memory hole of history, but actually created enough political pressure on the State Department that it was impossible to alter the long-standing policy of not recognizing the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States.