Introducing more equity in the CAP: a difficult challenge. Egmont Paper #55, June 2012

[From the Introduction]. The main question addressed by this paper is how to reach a more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments pragmatically, politically and economically? Pragmatically, the CAP is a multi-functional policy, which has to combine different goals, i.e. to be more equitable, green and market-oriented. However, these objectives are not always compatible and require trade-offs. Politically, regarding the CAP’s significant share (40%) of the EU budget and the current public debt crisis, Member States are most likely to keep their attention on the juste retour calculations rather than the promotion of the European public interest in the EU negotiations. Economically, reaching a more equitable distribution of payments should be achieved without significant disruptive changes that could have serious consequences on the costs and benefits of the agricultural sector in the EU. Considering these elements, it is already clear that reaching a more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments represents a difficult challenge.

eu spotlight 2012/07, December 2012: At long last, the EU takes on its banks

The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year beforehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the banking crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.

Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible. OSW Commentary No. 63, 2011-10-14

When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF reform only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis. For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conservative and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankruptcy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduction of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the new, poorer members of the eurozone.

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.

The role of politicians in inciting financial markets to attack the eurozone. EuropEos Commentary No. 4, 21 June 2010

While acknowledging that the sustainability of sovereign debt is a serious issue that must be confronted, this EuropEos Commentary finds that financial markets have blown the problem completely out of proportion, leading to a full-scale confidence crisis. The authors present evidence suggesting that politicians’ public disagreements and careless statements at critical junctures may have added oil to incipient fire. By creating the impression that domestic political interests would take precedence over orderly management of the Greek debt crisis, they raised broader doubts about their ability to address fundamental economic divergences within the area, which are the real source of debt sustainability problems in the medium term.

Focal points and fiscal discipline. ACES Cases No. 2013.2

Many studies suggest that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Typically, this is explained as a result of a legal deterrence logic, in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, determines its effectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument, and we assess this model using data on US states. We then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.

The Drivers of Current Account Surplus in Germany and the Politics of Rebalancing in the Eurozone. EU Centre, Singapore Working Paper No. 24, April 2015

Current account deficits have caught the public’s attention as they have contributed to the European debt crisis. However, surpluses also constitute an issue as a deficit in any country must be financed through a surplus in another country. In 2013, Germany, now the world’s largest surplus economy, registered a record high US$273 billion surplus. This paper looks at what accounts for Germany’s surplus, revealing that the major driving factors include strong global demand for quality German exports, domestic wage restraint, an undervalued single currency, high domestic savings rate and interest rate convergence in the euro area. This paper echoes the US Treasury’s view that a persistent German surplus makes it harder for the eurozone as a whole and the southern peripheral economies in particular to recover from the current financial crisis by imposing a Europe-wide “deflationary bias” through pushing up the exchange rate of the euro, exporting feeble German inflation and projecting its ultra-tight macroeconomic policies onto crisis economies. This paper contends that Germany’s trade surplus is likely to endure as Germany and other eurozone countries uphold diverging views on the nature of the surplus engage in a blame-game amidst a sluggish rebalancing process. Prizing the surplus as a reflection of hard work and economic competitiveness, German authorities urge their southern eurozone colleagues to undertake bold structural reforms to correct the imbalance, while the hand-tied governments in crisis-stricken economies call on Germany to do its “homework” by boosting German demands for European goods and services.

Institutions and Growth in Europe. CEPS Working Document No. 421, April 2016

This paper provides empirical evidence in support of the view that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth of European countries. When also taking into account the initial level of GDP per capita and government debt, cross-country institutional differences can explain to a great extent the relative long-term GDP performance of European countries. It also shows that an initial government debt level above a threshold (e.g. 60-70%) coupled with institutional quality below the EU average tends to be associated with particularly poor long-term real growth performance. Interestingly, the detrimental effect of high debt levels on long-term growth seems cushioned by the presence of very sound institutions. This might be because good institutions help to alleviate the debt problem in various ways, e.g. by ensuring sufficient fiscal consolidation in the longer-run, allowing for better use of government expenditures and promoting sustainable growth, social fairness and more efficient tax administration. The quality of national institutions seems to enhance the long-term GDP performance across a large sample of countries, also including OECD countries outside Europe. The paper offers some evidence that, in the presence of good institutions, conditions for catching-up seem generally good also for euro-area and fixed exchange rate countries. Looking at sub-groupings, it seems that sound institutions may be particularly important for long-term growth in the countries where the exchange rate tool is no longer available (and where also sovereign debt is high), and less so in the countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. However, this result is preliminary and requires further research. The empirical findings on the importance of institutions are robust to various measures of output growth, different measures of institutional indicators, different sample sizes, different country groupings and to the inclusion of additional control variables. Overall, the results tend to support the call for structural reforms in general and reforms enhancing the efficiency of public administration and regulation, the rule of law and the fight against rent-seeking and corruption in particular.

Directional mobility of debt ratings

In this paper we describe a method to decompose a well-known measure of debt ratings mobility into it's directional components. We show, using sovereign debt ratings as an example, that this directional decomposition allows us to better understand the underlying characteristics of debt ratings migration and, for the case of the data set used, that the standard Markov chain model is not homogeneous in either the time or cross-sectional dimensions. We find that the directional decomposition also allows us to sign the change in quality of debt over time and across sub-groups of the population.

Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: a Necessary but Manageable Evil?

There are two possible responses to the Greek debt crisis: ‘Plan A’, continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary private sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, coercive preemptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value reduction in privately-held debt. Both options have risks, but it is necessary to move to Plan B sooner or later. The impact on Greece could be mitigated by foreign bank ownership and proper liquidity support measures. The direct spillover impact on the rest of the euro area seems small. But there is the risk of contagion, which is a serious concern. There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it.

Bank financing of Hungarian SMEs: Getting over to credit crisis by state interventions

In this article we aimed to present and analyse the 21st century history of bank financing in the Hungarian small and medium enterprise (SME) sector in the period ranging from 2000 to 2012. The credit products offered by banks and credit unions are the most fundamental means of external financing capable of fulfilling the financing needs of a wide array of SMEs. The conditions of accessing credits and their prices exert a decisive influence on the profitability and business opportunities of SMEs. As a result of economic slowdown SMEs had to face higher interest rates, decreasing credit limits, and bank financing options that became increasingly slowly accessible alongside stricter conditions. Due to this process SMEs business performance had been falling continuously which has a destructive contribution to the national economy. In the first chapter of the article we present the dynamic development of credit financing in the Hungarian SME sector, along with the causes that triggered it, then we will continue with the negative tendencies dating from the onset of the 2008 debt crisis. In the second chapter we discuss the vicious circle, due to which the business performance of the SMEs, as well as the conditions of access to credits and their prices, have entered into a negative spiral. In the third and final chapter we make suggestions regarding the direction and means of necessary government intervention, in order to stop and reverse the negative tendencies observed in SME credit financing.

The Argentine Dilemma: “Vulture Funds” and the Risks Posed to Developing Economies

Post-crisis Argentina is a case study of crisis management through debt restructuring. This article examines how Argentina negotiated the external debt in the wake of the sovereign default in December 2001 and now confronts challenges posed by holdout creditors—the so called “vulture funds”. It argues that debt restructuring has put a straitjacket on the national economy, making it virtually impossible for healthy growth short of a break with the international economic order. While Argentina has successfully restructured a $95 billion debt with an unprecedented “hair cut” (around 70% reduction in “net value of debt”), a sustainable growth appears out of reach as long as reliance on the government debt market prevails. In this cycle, the transmission belt of financial crisis to developing countries is characterized by the entry of highly speculative players such as hedge funds, conflicts of interests embedded in “sovereign debt restructuring” (SDR) and vulnerabilities associated with “emerging market debt”.

Low-Volatility Anomaly in Helsinki Stock Exchange

International research shows that low-volatility stocks have beaten high-volatility stocks in terms of returns for decades on multiple markets. This abbreviation from traditional risk-return framework is known as low-volatility anomaly. This study focuses on explaining the anomaly and finding how strongly it appears in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Data consists of all listed companies starting from 2001 and ending close to 2015. Methodology follows closely Baker and Haugen (2012) by sorting companies into deciles according to 3-month volatility and then calculating monthly returns for these different volatility groups. Annualized return for the lowest volatility decile is 8.85 %, while highest volatility decile destroys wealth at rate of -19.96 % per annum. Results are parallel also in quintiles that represent larger amount of companies and thus dilute outliers. Observation period captures financial crisis of 2007-2008 and European debt crisis, which embodies as low main index annual return of 1 %, but at the same time proves the success of low-volatility strategy. Low-volatility anomaly is driven by multiple reasons such as leverage constrained trading and managerial incentives which both prompt to invest in risky assets, but behavioral matters also have major weight in maintaining the anomaly.

Is the supply of long-term debt independent of the term premia? Evidence from Portugal

An important assumption in the statistical analysis of the financial market effects of the central bank’s large scale asset purchase program is that the "long-term debt stock variables were exogenous to term premia". We test this assumption for a small open economy in a currency union over the period 2000M3 to 2015M10, via the determinants of short- term financing relative to long-term financing. Empirical estimations indicate that the maturity composition of debt does not respond to the level of interest rate or to the term structure. These findings suggest a lower adherence to the cost minimization mandate of debt management. However, we find that volatility and relative market size respectively decrease and increase short-term financing relative to long-term financing, while it decreases with an increase in government indebtedness.

Los determinantes de la rentabilidad primaria de los bonos de titulización hipotecaria: la influencia de las estructuras multitramo

[ES] Este artículo analiza los determinantes de la rentabilidad primaria de los bonos de titulización hipotecaria (conocidos en la literatura como mortgage backed securities, o MBS) emitidos en España durante el periodo 1993-2011, periodo en el que el mercado español llegó a convertirse en el más importante de Europa continental. Los resultados obtenidos sobre el análisis de la población completa de MBS emitidos (262 tramos configurados sobre 94 fondos de titulización) indican que la estructuración multitramo de los MBS ha ayudado a reducir el riesgo percibido global de las emisiones de MBS, mediante la generación de mercados más completos y la reducción de los problemas derivados de la existencia de asimetrías informativas implícitas en el proceso de selección de los activos transmitidos por parte de la entidad cedente. Esta reducción del riesgo percibido ha tenido un efecto directo sobre la rentabilidad ofrecida por los bonos de titulización emitidos. Además, no se encuentran evidencias de que la emisión de MBS persiga la transmisión efectiva de riesgos, más bien al contrario. Las Entidades de crédito, por lo general, han retenido los tramos de primeras pérdidas, lo que ha contribuido a mantener en niveles muy bajos (por debajo de la rentabilidad de la deuda soberana) la rentabilidad ofrecida por los MBS. Precisamente, el escaso diferencial ofrecido por los bonos de titulización se debe a que los tramos retenidos no han ofrecido primas de rentabilidad ajustadas al riesgo inherente.