An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

The Monetary policy rules and the inflation process in open emerging

This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.

Primary Commodity Prices: Co-movements, Common Factors and Fundamentals

The behavior of commodities is critical for developing and developed countries alike. This paper contributes to the empirical evidence on the co-movement and determinants of commodity prices. Using nonstationary panel methods, we document a statistically significant degree of co-movement due to a common factor. Within a Factor Augmented VAR approach, real interest rate and uncertainty, as postulated by a simple asset pricing model, are both found to be negatively related to this common factor. This evidence is robust to the inclusion of demand and supply shocks, which both positively impact on the co-movement of commodity prices.

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.

The Role of model uncertainty and learning in the U.S. postwar policy response to oil prices

This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a framework that explicitly accounts for policymakers' uncertainty about the channels of transmission of oil prices into the economy. More specfically, I examine the robust response to the real price of oil that US monetary authorities would have been recommended to implement in the period 1970 2009; had they used the approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005b) to incorporate model uncertainty and learning into policy decisions. In this context, I investigate the extent to which regulator' changing beliefs over different models of the economy play a role in the policy selection process. The main conclusion of this work is that, in the specific environment under analysis, one of the underlying models dominates the optimal interest rate response to oil prices. This result persists even when alternative assumptions on the model's priors change the pattern of the relative posterior probabilities, and can thus be attributed to the presence of model uncertainty itself.

Is there Descriminatory Mortgage Pricing against Immigrants in the Spanish Lending Market?

In this paper, we investigate whether evidence of discriminatory treatment against immigrants in the Spanish mortgage market exists. More specifically, we test whether, ceteris paribus, immigrant borrowers tend to be charged with higher interest rates on their mortgages than their Spanish born counterparts. To do so, we use a unique dataset on granted mortgages that contains information not only regarding the conditions of the loan but also the socio-economic characteristics of the mortgagors. We observe that immigrants are systematically charged with higher interest rates. We apply the well known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to measure the extent to which this disparate treatment of lenders in mortgage pricing against immigrants is due to discrimination. Our results indicate that approximately two thirds of the gap in the interest rate between Spanish born and immigrant borrowers can be attributed to discriminatory treatment. Key words: Immigration, discrimination, mortgage pricing, housing market. JEL codes: R21, G21, J14

How does monetary policy change? evidence on inflation targeting countries

We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) applying moment- based estimator at time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. Using this novel flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually pointing to the importance of applying time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest rate smoothing parameter is much lower that what previous time-invariant estimates of policy rules typically report. External factors matter for all countries, albeit the importance of exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates on inflation is particularly strong during the periods, when central bankers want to break the record of high inflation such as in the U.K. or in Australia at the beginning of 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting suggesting the positive effect of this regime on anchoring inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence as well as policy neutral rate typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.

Malaria entomological risk factors in relation to land cover in the Lower Caura River Basin, Venezuela

To explore the effects of deforestation and resulting differences in vegetation and land cover on entomological parameters, such as anopheline species composition, abundance, biting rate, parity and entomological inoculation rate (EIR), three villages were selected in the Lower Caura River Basin, state of Bolívar, Venezuela. All-night mosquito collections were conducted between March 2008-January 2009 using CDC light traps and Mosquito Magnet(r) Liberty Plus. Human landing catches were performed between 06:00 pm-10:00 pm, when anophelines were most active. Four types of vegetation were identified. The Annual Parasite Index was not correlated with the type of vegetation. The least abundantly forested village had the highest anopheline abundance, biting rate and species diversity. Anopheles darlingi and Anopheles nuneztovari were the most abundant species and were collected in all three villages. Both species showed unique biting cycles. The more abundantly forested village of El Palmar reported the highest EIR. The results confirmed previous observations that the impacts of deforestation and resulting changes in vegetation cover on malaria transmission are complex and vary locally.

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.