Accountability em educação : Políticas educativas e regulação da qualidade

O trabalho tem por objetivo discutir questoes atinentes à accountability em educaçao, considerando a emergência de políticas de responsabilizaçao e prestaçao de contas como mecanismo de regulaçao da qualidade no setor. Com base na revisao de literatura e por meio do recurso da análise de conteúdo, aborda aspectos conceituais do tema, realçando o caráter ambíguo e plural do termo no momento em que novas agendas políticas nacionais adotam a accountability como recurso de gestao pública. Segue discutindo sua recente entrada no campo da educaçao, nomeadamente na América Latina, onde ganha força o debate da responsabilizaçao. Por fim, destaca confluências e especificidades da accountability na educaçao básica brasileira, para o que revisita publicaçoes nacionais que enfocam o tema na sua especificidade, e questiona opçoes políticas de sistemas formais de accountability que se esgotam na recolha e publicitaçao de resultados educacionais, baseados em testes estandardizados. De forma conclusiva, alude que a visao de regulaçao da qualidade, predominante em vários países, confina a accountability a formatos que atribuem preponderantemente à escola a responsabilizaçao pelos resultados oficiais que produz

Two risky and costly end-user related taboos when developing information systems: qualifications and accountability

This work highlights two critical taboos in organizations: 1)taking for granted the quality of certain capabilities and attitudes of the end-user representatives (EUR) in information systems development projects (ISDP), and 2) the EUR´s inherent accountability for losses in IS investments. These issues are neither addressed by theory nor research when assessing success/ failure. A triangulation approach was applied to combine quantitative and qualitative methods, having convergent results and showing that in problematic cases, paradoxically, the origin of IS rejection by end users (EU) points towards the EUR themselves. It has been evaluated to what extent some EUR factors impacted a macro ISDP involving an enterprise resource planning (ERP) package, ranking the ‘knowledge of the EUR’ as the main latent variable. The results validate some issues found throughout decades of praxis, confirming that when not properly managed the EUR role by itself has a direct relationship with IS rejection and significant losses in IS investments.

Accountability, constituição e contabilidade

Inclui notas explicativas e bibliograficas

Transparência governamental e accountability: uma análise comparativa da evolução dos portais de informações públicas no município de São Paulo

Impulsionados por mudanças na legislação e pelo contexto de favorecimento de medidas de publicidade, vários órgãos governamentais vêm ampliando o leque de informações divulgadas nos seus portais de transparência. Entretanto, esse movimento não é uniforme certos órgãos têm tendência maior de serem mais transparentes que outros. Este trabalho sugere a montagem de um modelo de avaliação desses portais em relação à variedade, qualidade e acessibilidade das informações públicas cuja divulgação é exigida por lei e aplica-­o nos sites da Prefeitura de São Paulo, da Câmara Municipal e do Tribunal de Contas do Município. Foi verificada uma diferença significa na avaliação dos portais entre 2008 e 2013, também desigual de acordo com o órgão. Entrevistas com funcionários dos três órgãos indicam que fatores institucionais específicos como a accountability vertical, a receptividade em relação ao escrutínio público e a fiscalização por órgãos de controle são essenciais para entender a diferença nos estímulos para se ampliar a transparência governamental.

The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament: Assessing progress, shortcomings and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 58, September 2013

This paper examines the performance of the European Parliament in EU AFSJ law and policy-making from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until the end of the first half of 2013. The paper situates the EP in the new post-Lisbon institutional setting, documenting its transition to ‘AFSJ decision-maker’, and its new powers to shape and make policy covering the EU’s internal and external security agenda. While the paper finds that the EP has become an active co-owner of the EU AFSJ post-Lisbon, with the Parliament demonstrating a dynamic adjustment to its new post-Lisbon role and powers, the authors identify a set of new developments and challenges that have arisen in the conduct of democratic accountability by the EP in the AFSJ since 2009, which call for critical reflection ahead of the new parliamentary term 2014-2019 and the post-2014 phase of the EU’s AFSJ.

European Central Bank accountability: how the monetary dialogue could be improved. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/04, March 2014

According to the European Union Treaties, the European Central Bank (ECB) is accountable to the European Parliament. In practice, this accountability takes mainly the form of a quarterly Monetary Dialogue between the president of the ECB and the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs committee. We assess the impact of the Monetary Dialogue. We describe the ECB’s accountability practices, compare them to those of other major central banks and provide an assessment of the dialogue in the last five years. The Monetary Dialogue could be improved and we make recommendations on this. We also consider what role the Monetary Dialogue could play in the current context of the ECB’s evolving role. We discuss in particular forward guidance and quantitative easing. We review the main features and the way in which those policies have been implemented by other central banks. We then suggest the appropriate role for the Monetary Dialogue in relation to each of those policies. We conclude with some observations on the function of the Monetary Dialogue after the establishment of a banking union in Europe.

Discretion and Accountability: The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 30/2014

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrated the relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his independence. The paper also explains the inter-temporal interactions between the principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players. The second part is devoted to analysis of the functioning of ESMA in the context of its delegated powers. After the presentation of main aspects of the regulatory framework establishing ESMA, the paper continuous with an analysis and interpretation of the discretionary powers of ESMA. The rather rigid position of the Court of Justice in relation to the Meroni doctrine seems to be unsuitable to delegation of complex regulatory tasks. This is particularly evident in the case of financial markets. Finally, the judgment does not examine in any detail whether and how the principals - i.e. the EU and Member States - are best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and regulations and whether there are different but more effective accountability mechanisms.