The historical game-changes in the philosophy of devotion and caste as used and misused by the Bhagavad-gita

This thesis considers that the purport of the Bhagavadgita is to prioritize the philosophy of loving devotion to God (bhakti), not the propagation of color-coded-caste (varna system). The distinction between bhakti and caste becomes clear when one sees their effect on human life and on the society. Jnana and karma, two of the other polarities with which the Gita contends, finally support bhakti towards betterment, not deterioration, if done selflessly and with balance. Caste, however, is a totally different tension, which is always detrimental to the well-being of the person and the society. In the Gita, the devotees' mystical or emotional love of, God apprehends their ~ oneness with the Supreme God and with all beings, and transcends the pitiless segregation of the caste system, and opens the path of salvation to all irrespective of race, color, caste, class or gender in life. In spite of much opposition from orthodoxy, the bhakti movement spread allover India, and bhakti itself rose to the level of orthodoxy and has become the faith of millions of people especially of the south, and surprisingly, of even of those of the so called highest caste. And yet, caste still remains as an indelible mark of every Hindu, even after they change their religion. Although caste is less venomous now, it is still openly present in all walks of Indian life and shows up its ugly head at important moments such as marriage, elections for public office, admission to school or employment. True, bhakti is the antidote for. caste; but only real bhakti can remove caste completely, not mere lip-service to it. This thesis claims that bhakti is the deliberate major thrust of the teaching of the Gita while caste seems to be a contradiction of this thrust.

Applied philosophy of language

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data.

The Development of Dalton`s Atomic Theory as a Case Study in the History of Science: Reflections for Educators in Chemistry

The inclusion of the history of science in science curricula-and specially, in the curricula of science teachers-is a trend that has been followed in several countries. The reasons advanced for the study of the history of science are manifold. This paper presents a case study in the history of chemistry, on the early developments of John Dalton`s atomic theory. Based on the case study, several questions that are worth discussing in educational contexts are pointed out. It is argued that the kind of history of science that was made in the first decades of the twentieth century (encyclopaedic, continuist, essentially anachronistic) is not appropriate for the development of the competences that are expected from the students of sciences in the present. Science teaching for current days will benefit from the approach that may be termed the ""new historiography of science"".

Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life

I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy. There are salient aspects of both Kant’s and Cavell’s philosophy that are crucial to understanding perfectionism and, let me call it, perfectionist education, that I wish to emphasize in response to Guyer. In responding to Guyer’s text, I shall do three things. First, I shall explain why I think it is misleading to speak of Cavell’s view that moral perfectionism is involved in a struggle to make oneself intelligible to oneself and others in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral perfection. Rather, I will suggest that the constant work on oneself that is at the core of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a constant work for intelligibility. Second, I shall recall a feature of Cavell’s perfectionism that Guyer does not explicitly speak of: the idea that perfectionism is a theme, “outlook or dimension of thought embodied and developed in a set of texts.” Or, as Cavell goes on to say, “there is a place in mind where good books are in conversation. … [W]hat they often talk about … is how they can be, or sound, so much better than the people that compose them.” This involves what I would call a perfectionist conception of the history of philosophy and the kinds of texts we take to belong to such history. Third, I shall sketch out how the struggle for intelligibility and a perfectionist view of engagement with texts and philosophy can lead to a view of philosophy as a form of education in itself. In concluding these three “criticisms,” I reach a position that I think is quite close to Guyer’s, but with a slightly shifted emphasis on what it means to read Kant and Cavell from a perfectionist point of view.

'In Charge of the Truffula Seeds' : On Children's Literature, Rationality and Children's Voices in Philosophy

In this paper I investigate how philosophy can speak for children and how children can have a voice in philosophy and speak for philosophy. I argue that we should understand children as responsible rational individuals who are involved in their own philosophical inquiries and who can be involved in our own philosophical investigations-not because of their rational abilities, but because we acknowledge them as conversational partners, acknowledge their reasons as reasons, and speak for them as well as let them speak for us and our rational community. In order to argue this I turn, first, to Gareth Matthews' philosophy of childhood and suggest a reconstruction of some of his concepts in line with the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. Second, in order to examine more closely our conceptions of rationality and our pictures of children, I consider the children's books, The Lorax and Where is My Sister? and Henrik Ibsen's play, The Wild Duck.

Dummett and the origins of analytical philosophy

Michael Dummett has argued that the linguistic turn, initiated by Frege, is the decisive moment in the birth of the analytical tradition and what distinguishes that tradition from other movements. The thesis of the paper is that Dummett’s account of the origins of the analytical tradition understates the extent to which Frege’s work, and the linguistic turn more generally, are responses to antinomies in the modern philosophical project. An adequate characterisation of the origins of the analytic tradition presupposes an account of the fundamental conceptual shift that occurred during the time of the scientific revolution and the epistemological problems that arose in conjunction with this shift. This is why it is misleading to assert, with Dummett, that the really interesting developments in terms of understanding the analytical tradition are subsequent to Frege. The most productive contrast in terms of understanding the origins of the analytical tradition is not between pre and post Fregean thought, the paper argues, but between modern and premodern conceptions of philosophy and its relation to the world of everyday experience.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 657 - "The Philosophy of Western Society", "Bericht über die Aktivitäten des Instituts für Sozialforschung für Robert M. MacIver", "Über die Tätigkeit des Instituts für Sozialforschung", "Stipendiaten des Instituts für Sozialforschung: Forschungsberichte", "Research Projects of the International Institut of Social Research" (p. IX 56-IX 59.2)

Über das Forschungsprogramm: The Philosophy of Western Society. Teilstück des allgemeinen Forschungsprogramms, veröffentlicht unter dem Untertitel: "The Philosophy of Social Science", in: "International Institute of Social Research. A Report of Its History, Aims and Activites, 1933-1938", New York (1938?), S. 19, Typoskript mit eigenhändiger Korrektur, 2 Blatt; Bericht über die Aktivitäten des Instituts für Sozialforschung für Robert M. MacIver, 1938-39: 1. Bericht vom 7.12.1939; a) Typoskript, englisch, 9 Blatt; b) Typoskript, als Brief von Pollock an Robert M. MacIver, Typoskript 10 Blatt; c) Entwurf Typoskript, englisch, 15 Blatt; d) Entwurf Typoskript, deutsch, 17 Blatt; MacIver, Robert M.: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Friedrich Pollock, New York, 27.04.1938, 1 Blatt; "Some data on the Institut`s Staff and Activities", 11.03.1938, zwei Typoskripte, je 2 Blatt; Über die Tätigkeiten des Instituts für Sozialforschung. Verschiedene Berichte. 1939; Aufstellung der Forschungsgebiete verschiedener Mitarbeiter des Instituts. Ohne Datum, Typoskript, 9 Blatt; Aufstellung der Forschungsgebiete verschiedener Mitarbeiter des Institutes, aus einem Bericht. Typoskript, 7 Blatt; Bericht an den Präsidenten des Columbia University. Typoskript, 2 Blatt; "Contribution of Dr. Franz Neumann to the Round Table Discussion, Chicago, Social Science Reaserach Building" Dezember 1939; a) Typoskript mit Handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 3 Blatt; b) Typoskript, 3 Blatt; "Statment on the objectives of the International Institut of Social Research". Typoskript, 2 Blatt; Stipendiaten des Instituts für Sozialforschung: Forschungsberichte, Ende 1939; Adorno, Theodor W.: a) Typoskript, englisch, mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 4 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, 3 Blatt; Beck, Maximilian: "Geschichte des Begriffs der Vernunft von Platon bis Husserl (Outline)". Typoskript, englisch und deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 7 Blatt; Flechtheim, Ossip K.: Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 1 Blatt; Fried, Hans Ernest: Typoskript, 1 Blatt, 16.11.1939; Grossmann, Henryk: "Capitalism in the 13th Century"; a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 6 Blatt; b) Typoskript, englisch, 6 Blatt; c) Typoskript, deutsch, 4 Blatt; Grossmann, Henryk: "The Classical Theory and Marxism"; a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; Kirchheimer, Otto: Manuskript, 1 Blatt; Lauterbach, Albert: a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt; Marcuse, Herbert: Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; Neumann, Franz L.: Typoskript, 2 Blatt; Wittfogel, Karl August: Typsokript, 2 Blatt; Zilsel, Edgar: Typoskript, 4 Blatt; Research Projects of the International Institute of Social Research. nicht vor 1939; Beschreibung der Forschungsprojekte: Pollock, Friedrich: "Economic and Social Cosequences of a Prepardness Economy". Neumann, Franz L.: "The Rule of Law". Fromm, Erich: "The German Worker in the Weiman Republic". Kirchheimer,Otto: "Criminal Law and Social Structure". Marcuse, Herbert: " A Text and Source Book for the History of Philosophy". Fromm, Erich: "Character Structure of Modern Man". Neumann, Franz L.: "The Theory and Practice of European Labor Law". Wittfogel, Karl August; Wittfogel-Lang, Olga: "The Chinese Family"; Dasselbe wie in "Beschreibung der Forschungsprojekte", ausgenommen Pollock, Friedrich: "Economic and Social Cosquences of a Prepardness Economy" und Fromm, Erich: "The German Worker in the Weimar Republic", zusätzlich Kirchner, Otto; Weil, Felix: "Changes in Social Stratification, National Income, and Living Standards of Germany since 1933"; 1 Ordner, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 49 Blatt;

A synopsis of naturall philosophy according to the method of the ancients, but improved & augmented with the notions of later philosophers : manuscript, 1677-1679

Possibly autograph, dated at end of volume: Finitu[m] mart: 14, 1678/9. Imperfect copy with title page missing; supplied from a MS copy, dated 29 March 1680, now in the Bodleian Library.

Philosophy of reality. Should it be favored by America?

"This little work embraces the article I read at the great exhibition at Chicago on 'Reality: what place it should hold in philosophy'. It also contains my little work, 'The prevailing types of philosophy: can they logically reach reality?'"--Pref.

The state of history and the empire of metaphysics [Review]

One of the curious things about this challenging book is that its ostensible subject— the Saxon medical and political scientist Hermann Conring (1606–1681)— is not mentioned in the title. Constantin Fasolt argues that we cannot know what Conring really thought or meant in his writings, which means that his topic cannot be Conring as such and must instead be that which occludes our knowledge of him, the titular limits of history. Given that we do in fact learn a good deal about Conring from Fasolt’s book, we can only hope that the decapitation of its subject will be rectified in a subsequent edition, or perhaps by the restorative work of librarians putting together subject headings. And yet Fasolt’s decision is understandable, for Conring is indeed a stalking-horse for a much bigger quarry: historiography and the historical consciousness. By “history” Fasolt understands a way of imposing intelligibility on the world, which is founded on the twin assumptions that the past is gone and unchangeable, and that the meaning of texts can be determined by placing them in their historical contexts (ix). In challenging this mode of intelligibility, Fasolt is not attempting to improve professiona history—it’s already as good as it can be—but to displace it. He regards his work as a declaration of “independence from historical consciousness” (32). At the same time, Fasolt insists that he is not simply jumping from historiography to philosophy, or attempting to preempt history with ontology (37-39). That has been tried by Nietzsche and Heidegger, who have been tainted by Nazism (Fasolt thinks unfairly). It has also been attempted by modern philosophers from Gadamer to Foucault and Charles Taylor who, in failing to address the “violence” that its mode of intelligibility does to the world, have not succeeded in outflanking history. Perhaps, Fasolt wonders, it is only the personal experience of those who have been subject to this violence—the experience of those who have been subject to historical examination—that can break the spell of history. Fasolt’s disclaimer notwithstanding, in the course of these remarks I shall argue that he is indeed jumping from history to philosophy, or attempting to outflank history by subjecting it to a particular metaphysical understanding. I shall do so in part by sketching the recent intellectual history of this move—a historical examination that I hope inflicts as little violence as possible on Fasolt’s argument.

A brief philosophical examination of ADHD

Concerns have been raised over ADHD from within a range of different disciplines, concerns which are not only voiced from within the hard sciences themselves, but also from within the social sciences. This paper will add the discipline of philosophy to that number, arguing that an analysis of two traditionally philosophical topics - namely "truth" and "free-will" - allows us a new and unsettling perspective on conduct disorders like ADHD. More specifically, it will be argued that ADHD not only fails to meet its own ontological and epistemological standards as an 'objective' pathology, but it also constitutes one more element in what has already become a significant undermining of a crucial component of social life: moral responsibility.