An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

What drives invasibility? A multi-model inference test and spatial modelling of alien plant species richness patterns in northern Portugal

Understanding and anticipating biological invasions can focus either on traits that favour species invasiveness or on features of the receiving communities, habitats or landscapes that promote their invasibility. Here, we address invasibility at the regional scale, testing whether some habitats and landscapes are more invasible than others by fitting models that relate alien plant species richness to various environmental predictors. We use a multi-model information-theoretic approach to assess invasibility by modelling spatial and ecological patterns of alien invasion in landscape mosaics and testing competing hypotheses of environmental factors that may control invasibility. Because invasibility may be mediated by particular characteristics of invasiveness, we classified alien species according to their C-S-R plant strategies. We illustrate this approach with a set of 86 alien species in Northern Portugal. We first focus on predictors influencing species richness and expressing invasibility and then evaluate whether distinct plant strategies respond to the same or different groups of environmental predictors. We confirmed climate as a primary determinant of alien invasions and as a primary environmental gradient determining landscape invasibility. The effects of secondary gradients were detected only when the area was sub-sampled according to predictions based on the primary gradient. Then, multiple predictor types influenced patterns of alien species richness, with some types (landscape composition, topography and fire regime) prevailing over others. Alien species richness responded most strongly to extreme land management regimes, suggesting that intermediate disturbance induces biotic resistance by favouring native species richness. Land-use intensification facilitated alien invasion, whereas conservation areas hosted few invaders, highlighting the importance of ecosystem stability in preventing invasions. Plants with different strategies exhibited different responses to environmental gradients, particularly when the variations of the primary gradient were narrowed by sub-sampling. Such differential responses of plant strategies suggest using distinct control and eradication approaches for different areas and alien plant groups.

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

Model development for capercaillie (Tetrao urogallus) habitat in the Jura Mountains (Western Switzerland)

Capercaillie, Tetrao urogallus, is a threatened species in central Europe, and Swiss populations declined 40 to 50 % between 1970 and 1985. Capercaillie are sensitive to forest structure, and loss of habitat is a major cause of their decline. Knowledge of habitat characteristics is therefore essential for capercaillie conservation. Here, we present models predicting capercaillie probability of occurrence, based on relevant structural habitat variables. Models were built using multiple logistic regression analyses on capercaillie presence/absence data. Vegetation survey was carried out in July 1999 in a 170-km2 forested area (Jura mountains, canton de Vaud, western Switzerland) inhabited by capercaillie and presence/absence of the species was assessed according to dropping presence/absence. The survey was based on 10-m-radius sample plots each in a 1-km2 forest patch (n = 76 with capercaillie droppings, n = 80 without). A first model included seven out of 27 measured habitat variables and a second model only four. The latter model best represents practical needs. It includes three variables which had a negative impact on capercaillie presence: tree and shrub covers and spruce, Picea excelsa, shrub cover, and one which had a positive effect: bilberry, Vaccinium myrtillus, cover, highlighting that capaercaillie selected open forest with high bilberry abundance. The model can be used to map potential capercaillie habitat distribution and to manage the habitat in favour of capercaillie (protection and adapted forestry practices) in the Swiss Jura mountains.

Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.

Advertising in Mobile Games - A Business Model Evaluation

Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää kuinka houkuttelevan liiketoimintamahdollisuuden mobiilipelit tarjoavat mainostusalustana. Tutkimus suoritettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tutkimus aloitettiin määrittelemällä liiketoimintamalli, jonka jälkeen suoritettiin yleinen katsaus Suomen mobiilipelimarkkinoille. Tämän jälkeen arvoketju-, arvoverkko- sekä markkina-analyysin avulla selvitettiin liiketoimintamallin mahdollisuudet sekä rajoitukset. Tutkimukseen käytettiinteorettista viitekehystä joka pohjautui Hamelin liiketoimintamalliin, Porterin arvoketjuun sekä Alleenin arvoverkoon. Tutkimuksen tuloksena todettiin, että mainostaminen mobiilipeleissä tarjoaa liiketoimintamahdollisuuden ilman esteitä sentoteuttamiselle. Suomalaiset mobiilipelimarkkinat ovat kuitenkin pirstoutuneet,minkä johdosta tutkittu 'mainosten hallinta-alusta'-liiketoimintamalli aiheuttaa liian suuret integraatiokustannukset. Myös suuri määrä pelitoimittajia heikentää mallin tehokkuutta.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

Mobile E-commerce business model – A value web based approach to business models in mobile gaming industry

Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tutkia langattomien internet palveluiden arvoverkkoa ja liiketoimintamalleja. Tutkimus oli luonteeltaan kvalitatiivinen ja siinä käytettiin strategiana konstruktiivista case-tutkimusta. Esimerkkipalveluna oli Treasure Hunters matkapuhelinpeli. Tutkimus muodostui teoreettisesta ja empiirisestä osasta. Teoriaosassa liitettiin innovaatio, liiketoimintamallit ja arvoverkko käsitteellisesti toisiinsa, sekä luotiin perusta liiketoimintamallien kehittämiselle. Empiirisessä osassa keskityttiin ensin liiketoimintamallien luomiseen kehitettyjen innovaatioiden pohjalta. Lopuksi pyrittiin määrittämään arvoverkko palvelun toteuttamiseksi. Tutkimusmenetelminä käytettiin innovaatiosessiota, haastatteluja ja lomakekyselyä. Tulosten pohjalta muodostettiin useita liiketoimintakonsepteja sekä kuvaus arvoverkon perusmallista langattomille peleille. Loppupäätelmänä todettiin että langattomat palvelut vaativat toteutuakseen useista toimijoista koostuvan arvoverkon.

A model for the evolution of reinforcement learning in fluctuating games

Many species are able to learn to associate behaviours with rewards as this gives fitness advantages in changing environments. Social interactions between population members may, however, require more cognitive abilities than simple trial-and-error learning, in particular the capacity to make accurate hypotheses about the material payoff consequences of alternative action combinations. It is unclear in this context whether natural selection necessarily favours individuals to use information about payoffs associated with nontried actions (hypothetical payoffs), as opposed to simple reinforcement of realized payoff. Here, we develop an evolutionary model in which individuals are genetically determined to use either trial-and-error learning or learning based on hypothetical reinforcements, and ask what is the evolutionarily stable learning rule under pairwise symmetric two-action stochastic repeated games played over the individual's lifetime. We analyse through stochastic approximation theory and simulations the learning dynamics on the behavioural timescale, and derive conditions where trial-and-error learning outcompetes hypothetical reinforcement learning on the evolutionary timescale. This occurs in particular under repeated cooperative interactions with the same partner. By contrast, we find that hypothetical reinforcement learners tend to be favoured under random interactions, but stable polymorphisms can also obtain where trial-and-error learners are maintained at a low frequency. We conclude that specific game structures can select for trial-and-error learning even in the absence of costs of cognition, which illustrates that cost-free increased cognition can be counterselected under social interactions.