ANÁLISE DAS MUDANÇAS DOS FATORES DETERMINANTES DA ESTRUTURA DE CAPITAL EM FUNÇÃO DO CICLO DE VIDA DAS EMPRESAS BRASILEIRAS SÃO BERNARDO DO CAMPO

As várias teorias acerca da estrutura de capital despertam interesse motivando diversos estudos sobre o assunto sem, no entanto, ter um consenso. Outro tema aparentemente pouco explorado refere-se ao ciclo de vida das empresas e como ele pode influenciar a estrutura de capital. Este estudo teve como objetivo verificar quais determinantes possuem maior relevância no endividamento das empresas e se estes determinantes alteram-se dependendo do ciclo de vida da empresa apoiada pelas teorias Trade Off, Pecking Order e Teoria da Agência. Para alcançar o objetivo deste trabalho foi utilizado análise em painel de efeito fixo sendo a amostra composta por empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, com dados secundários disponíveis na Economática® no período de 2005 a 2013, utilizando-se os setores da BM&FBOVESPA. Como resultado principal destaca-se o mesmo comportamento entre a amostra geral, alto e baixo crescimento pelo endividamento contábil para o determinante Lucratividade apresentando uma relação negativa, e para os determinantes Oportunidade de Crescimento e Tamanho, estes com uma relação positiva. Para os grupos de alto e baixo crescimento alguns determinantes apresentaram resultados diferentes, como a singularidade que resultou significância nestes dois grupos, sendo positiva no baixo crescimento e negativa no alto crescimento, para o valor colateral dos ativos e benefício fiscal não dívida apresentaram significância apenas no grupo de baixo crescimento. Para o endividamento a valor de mercado foi observado significância para o Benefício fiscal não dívida e Singularidade. Este resultado reforça o argumento de que o ciclo de vida influência a estrutura de capital

Estimating additionality and leverage:between public and private sector equity finance in Ireland (2000 – 2002)

This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the role of the public sector in stimulating greater use of private sector equity for business start-up and growth in two ways. First, to examine the extent to which the provision of public sector equity finance enables individual firms to raise additional funds in the private sector market place. Second, to consider the methodological implications for an economic impact assessment of industrial policy interventions (especially those which include an equity component) at the level of the individual firm. We assess the extent to which there may be indirect positive effects (externalities) associated with public sector financial assistance to individual firms and if so how they distort standard evaluation methodologies designed to estimate the level of additionality of that support. The paper draws upon the results of a recent study of the impact of Enterprise Ireland (EI) financial assistance to indigenous Irish industry in the period 2000 to 2002. The paper demonstrates that a process of re-calibration is necessary in estimates of economic impact in order to account for these positive externalities and the result in this study was a ‘boost’ to additionality. In operational and conceptual terms, the study underlines the importance of the relationship between private and public sector sources of equity finance as an important dynamic in the attempt by industrial and regional policy to stimulate the number of firms with viable investment proposals accessing external equity finance.

Capital markets and the market structure of foreign investments

Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct ownership. Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital component of the multinational’s competitive market structure. Moreover, multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets. They can also mitigate higher levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial risk to creditors in the host economy. Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their equity to foreign market risk. Multinationals can modify the profit maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 countries.We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by modifying their capital structure and debt maturity. Further, we show how the operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or profit maximization. We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good asset utilization.

Why are aggregate equity payouts pro-cyclical?

We use two general equilibrium models to explain why changes in the external economic environment result in pro-cyclical aggregate dividend payout behavior. Both models that we consider endogenize low elasticity of investment. The first model incorporates capital adjustment costs, while the second one assumes that risk-averse managers maximize their own objective function rather than shareholder wealth. We show that, while both models generate pro-cyclical aggregate dividends, a feature consistent with the observed business-cycle pattern of payouts from well-diversified portfolios, the second model provides a more likely explanation for this effect. Our findings emphasize the importance of incorporating agency conflicts when considering the relationship between the external economic environment and the financial behavior of businesses.

Formalization of the informal venture capital market - Business angel networks and syndicates

Business angels are natural persons who provide equity financing for young enterprises and gain ownership in them. They are usually anonym investors and they operate in the background of the companies. Their important feature is that over the funding of the enterprises based on their business experiences they can contribute to the success of the companies with their special expertise and with strategic support. As a result of the asymmetric information between the angels and the companies their matching is difficult (Becsky-Nagy – Fazekas 2015), and the fact, that angel investors prefer anonymity makes it harder for entrepreneurs to obtain informal venture capital. The primary aim of the different type of business angel organizations and networks is to alleviate this matching process with intermediation between the two parties. The role of these organizations is increasing in the informal venture capital market compared to the individually operating angels. The recognition of their economic importance led many governments to support them. There were also public initiations that aimed the establishment of these intermediary organizations that led to the institutionalization of business angels. This study via the characterization of business angels focuses on the progress of these informational intermediaries and their ways of development with regards to the international trends and the current situation of Hungarian business angels and angel networks.

Estimation of global beta and tests of capital asset pricing models

With the rapid globalization and integration of world capital markets, more and more stocks are listed in multiple markets. With multi-listed stocks, the traditional measurement of systematic risk, the domestic beta, is not appropriate since it only contain information from one market. ^ Prakash et al. (1993) developed a technique, the global beta, to capture information from multiple markets wherein the stocks are listed. In this study, the global betas are obtained as well as domestic betas for 704 multi-listed stocks from 59 world equity markets. Welch tests show that domestic betas are not equal across markets, therefore, global beta is more appropriate in a global investment setting. ^ The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM) is also tested with regards to both domestic beta and global beta. The results generally support the positive relationship between stocks returns and global beta while tend to reject this relationship between stocks returns and domestic beta. Further tests of International CAPM with domestic beta and global beta strengthen the conclusion.^

Who Financed the Expansion of the Equity Market? Shareholder Clienteles in Victorian Britain

Who financed the great expansion of the Victorian equity market, and what attracted them to invest? Using data on 453 firm-years and over 172,000 shareholders, we find that the largest providers of capital were rentiers, men with no formal occupation who relied on investment income. We also see a substantial growth in women investors as time progressed. In terms of clientele effects, we find that rentiers invested in large firms, whilst businessmen were the venture capitalists of young, regional enterprises. Women and the middle classes preferred safe investments, whilst financiers and institutional investors were speculators in foreign companies. Our results may help to explain the growth of new types of assets catering for particular clienteles, and the development of managerial policies on dividends and share issues. 

Capital 2.0 capital formation and legal risk in a new global economic order from fiat to exit: including case studies of the proposed transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the United States and the European Union and the financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation. Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on to explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial production. Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality. Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible. Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions. In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order. Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.

Increased water charges improve efficiency and equity in an irrigation system

Conventional wisdom in many agricultural systems across the world is that farmers cannot, will not, or should not pay the full costs associated with surface water delivery. Across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only a handful can claim complete recovery of operation, maintenance, and capital costs; across Central and South Asia, fees are lower still, with farmers in Nepal, India, and Kazakhstan paying fractions of a U.S. penny for a cubic meter of water. In Pakistan, fees amount to roughly USD 1-2 per acre per season. However, farmers in Pakistan spend orders of magnitude more for diesel fuel to pump groundwater each season, suggesting a latent willingness to spend for water that, under the right conditions, could potentially be directed toward water-use fees for surface water supply. Although overall performance could be expected to improve with greater cost recovery, asymmetric access to water in canal irrigation systems leaves the question open as to whether those benefits would be equitably shared among all farmers in the system. We develop an agent-based model (ABM) of a small irrigation command to examine efficiency and equity outcomes across a range of different cost structures for the maintenance of the system, levels of market development, and assessed water charges. We find that, robust to a range of different cost and structural conditions, increased water charges lead to gains in both efficiency and concomitant improvements in equity as investments in canal infrastructure and system maintenance improve the conveyance of water resources further down watercourses. This suggests that, under conditions in which (1) farmers are currently spending money to pump groundwater to compensate for a failing surface water system, and (2) there is the possibility that through initial investment to provide perceptibly better water supply, genuine win-win solutions can be attained through higher water-use fees to beneficiary farmers.

THE COSTS OF RAISING EQUITY RATIO FOR BANKS Evidence from publicly listed banks operating in Finland

The solvency rate of banks differs from the other corporations. The equity rate of a bank is lower than it is in corporations of other field of business. However, functional banking industry has huge impact on the whole society. The equity rate of a bank needs to be higher because that makes the banking industry more stable as the probability of the banks going under will decrease. If a bank goes belly up, the government will be compensating the deposits since it has granted the bank’s depositors a deposit insurance. This means that the payment comes from the tax payers in the last resort. Economic conversation has long concentrated on the costs of raising equity ratio. It has been a common belief that raising equity ratio also increases the banks’ funding costs in the same phase and these costs will be redistributed to the banks customers as higher service charges. Regardless of the common belief, the actual reaction of the funding costs to the higher equity ratio has been studied only a little in Europe and no study has been constructed in Finland. Before it can be calculated whether the higher stability of the banking industry that is caused by the raise in equity levels compensates the extra costs in funding costs, it must be calculated how much the actual increase in the funding costs is. Currently the banking industry is controlled by complex and heavy regulation. To maintain such a complex system inflicts major costs in itself. This research leans on the Modigliani and Miller theory, which shows that the finance structure of a firm is irrelevant to their funding costs. In addition, this research follows the calculations of Miller, Yang ja Marcheggianon (2012) and Vale (2011) where they calculate the funding costs after the doubling of specific banks’ equity ratios. The Finnish banks studied in this research are Nordea and Danske Bank because they are the two largest banks operating in Finland and they both also have the right company form to able the calculations. To calculate the costs of halving their leverages this study used the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The halving of the leverage of Danske Bank raised its funding costs for 16—257 basis points depending on the method of assessment. For Nordea the increase in funding costs was 11—186 basis points when its leverage was halved. On the behalf of the results found in this study it can be said that the doubling of an equity ratio does not increase the funding costs of a bank one by one. Actually the increase is quite modest. More solvent banks would increase the stability of the banking industry enormously while the increase in funding costs is low. If the costs of bank regulation exceeds the increase in funding costs after the higher equity ratio, it can be thought that this is the better way of stabilizing the banking industry rather than heavy regulation.

Capital structure of Finnish firms – Estimating the effects of firm characteristics on capital structure

One of the most disputable matters in the theory of finance has been the theory of capital structure. The seminal contributions of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) gave rise to a multitude of studies and debates. Since the initial spark, the financial literature has offered two competing theories of financing decision: the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. The trade-off theory suggests that firms have an optimal capital structure balancing the benefits and costs of debt. The pecking order theory approaches the firm capital structure from information asymmetry perspective and assumes a hierarchy of financing, with firms using first internal funds, followed by debt and as a last resort equity. This thesis analyses the trade-off and pecking order theories and their predictions on a panel data consisting 78 Finnish firms listed on the OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Estimations are performed for the period 2003–2012. The data is collected from Datastream system and consists of financial statement data. A number of capital structure characteristics are identified: firm size, profitability, firm growth opportunities, risk, asset tangibility and taxes, speed of adjustment and financial deficit. A regression analysis is used to examine the effects of the firm characteristics on capitals structure. The regression models were formed based on the relevant theories. The general capital structure model is estimated with fixed effects estimator. Additionally, dynamic models play an important role in several areas of corporate finance, but with the combination of fixed effects and lagged dependent variables the model estimation is more complicated. A dynamic partial adjustment model is estimated using Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differencing generalized method of moments, the ordinary least squares and fixed effects estimators. The results for Finnish listed firms show support for the predictions of profitability, firm size and non-debt tax shields. However, no conclusive support for the pecking-order theory is found. However, the effect of pecking order cannot be fully ignored and it is concluded that instead of being substitutes the trade-off and pecking order theory appear to complement each other. For the partial adjustment model the results show that Finnish listed firms adjust towards their target capital structure with a speed of 29% a year using book debt ratio.

THE COSTS OF RAISING EQUITY RATIO FOR BANKS Evidence from publicly listed banks operating in Finland

The solvency rate of banks differs from the other corporations. The equity rate of a bank is lower than it is in corporations of other field of business. However, functional banking industry has huge impact on the whole society. The equity rate of a bank needs to be higher because that makes the banking industry more stable as the probability of the banks going under will decrease. If a bank goes belly up, the government will be compensating the deposits since it has granted the bank’s depositors a deposit insurance. This means that the payment comes from the tax payers in the last resort. Economic conversation has long concentrated on the costs of raising equity ratio. It has been a common belief that raising equity ratio also increases the banks’ funding costs in the same phase and these costs will be redistributed to the banks customers as higher service charges. Regardless of the common belief, the actual reaction of the funding costs to the higher equity ratio has been studied only a little in Europe and no study has been constructed in Finland. Before it can be calculated whether the higher stability of the banking industry that is caused by the raise in equity levels compensates the extra costs in funding costs, it must be calculated how much the actual increase in the funding costs is. Currently the banking industry is controlled by complex and heavy regulation. To maintain such a complex system inflicts major costs in itself. This research leans on the Modigliani and Miller theory, which shows that the finance structure of a firm is irrelevant to their funding costs. In addition, this research follows the calculations of Miller, Yang ja Marcheggianon (2012) and Vale (2011) where they calculate the funding costs after the doubling of specific banks’ equity ratios. The Finnish banks studied in this research are Nordea and Danske Bank because they are the two largest banks operating in Finland and they both also have the right company form to able the calculations. To calculate the costs of halving their leverages this study used the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The halving of the leverage of Danske Bank raised its funding costs for 16—257 basis points depending on the method of assessment. For Nordea the increase in funding costs was 11—186 basis points when its leverage was halved. On the behalf of the results found in this study it can be said that the doubling of an equity ratio does not increase the funding costs of a bank one by one. Actually the increase is quite modest. More solvent banks would increase the stability of the banking industry enormously while the increase in funding costs is low. If the costs of bank regulation exceeds the increase in funding costs after the higher equity ratio, it can be thought that this is the better way of stabilizing the banking industry rather than heavy regulation.

Corporate governance and cost of capital: evidence from Pakistani listed firms

This thesis investigates the effectiveness of Corporate Governance (CG) reforms in Pakistan. Using a sample of 160 Pakistani firms from 2003 to 2013 and governance data collected manually from the annual reports, this thesis investigates seven closely related and important corporate issues that are related to the compliance of governance rules. Specifically, it aims to : (i) investigate the degree of CG compliance with 2002 Pakistani Code of CG (PCCG); (ii) determine whether the introduction of 2002 PCCG has improved Pakistani CG practices; (iii) investigate the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure for Pakistani listed firms; (iv) test the nexus between CG compliance with the 2002 PCCG and firms’ cost of capital (COC); (v) investigate the impact of different individual CG mechanisms on listed firms COC; (vi) examine how different ownership structures impact on firms’ COC; and (vii) analyse relationship between CG structures and Cost of Equity (COE) as well as Cost of Debt (COD) for Pakistani listed firms. These empirical investigations report some important results. First, the reported findings suggest that Pakistani firms have responded positively to governance disclosure requirements over the eleven year period from 2003 to 2013. The results also show that the introduction of the PCCG in 2002 has improved CG standards by Pakistani listed firms. Second, the reported results related to the determinants of CG compliance demonstrate that significant and positive association between institutional, government and foreign ownership with CG compliance. However, findings relating to the determinants of CG compliance show a negative and significant association between board size and block ownership with CG compliance and disclosure. The study finds no significant relationship between director ownership, audit firm size and the presence of female board members with the constructed Pakistan Corporate Governance Index (PCGI). Third, the investigation on the relationship between CG and COC report a significantly negative nexus between PCGI and firms’ COC. The investigation on the association between ownership structures and COC report a negative and significant nexus between block ownership with firms’ COC. Further, a number of robustness analyses performed in this study suggest that the empirical results reported in this study are generally robust to the alternative CG variables, alternative COC variables and potential endogeneity problems.

Capital structure and dividends : evidence from Portugal (2003-2014)

Mestrado em Finanças

Relevance or irrelevance of capital structure?

In this paper we examine the effects of asymmetric information on the nature of financial equilibrium and on the capital structure of firms. In the first model presented, the financial contracts on offer involve pooling equilibrium with no adverse selection. However, in the special case analyzed, where contracts are of mixed form, there may be a separating equilibrium and also equilibrium may not exist. Interesting result is that the separating equilibrium found is not economically efficient since aggregate investments falls short of first-best level. More importantly, capital structure does matter. The relative magnitude of outside equity makes a real difference to the quantity of aggregate investment in equilibrium.