Arbitrage-Based Pricing when Volatility is Stochastic.

The paper investigates the pricing of derivative securities with calendar-time maturities.

Asset Pricing in a Production Economy with Chew–Dekel Preferences

In this paper we provide a thorough characterization of the asset returns implied by a simple general equilibrium production economy with Chew–Dekel risk preferences and convex capital adjustment costs. When households display levels of disappointment aversion consistent with the experimental evidence, a version of the model parameterized to match the volatility of output and consumption growth generates unconditional expected asset returns and price of risk in line with the historical data. For the model with Epstein–Zin preferences to generate similar statistics, the relative risk aversion coefficient needs to be about 55, two orders of magnitude higher than the available estimates. We argue that this is not surprising, given the limited risk imposed on agents by a reasonably calibrated stochastic growth model.

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

Network pricing problems : complexity, polyhedral study and solution approaches

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Three essays in empirical asset pricing

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

An analysis on the network access pricing rules

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities

In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments - including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms - satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB)procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in NYC.

House allocation via deferred-acceptance

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, where at most one copy of each object is available, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. For house allocation we show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. These choice functions are used by objects to reject agents in the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. Therefore, in the general model resource-monotonicity is the «stronger» comparative statics requirement because it characterizes (together with our basic requirements and strategy-proofness) choice-based DA-mechanisms whereas population-monotonicity (together with our basic properties and strategy-proofness) does not.

A Dream Deferred

Presentation at the MLK Annual Unity Breakfast, Boston College, January 19, 2005.

Arbitrage Pricing Theory and Return Generating Process: A Macroeconomic Approach to Indian Stock Market

A study focusing on the identification of return generating factors and to the extent of their influence on share prices the outcome will be a tool for investment analysis in the hands of investors portfolio managers and mutual funds who are mostly concerned with changing share prices. Since the study takes into account the influence of macroeconomic variables on variations in share returns by using the outcome the government can frame out suitable policies on long term basis and that will help in nurturing a healthy economy and resultant stock market. As every company management tries to maximize the wealth of the share holders a clear idea about the return generating variables and their influence will help the management to frame various policies to maximize the wealth of the shareholders.

A Nonparametric Approach to Pricing and Hedging Derivative Securities via Learning Networks

We propose a nonparametric method for estimating derivative financial asset pricing formulae using learning networks. To demonstrate feasibility, we first simulate Black-Scholes option prices and show that learning networks can recover the Black-Scholes formula from a two-year training set of daily options prices, and that the resulting network formula can be used successfully to both price and delta-hedge options out-of-sample. For comparison, we estimate models using four popular methods: ordinary least squares, radial basis functions, multilayer perceptrons, and projection pursuit. To illustrate practical relevance, we also apply our approach to S&P 500 futures options data from 1987 to 1991.

Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies with Random Demand and Fixed Ordering Cost: The Finite Horizon Case

We analyze a finite horizon, single product, periodic review model in which pricing and production/inventory decisions are made simultaneously. Demands in different periods are random variables that are independent of each other and their distributions depend on the product price. Pricing and ordering decisions are made at the beginning of each period and all shortages are backlogged. Ordering cost includes both a fixed cost and a variable cost proportional to the amount ordered. The objective is to find an inventory policy and a pricing strategy maximizing expected profit over the finite horizon. We show that when the demand model is additive, the profit-to-go functions are k-concave and hence an (s,S,p) policy is optimal. In such a policy, the period inventory is managed based on the classical (s,S) policy and price is determined based on the inventory position at the beginning of each period. For more general demand functions, i.e., multiplicative plus additive functions, we demonstrate that the profit-to-go function is not necessarily k-concave and an (s,S,p) policy is not necessarily optimal. We introduce a new concept, the symmetric k-concave functions and apply it to provide a characterization of the optimal policy.