Audit report of the Schedule of Debt Service and Coverage for Iowa State University of Science and Technology for the Dormitory Revenue Refunding Bonds for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report of the Schedule of Debt Service and Coverage for Iowa State University of Science and Technology for the Dormitory Revenue Refunding Bonds for the year ended June 30, 2012

Consumer Advisory: Cell Phone Contracts, January 2014

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Cell Phone Contracts

International debt deleveraging

I provide a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of financiallyintegrated countries. During an episode of international deleveraging world consumptiondemand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save.If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can depreciate their nominalexchange rate to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associatedwith debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union thischannel of adjustment is shut off, and therefore the falls in consumption demand and inthe world interest rate are amplified. Hence, monetary unions are especially prone tohit the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and enter a liquidity trap duringdeleveraging. In a liquidity trap deleveraging gives rise to a union-wide recession, which isparticularly severe in high-debt countries. The model suggests several policy interventionsthat mitigate the negative impact of deleveraging on output in monetary unions.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

Consumer Advisory: Debt Collections & Debt Collection Scams, February 2015

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Tax Time Scams & Tips

Issue review : court debt collection.

This issue review provides background regarding the collection of outstanding court debt and highlights changes made in Senate File 2428, Delinquent Debt Collection Act, beginning in fiscal year 2009.

Audit report of Debt Service and Coverage for Iowa State University of Science and Technology as of June 30, 2014

Audit report of Debt Service and Coverage for Iowa State University of Science and Technology as of June 30, 2014

Causality and Contagion in EMU Sovereign Debt Markets

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger causality approach and endogenous breakpoint test to offer an operational definition of contagion to examine European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary union is used. The main results suggest that the 41 new causality patterns, which appeared for the first time in the crisis period, and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, provide clear evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Balancing knowledge sharing and protection in collaborative innovation - The roles and dynamics of contracts, IPR's and trust

Pro-gradu tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia, miten yritykset tasapainoilevat tiedon jakamisen ja suojaamisen välillä innovaatioyhteistyöprojekteissa, ja miten sopimukset, immateriaalioikeudet ja luottamus voivat vaikuttaa tähän tasapainoon. Yhteistyössä yritysten täytyy jakaa tarpeellista tietoa kumppanilleen, mutta toisaalta niiden täytyy varoa, etteivät ne menetä ydinosaamiseensa kuuluvaa tietoa ja kilpailuetuaan. Yrityksillä on useita keinoja tietovuodon estämiseen. Tutkielmassa keskitytään patenttien, sopimusten ja liikesalaisuuksien käyttöön tietoa suojaavina mekanismeina. Kyseiset suojamekanismit vaikuttavat luottamukseen kumppaneiden välillä, ja täten myös näiden halukkuuteen jakaa tietoa kumppaneilleen. Jos kumppanit eivät jaa tarpeeksi tietoa toisilleen, voi yhteistyö epäonnistua. Sopimusten, immateriaalioikeuksien ja luottamuksen rooleja ja vuorovaikutusta tutkitaan kahdenvälisissä yhteistyöprojekteissa. Tutkielmassa esitellään neljä case-esimerkkiä, jotka on koottu suomalaisen metsätoimialan yrityksen haastatteluista.

EMU sovereign debt market crisis: Fundamentals-based or pure contagion?

We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Grangercausality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.

EMU sovereign debt market crisis: Fundamentals-based or pure contagion?

We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of Grangercausality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.

Causality and Contagion in EMU Sovereign Debt Markets

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger causality approach and endogenous breakpoint test to offer an operational definition of contagion to examine European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary union is used. The main results suggest that the 41 new causality patterns, which appeared for the first time in the crisis period, and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, provide clear evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis.