Midwest Regional Rail Passenger Initiative Status Report December 2006

This report is submitted as required per Code of Iowa section 327J.3(5), "The director shall report annually to the general assembly concerning the development and operation of the midwest regional rail system and the state's passenger rail service." The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) is a nine-state effort to develop an implementation plan for a 3,000-mile, high-speed rail system hubbed in Chicago. Studies done since 1996 have concluded that such a regional system, including a line from Chicago to Omaha through Davenport, Iowa City and Des Moines, is viable. Most of the system would be upgraded to allow 110 mile-per-hour service. Some low volume lines, including the Iowa portions, would be upgraded for 79 mile-per-hour service. The nine-state coalition released an updated 2004 executive report for the system. As reported, the updated cost estimate for the Chicago to Omaha corridor, which includes a branch to Quincy, Ill., is $638 million for infrastructure and $167 million for rolling stock. These costs are higher than first estimated in 1998 and are given in 2002 dollars, (not adjusted for the cost of inflation). Operating subsidies would be required during an extended start-up phase. The allocation of these subsidy costs among the various states has not been determined, and is still a subject for analysis and negotiation. Little progress on implementation is expected unless a federal funding package is passed for passenger rail initiatives. Continued congressional discussion on policy directions relative to Amtrak clouds the issue of passenger rail funding. However, Congress is expected to address passenger rail issues and funding in 2007. Participation of the Iowa Department of Transportation in the MWRRI is authorized under Iowa Code section 327J.3.

Campaign effects in direct-democratic votes in Switzerland

The purpose of this article is to analyse the conditions under which referendum campaigns have an impact on voting choices. Based on a model of opinion formation that integrates both campaign effects and partisan effects, we argue that campaign effects vary according to the context of the popular vote (size and type of conflict among the party elite and intensity and direction of the referendum campaign). We test our hypotheses with two-step estimations for hierarchical models on data covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration policy in Switzerland. Our results show strong campaign effects and they suggest that their strength and nature are indeed highly conditional on the context of the vote: the type of party coalition pre-structures the patterns of individual voting choices, campaign effects are higher when the campaign is highly intense and they are more symmetric when it is balanced.

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Coparenting and Toddler's Interactive Styles in Family Coalitions

The current study examined the coparenting and toddler's interactive styles in family coalitions. According to structural family theory, boundaries between generations are clear in alliances, but disturbed in coalitions: the parents look to the child to regulate their conflictual relationship and the child attempts to meet this need. In a normative sample studied longitudinally during the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation (LTP, N=38), 15 coalition cases were detected. Styles of coparenting and of child's interactions were determined and compared in coalition and alliance cases at 18 months. Findings confirm the structural family model by showing the specific ways in which the coparenting and the toddler's interactive styles are associated in 3 different patterns of coalitions: binding, detouring, and triangulation. They illustrate how the child's triangular capacity, or her ability to simultaneously communicate with both parents, is used to regulate the parents' relationship. They suggest that the LTP observational paradigm is a promising assessment method of early family interactions. They point to the importance of assessing early the child's contribution to family coalitions.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, wheresubsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential:First the alliance fights it out with the rest and in case they win later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, wefind that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form analliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios:equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinityof preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that thecommonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.

Modernien puolueiden kertomukset : kokoomuslaisten ja sosiaalidemokraattien puoluekäsitykset 1960-1970-luvuilla kertomusnäkökulmasta

Abstract: The political conceptions of the National Coalition Party (conservatives) and the Social Democratic Party in Finland in 1960-1970 with the manner of narrating stories

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

A two-level analysis of the determinants of direct democratic choices in European, immigration and foreign policy in Switzerland

This article employs a unique data set - covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration/asylum policy held between 1992 and 2006 in Switzerland - in order to examine the conditional impact of context upon utilitarian, cultural, political and cognitive determinants of individual attitudes toward international openness. Our results reveal clear patterns of cross-level interactions between individual determinants and the project-related context of the vote. Thus, although party cues and political competence have a strong impact on individuals' support for international openness, this impact is substantially mediated by the type of coalition that is operating within the party elite. Similarly, subjective utilitarian and cultural considerations influence the voters' decision in interaction with the content of the proposal submitted to the voters as well as with the framing of the voting campaign.

Suomalainen oikeisto ja "kansankoti" : Kansallisen kokoomuksen suhtautuminen pohjoismaiseen hyvinvointivaltiomalliin jälleenrakennuskaudelta konsensusajan alkuun

Väitöskirja, Turun yliopisto