Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Assinatura Digital Foco Smart Card

A assinatura digital é um processo de assinatura electrónica baseado no sistema criptográfico assimétrico composto por um algoritmo ou série de algoritmos, mediante o qual é gerado um par de chaves assimétricas exclusivas e complementares. Tal como a assinatura manuscrita, a assinatura digital não pode ser falsificada, pelo que se adiciona uma função hash ao valor da chave gerada, para garantir a segurança do sistema. A assinatura digital permite, ao mesmo tempo, a identificação positiva do autor de uma mensagem (ou do signatário de um documento) e a verificação da integridade da mesma. Refira-se, porém, que a assinatura digital pode ser anexa a qualquer mensagem, seja esta decifrada ou não, apenas para que o receptor tenha a certeza da identidade do emissor e de que a mensagem chegou intacta ao destino. Baseia-se na criptografia da chave pública, que usa um algoritmo de duas chaves, a privada e a pública, diferentes mas matematicamente associadas: a primeira cria a assinatura digital e decifra os dados; a segunda verifica a assinatura e devolve-a ao formato original. O autor da mensagem mantém secreta a sua chave privada e divulga a chave pública, e vice-versa. A identidade do dono da chave pública é atestada pelo certificado digital emitido por uma entidade certificadora (uma espécie de notário). Independentemente da forma que assume, a assinatura electrónica, e a digital em particular, deve cumprir três funções: a autenticação (tal como acontece com o habitual gatafunho a que chamamos assinatura, apenas o indivíduo deve ser capaz de a reproduzir); não repudiação (quando o indivíduo assina não pode voltar atrás); e integridade (é necessário assegurar que os documentos assinados não são alterados sem o consentimento dos signatários).

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Gift Card Fact Sheet – and Tips for Consumers, December 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Gift Card Fact Sheet – and Tips for Consumers

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Bank Credit Card Information, Fall 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Bank Credit Card Information

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, More Sources on Students and Credit Card Debt, October 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: More Sources on Students and Credit Card Debt Suggested by the Office of Attorney General Tom Miller

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, How to Deal With Credit Card Offers, August 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: How to Deal With Credit Card Offers

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.

An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency,converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems.The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with thesame axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.