Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

On the design of education conditional cash transfer programs and non education outcomes: the case of teenage pregnancy

We investigate the effect of education Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) on teenage pregnancy. Our main concern is with how the size and sign of the effect may depend on the design of the program. Using a simple model we show that an education CCT that conditions renewal on school performance reduces teenage pregnancy; the program can increase teenage pregnancy if it does not condition on school performance. Then, using an original data base, we estimate the causal impact on teenage pregnancy of two education CCTs implemented in Bogot´a (Subsidio Educativo, SE, and Familias en Acci´on, FA); both programs differ particularly on whether school success is a condition for renewal or not. We show that SE has negative average effect on teenage pregnancy while FA has a null average effect. We also find that SE has either null or no effect for adolescents in all age and grade groups while FA has positive, null or negative effects for adolescents in different age and grade groups. Since SE conditions renewal on school success and FA does not, we can argue that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our model and that conditioning renewal of the subsidy on school success crucially determines the effect of the subsidy on teenage pregnancy

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Parametric pension reform and the intensive margin of labor supply, evidence from Colombia

We analyze the effect of a parametric reform of the fully-funded pension regime in Colombia on the intensive margin of the labor supply. We take advantage of a threshold defined by law in order to identify the causal effect using a regression discontinuity design. We find that a pension system that increases retirement age and the minimum weeks during which workers must contribute to claim pension benefits causes an increase of around 2 hours on the number of weekly worked hours; this corresponds to 4% of the average number of weekly worked hours or around 14% of a standard deviation of weekly worked hours. The effect is robust to different specifications, polynomial orders and sample sizes.

Poor people and risky business

We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

Reflexiones economicistas sobre la izquierda y la derecha

Este documento está compuesto por cuatro secciones de las cuales esta introducción es la primera. En la segunda sección se analiza la visión que diferentes individuos pueden tener acerca del problema de la desigualdad y las implicaciones que estas diferencias tienen sobre el ideal de política re-distributiva. En la tercera sección se presenta una revisión analítica de la literatura económica que se ocupa de las relaciones entre distribución del ingreso y crecimiento económico. Finalmente, en la última sección se presentan algunas conclusiones.

Salarios de eficiencia en un modelo de crecimiento económico

En este artÌculo se introducen los salarios de eÖciencia como microfundamento para explicar la existencia de desempleo involuntario permanente y la rigidez de los salarios a la baja. Los salarios de eÖciencia se incorporan en un modelo de crecimiento econÛmico de generaciones traslapadas, en el cual se puede alcanzar un equilibrio de largo plazo en el que existe desempleo involuntario permanente, explicado por la rigidez de los salarios.

Salud y crecimiento económico: un modelo de generaciones traslapadas, expectativa de vida endógena y capital humano

Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo de generaciones traslapadas con expectativa de vida endógena y capital humano. Recoge parte de la evidencia empírica acerca de la transición demográfica explicada por Notestein en 1945, donde variaciones en la longevidad de los individuos afectan positivamente el crecimiento económico de un país. El modelo establece que la falta de incentivos para invertir en salud estanca a una economía en una trampa de pobreza y muestra que incrementos en la productividad en el sector de producción de capital humano, al igual que cambios tecnológicos sesgados al uso intensivo del mismo, incrementan el producto de estado estacionario y pueden sacar a una economía de una trampa de pobreza.

Seguridad democrática, presencia de la policía y conflicto en Colombia

Este artículo evalúa uno de los componentes fundamentales de la política más icónica del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe: la ´ Seguridad Democrática. En particular, se evalúa el impacto sobre la intensidad del conflicto armado de los despliegues y refuerzos de policía en municipios con poca o nula presencia policial antes de agosto de 2002. Para ello se utiliza el estimador de diferencia en diferencias que compara el cambio en la dinámica del conflicto una vez se asignan los nuevos efectivos a los municipios receptores, relativo al cambio ocurrido simultáneamente en los municipios no receptores. Nuestros resultados sugieren que tanto los despliegues (instauración de inspecciones de policía en municipios que carecían de ´estas) como los refuerzos (envío de nuevos efectivos a municipios con poca presencia policial previa) generan incrementos en el número de ataques guerrilleros. Por otro lado, también hay evidencia que en los casos en los que la asignación de efectivos policiales estuvo acompañada de la movilización de tropas del ejército el conflicto disminuyó en las áreas afectadas, lo que sugiere que la coordinación de las fuerzas armadas resulta clave para el éxito de iniciativas regionales de seguridad.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Teorías y algunas experiencias internacionales en el financiamiento de la educación superior: lecciones para Colombia

Se analizan diferentes alternativas para la financiación de la educación superior, teniendo en cuenta que la presencia de fallas de mercado -tanto por el lado de la demanda como por el de la oferta- hace de éste un sector muy particular. Las primeras se relacionan con las decisiones privadas en términos de educación de la población estudiantil, y las segundas con las asimetrías de información que caracterizan el lado de la oferta en el financiamiento de la educación. El documento hace una revisión de literatura académica y de algunas experiencias internacionales sobre las diferentes fuentes de financiación en este sector, así como sus potenciales efectos sobre ciertas variables. Así, esta revisión arroja luces sobre las alternativas para el caso Colombiano.

Why labor income shares seem to be constant?

The common assumptions that labor income share does not change over time or across countries and that factor income shares are equal to the elasticity of output with respect to factors have had important implications for economic theory. However, there are various theoretical reasons why the elasticity of output with respect to reproducible factors should be correlated with the stage of development. In particular, the behavior of international trade and capital flows and the existence of factor saving innovations imply such a correlation. If this correlation exists and if factor income shares are equal to the elasticity of output with respect to factors then the labor income share must be negatively correlated with the stage of development. We propose an explanation for why labor income share has no correlation with income per capita: the existence of a labor intensive sector which produces non tradable goods.

¿Existe una trampa de pobreza en el sector rural en Colombia?

A diferencia de la generalidad de trabajos sobre la pobreza rural en Colombia, este estudio emplea un enfoque de activos para indagar acerca de los determinantes de la pobreza rural. En particular se examinan la existencia de no convexidades locales en el proceso de generación de ingresos, el grado de concentración de los hogares en ciertos rangos de acumulación de activos y la presencia de retornos marginales diferenciados a los activos. Con base en esto se proporciona evidencia prima facie acerca de la existencia de una trampa de pobreza en el sector rural, abriendo una línea promisoria de investigación sobre el tema, que puede contribuir de forma importante a su comprensión y a un mejor diseño de política social y sectorial.