Expectativas heterogêneas análises técnicas e os preços de equilíbrio

Este trabalho trata das consequências sobre os preços de equilíbrio da presença de agentes com racionalidade limitada e da possibilidade de eficácia de um tipo de análise técnica muito utilizada no mercado financeiro: a regra de médias móveis. Na primeira parte, apresentamos uma resenha de diversos trabalhos sobre o papel dos agentes com racionalidade limitada na formação dos preços de equilíbrio das ações. Os diversos modelos foram colocados em um arcabouço comum para facilitar a exposição. Sob hipóteses gerais, a presença de agentes com racionalidade limitada aumenta a volatilidade das ações e pode tornar as trajetórias de preços bastante complicadas. A presença de agentes irracionais e de analistas técnicos pode ser justificada do ponto de vista teórico. Porém, utilizando técnicas de bootstrap, não encontramos evidências empíricas de que um tipo particular de regra de médias móveis produza retornos acima da média incondicional do IBOVESPA.

Mercados incompletos, distribuições hiperbólicas e aplicações para o caso brasileiro

Apresentamos a distribuição hiperbólica corno alternativa à distribuição normal para a modelagem em finanças. A distribuição hiperbólica possui a vantagem de ter caudas pesadas e de permitir grande concentração das observações em torno da média. Estas características são verificadas empiricamente para os retornos dos ativos financeiros. Além de possuir um bom ajuste aos dados, o processo de Lévy hiperbólico apresenta caminhos puramente descontínuos. Corno os preços dos ativos seguem trajetórias descontínuas. esta característica consiste em mais urna vantagem desta distribuição. As descontinuidades nos levam a um modelo incompleto. )"lesmo assim, é possível definir urna fórmula para o apreçamento de opções. O bom ajuste aos dados da distribuição hiperbólica pode ser mais um indício de trabalharmos em mercados incompletos. Estimamos os parâmetros da hiperbólica para dados brasileiros. Com a fórmula de apreçamento e com os parâmetros estimados, determinamos os pre(;os para urna opção de Telebrás.

Modelos de ciclos reais de negócios aplicados à economia brasileira: um estudo de matching

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A reconstrução do marco regulatório do sistema financeiro do Brasil: os mercados de capitais, de seguros e previdência privada

The major objective of this paper is to identify, in the light of economic theory and of recent Brazilian and foreign institutional experiences, the best alternative for the reform of the regulatory framework of the domestic financial system, encompassing capital markets, insurance and private complementary social welfare. This paper is divided into four sections: in the first part, we identify the changes in the international and domestic financial systems, currently in an accelerated process of integration (search for similar rules and standards) and convergence (leveling of operational procedures). Next, we evaluate the potential impact of this new environment upon Brazilian economic development. In the second part, we analyze the concept of financial markets efficiency, where a contractualist view of the relationship involving suppliers and consumers of financial services is exposed. We also identify the major differences of focus among the several trends of regulation of the capital markets, insurance and private complementary social welfare In the third part, we present the concepts and the functions of a typical regulatory agency and alternative models of market regulation. In particular, we explore the differences between a regulatory model in which there are several regulatory agencies, each acting in segmented markets, as opposed to one in which there is single agency that regulates, supervises and oversees ali the indicated markets. In the forth and last part, we analyze the Brazilian case, attempting to identify, in the view of economic theory and recent experiences in other countries of the world, the best alternative for reforming present legislation. The basic recommended conclusion is to undertake studies that lead to the establishment of a single regulatory agency, congregating the functions currently performed by the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM), the Superintendency of Private Insurance (Susep) and the Secretariai of Complementary Welfare (SPC).

O problema da reestruturação de dívida soberana : uma resenha das contribuições recentes

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Exercícios do tempo : Dias felizes e Esperando Godot, de Samuel Beckett; O marinheiro, de Fernando Pessoa

Resumo não disponível.

The trasition from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes: the case of Brazil

This dissertation evaluates macroeconomic management in Brazil from 1994 to the present, with particular focus on exchange rate policy. It points out that while Brazil's Real Plan succeeded in halting the hyperinflation that had reached more than 2000 percent in 1993, it also caused significant real appreciation of the exchange rate situation that was only made worse by the extremely high interest rates and ensuing bout of severe financial crises in the intemational arena. By the end of 1998, the accumulation of internai and externai imbalances led the authorities to drop foreign exchange controls and allow the currency to float. In spite of some initial scepticism, the flexible rate regime cum inflation target proved to work well. Inflation was kept under control; the current account position improved significantly, real interest rates fell and GDP growth resumed. Thus, while great challenges still lie ahead, the recent successes bestow some optimism on the well functioning of this exchange rate regime. The Brazilian case suggests that successful transition from one foreign exchange system to another, particularly during financial crisis, does not depend only on one variable be it fiscal or monetary. In reality, it depends on whole set of co-ordinated policies aimed at resuming price stability with as little exchange rate and output volatility as possible.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Equilibria in security markets with a continuum of agents

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for exchange economies with a measure space of agents and for which the commodity space is ` p, 1 < p < +∞. A vector x = (xn) in ` p may be interpreted as a security which promises to deliver xn units of numeraire at state (or date) n. Under assumptions imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results on core-Walras equivalence were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [21] and Podczeck [20]. In this paper we prove that under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set of competitive equilibria (and thus the core) is non-empty.

Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one