Reflexiones sobre gobernanza; confianza en las instituciones públicas, densidad asociativa y participación electoral en Europa.

[ES] El presente estudio trata de forma abierta de los cambios que se están produciendo en los métodos de gobernar y en las posibilidades que ofrece la nueva gobernanza a la participación de la ciudadanía para influir en las decisiones que conciernen al territorio y su futuro. También introduce elementos relacionados con el dinamismo que han adquirido los movimientos sociales y la participación política no convencional, precisamente cuando más aumenta la desafección a la política y a los partidos políticos e igualmente se incrementan los índices de abstención electoral.

Cambios en la legislación electoral durante el sexenio (1868-1874): sus repercusiones en Canarias

[ES] El proceso de consolidación del régimen liberal a lo largo del siglo XIX plantea la necesidad de establecer un sistema de representación política. Conseguir el equilibrio del poder político, será el fin último que perseguirán los diversos modelos que se ofrecen para llevar a efecto esta representación a través del sufragio y los sistemas electorales. Modelos que varían en función de los intereses e ideologías que en esos momentos esté en juego.

The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe

Zarycki studied the political map of Central Europe today on the basis of results of recent parliamentary and/or presidential elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, L8ithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. He identified first the structure of regional political cleavages, then the spatial patterns emerging in different countries. He also considered the significance and eventual regional differentiation of various possible influences on these patterns, including urbanisation, historical heritage, ethnic factors, population movements, economic differentiation, the effects of the transformation, demographic factors, education and religion. Virtually all the countries showed a cleavage between more traditional, anti (or non-) communist regions and secular areas with higher post-communist support. Except in Ukraine and the Czech Republic, the post-communist party is dominated by the direct heirs of the former communist parties transformed into moderate left parties. The second major class of cleavages was typical of the Visegrad countries, i.e. the conflict between liberal, mostly metropolitan, regions and a different periphery, usually with a strong populist or anti-liberal appeal. This usually depends on the existence of a sizeable well-educated class, usually pro-market and pro-Western, and on the resolution of the conflict between post and anti-Communists. The third type of cleavage is based on ethnic factors and is clearest in Lithuania and Slovakia, where there are large ethnic minorities. Of factors influencing political behaviour, the two major ones identified were the historical heritage and urbanisation.

Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) ‘Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?’; and (2) ‘Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?’ A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

New Patterns of Democracy in the Countries of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

The chapter introduces a new database on political-institutional patterns of democracy used in the contributions to the book. It provides an update and extension of Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) measurement of consensus and majoritarian democracy for the countries of the second wave of the CSES during the period 1997–2006, using 11 partly improved indicators. The chapter explores patterns of democracy by the means of factor analysis, construct additive indices, and present the resulting country scores of consensus and majoritarian democracy graphically. Two variants are presented, one featuring Lijphart’s (1999) classic ‘executives–parties’ and ‘federal–unitary’ dimensions, and another incorporating direct democracy into the framework, yielding an additional ‘cabinets–direct democracy’ dimension

What Type of Resources? Household Effects and Female Electoral Participation

Mechanisms behind partner effects are contingent on women's individual resource endowment. While low and medium educated women most strongly profit from higher educational partner resources, i.e. from a compensatory mechanism, the resource “time” seems to particularly confine political involvement of women with both high professional status or no employment.

Loyal to the Game? Strategic Policy Representation in Mixed Electoral Systems

In Germany's compensatory mixed electoral system, alternative electoral routes lead into parliament. We study the relationship between candidates' electoral situations across both tiers and policy representation, fully accounting for candidate, party and district preferences in a multi-actor constellation and the exact electoral incentives for candidates to represent either the party or the district. The results (2009 Bundestag election data) yield evidence of an interactive effect of closeness of the district race and list safety on candidates' positioning between their party and constituency.

Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Electoral and Financial Bookkeeping: A Comparison of Pre-Electoral Pledges on Public Spending and the Outcome of Post-Electoral Budget Debates

In the wake of the financial crisis, budgetary discipline has taken centre stage in politics. More than ever a country's budget mirrors the true policy preferences of the legislative majority beyond all political discourse and cheap talk. The paper sheds light on mandate fulfilment in the field of public spending and fiscal policy in general. Based on previous work on pledge fulfilment in Switzerland the paper compares publicised pre-electoral statements of MPs on public spending and the development of the public finances with their post-electoral legislative behaviour during budget debates and votes. The findings of the paper confirm the results of the aforementioned earlier studies and point to the potential of budgetary statements for future mandate fulfilment research.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.