Tameside College: Triptico games and resources used to engage students

Tracey Holt introduced Triptico to her department after attending training from Sue Shercliff, ESOL Lecturer. Triptico is a resource for teachers to use in conjunction with their interactive whiteboards that currently contains around 20 different interactive resources - all of which can be easily edited, adapted and saved for later use. This quickly spread throughout the entire college. It is a fantastic free resource which promotes more interaction in the classroom between the teacher and students.

Lancaster and Morecambe College: Uses serious computer games as a teaching tool

John Latham, International Projects Co-ordinator at Lancaster and Morecambe College (LMC), got involved with the project Serious Computer Games as a Teaching Tool (SCOGATT) after using the game EnerCities with his students. The web based platform at www.scogatt.eu serves as a One Stop Toolkit for vocational teachers and trainers who want to use serious computer games (SCG) in their teaching environments but might need a helping hand. There they will be able to find a compendium of serious games, SCOGATT pilot results, teacher reports and the exemplar games, EnerCities.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).

The Relevance of Relative Position in Ultimatum Games

This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position.

Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games

This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

Los “serious games” como herramienta docente para el fomento del emprendimiento:concurso e-mprende UPV/EHU

La sociedad está sometida a un proceso de cambio constante y las metodologías docentes deben adaptarse también a estos cambios. Hemos decidido realizar el presente Trabajo de Fin de Grado con el fin de poner en valor la utilidad de las metodologías docentes más innovadoras que consigan adaptar la docencia a la sociedad moderna. Así pues, explicamos lo que son los Serious Games y los usos que pueden tener en la docencia desde el punto de vista del emprendimiento empresarial. Como ejemplo más cercano de Serious Game, utilizamos el simulador del concurso E-mprende, un concurso diseñado para estudiantes que enfrenta a los usuarios a través de un Simulador empresarial. Se trata de un Business Game desarrollado entre otros por la Universidad del País Vasco que intenta enseñar a los jugadores lo que es dirigir una empresa de nueva creación dándoles el control virtual de la misma a través de una plataforma web donde deberán tomar una serie de rondas de decisiones. Para comenzar, realizamos un análisis bibliográfico con el fin de dar una correcta explicación de lo que son los juegos, los Serious Games y los Business Games. Básicamente, un Serious Game se diferencia de un Juego ordinario en su finalidad. Mientras que un juego ordinario se ha diseñado con el único fin de divertir, el Juego Serio también tiene el objetivo de formar, entrenar o educar. Por su parte, Un Business Game es un Serious Game diseñado para el ámbito de los negocios en el que se pretende formar al jugador en materia de empresas. Realizando ese análisis bibliográfico, obtenemos una serie de conclusiones que podremos contrastar utilizando como ejemplo el simulador del concurso emprende. Para conseguir datos totalmente verídicos, elaboramos un cuestionario a medida destinado a los participantes del concurso que se entregó al finalizar el concurso. Dado que este Trabajo de Fin de Grado se enmarca en el ámbito del emprendimiento, lo que nos interesa contrastar por encima de todo es si el hecho de participar en un Business Game como el del concurso E-mprende ayuda a fomentar el espíritu emprendedor en el alumno más allá de complementar conocimientos teóricos y prácticos, lo cual no deja de ser importante.

Effects of Small-Sided Games vs. Interval Training in Aerobic Fitness and Physical Enjoyment in Young Elite Soccer Players

The purpose of this study was to compare the effects of Small-Sided Games (SSG) vs. Interval Training (IT) in soccer training on aerobic fitness and physical enjoyment in youth elite soccer players during the last 8 weeks of the season. Seventeen U-16 male soccer players (age = 15.5 +/- 0.6 years, and 8.5 years of experience) of a Spanish First Division club academy were randomized to 2 different groups for 6 weeks: SSG group (n = 9) and IT group (n = 8). In addition to the usual technical and tactical sessions and competitive games, the SSG group performed 11 sessions with different SSGs, whereas the IT group performed the same number of sessions of IT. Players were tested before and after the 6-week training intervention with a continuous maximal multistage running field test and the counter movement jump test (CMJ). At the end of the study, players answered the physical activity enjoyment scale (PACES). During the study, heart rate (HR) and session perceived effort (sRPE) were assessed. SSGs were as effective as IT in maintaining the aerobic fitness in elite young soccer players during the last weeks of the season. Players in the SSG group declared a greater physical enjoyment than IT (P = 0.006; ES = 1.86 +/- 1.07). Coaches could use SSG training during the last weeks of the season as an option without fear of losing aerobic fitness while promoting high physical enjoyment.

The use of role-play games in teaching: The International Climate Negotiation Game

This paper presents a role-play game designed by the authors, which focuses on international climate negotiations. The game has been used at a university with students all drawn from the same course and at summer schools with students from different levels (undergraduate, master’s and doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers) and different knowledge areas (economics, law, engineering, architecture, biology and others). We discuss how the game fits into the process of competence-based learning, and what benefits games, and role-play games in particular, have for teaching. In the game, students take on the role of representatives of national institutions and experience at first hand a detailed process of international negotiation concerned with climate change.

The SD-prekernel for TU games

We introduce and analyze a new solution concept for TU games:The Surplus Distributor Prekernel. Like the prekermel, the new solu- tion is based on the an alternative motion of complaint of one player against other with respect to an allocation. The SD-prekernel contains the SD-prenucleolus and they coincide in the class of convex games. This result allows us to prove that in bankruptcy problems the SD-prekernel and the Minimal Overlapping rule select the same allocation.

Neural mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.

Humans have the arguably unique ability to understand the mental representations of others. For success in both competitive and cooperative interactions, however, this ability must be extended to include representations of others' belief about our intentions, their model about our belief about their intentions, and so on. We developed a "stag hunt" game in which human subjects interacted with a computerized agent using different degrees of sophistication (recursive inferences) and applied an ecologically valid computational model of dynamic belief inference. We show that rostral medial prefrontal (paracingulate) cortex, a brain region consistently identified in psychological tasks requiring mentalizing, has a specific role in encoding the uncertainty of inference about the other's strategy. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encodes the depth of recursion of the strategy being used, an index of executive sophistication. These findings reveal putative computational representations within prefrontal cortex regions, supporting the maintenance of cooperation in complex social decision making.