Proposal for shared services performance management model applied to portugueses public administration

Comunicação apresentada no 8º Congresso Nacional de Administração Pública - Desafios e Soluções, em Carcavelos de 21 a 22 de Novembro de 2011.

Stochastic Framework for Strategic Decision-making of Load-serving Entities for Day-ahead Market

The deregulation of electricity markets has diversified the range of financial transaction modes between independent system operator (ISO), generation companies (GENCO) and load-serving entities (LSE) as the main interacting players of a day-ahead market (DAM). LSEs sell electricity to end-users and retail customers. The LSE that owns distributed generation (DG) or energy storage units can supply part of its serving loads when the nodal price of electricity rises. This opportunity stimulates them to have storage or generation facilities at the buses with higher locational marginal prices (LMP). The short-term advantage of this model is reducing the risk of financial losses for LSEs in DAMs and its long-term benefit for the LSEs and the whole system is market power mitigation by virtually increasing the price elasticity of demand. This model also enables the LSEs to manage the financial risks with a stochastic programming framework.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Contratualização interna vs. contratualização ext

RESUMO - Independentemente do modelo jurídico adoptado para os hospitais é necessário introduzir políticas de gestão estratégicas e adoptar instrumentos que permitam uma melhoria efectiva dos processos de gestão organizacional. A implementação de um modelo de contratualização interna que se traduza na transposição dos compromissos assumidos externamente para o interior da organização e, consequentemente, a sua desagregação pelos diferentes níveis de gestão, permite alcançar um alinhamento cada vez maior entre os objectivos contratualizados externamente e a missão das instituições de saúde. No presente estudo pretendeu-se identificar o estado de arte relativamente à contratualização interna numa amostra representativa das unidades hospitalares portuguesas, tendo-se concluído pela identificação de acções a desenvolver para servir de suporte à sua efectiva adopção.--------------------------ABSTRACT – Despite legal framework applied on hospitals, it is essential to develop and launch a set of management and strategic policies, as well as to adopt instruments that can grant an effective improvement to organizational management processes. The implementation of a «management by objectives model» that will carry external commitments the organization and therefore its splitting through the different management levels, will provide a higher alignment between the objectives externally agreed and the mission of health institutions. The goal of this study, is to identify the «management by objectives» state of the art on a representative sample of the Portuguese hospital units, as well as to identify the actions nece

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Strategic Noise Mapping with GIS for the Universitat Jaume I Smart Campus: best methodology practices

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

Evaluating a co-creation model for social businesses: The case of ‘Linhas sobre rodas’

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

A conceptual model of a brand's presence on Facebook aligned with teenagers' motivations and marketing strategies

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business model analysis of Mobitto: How to solve the chicken and egg problem of a multi-sided platform?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

A conceptual model to approach the scaling process of social entreprises: The case of Cozinha com Alma

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

From a project to an organisation: a Strategic Communication’s approach

Relatório de Estágio apresentado para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências da Comunicação, área de especialização em Comunicação Estratégica

Influence of Lean and Green on supply chain performance: an interpretive structural modelling model

This work aims to identify and rank a set of Lean and Green practices and supply chain performance measures on which managers should focus to achieve competitiveness and improve the performance of automotive supply chains. The identification of the contextual relationships among the suggested practices and measures, was performed through literature review. Their ranking was done by interviews with professionals from the automotive industry and academics with wide knowledge on the subject. The methodology of interpretive structural modelling (ISM) is a useful methodology to identify inter relationships among Lean and Green practices and supply chain performance measures and to support the evaluation of automotive supply chain performance. Using the ISM methodology, the variables under study were clustered according to their driving power and dependence power. The ISM methodology was proposed to be used in this work. The model intends to provide a better understanding of the variables that have more influence (driving variables), the others and those which are most influenced (dependent variables) by others. The information provided by this model is strategic for managers who can use it to identify which variables they should focus on in order to have competitive supply chains.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

An effective on-the-job training model-to facilitate strategy execution

Strategy execution has been a heated topic in the management world in recent years. However, according to a survey done by the Conference Board (2014), the chief executives are so concerned about the execution in their companies and have rated it as the No.1 or No.2 most challenging issue. Many of them choose to invest in training with a purpose to harvest the most for strategy execution. Therefore, this research is trying to find out a model to design training programs that can at most contribute to the success of strategy execution with three real-life training cases done by BTS Consulting Service. It was found that strategy execution could be greatly supported by training programs that take into consideration the four factors, namely Alignment, Mindset to Change, Capability and Organization Support. Main implications of the findings are presented and discussed. Key

Strategic planning of electricity systems: Integrating renewable energies

Tese de Doutoramento - Programa Doutoral em Engenharia Industrial e Sistemas (PDEIS)