Critical discourse analysis and political economy of communication : understanding the new corporate order

This article uses critical discourse analysis to analyse material shifts in the political economy of communications. It examines texts of major corporations to describe four key changes in political economy: (1) the separation of ownership from control; (2) the separation of business from industry; (3) the separation of accountability from responsibility; and (4) the subjugation of ‘going concerns’ by overriding concerns. The authors argue that this amounts to a political economic shift from traditional concepts of ‘capitalism’ to a new ‘corporatism’ in which the relationships between public and private, state and individual interests have become redefined and obscured through new discourse strategies. They conclude that the present financial and regulatory ‘crisis’ cannot be adequately resolved without a new analytic framework for examining the relationships between corporation, discourse and political economy.

Corruption and political interest : empirical evidence at the micro level

The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinates of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analysing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependant variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level.The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that political interest has an impact on corruption controlling for a huge number of factors.

Health, endogenous time preference, and inequality : a political economy perspective

We study an overlapping-generations model in which agents' mortality risks, and consequently impatience, are endogenously determined by private and public investment in health care. Revenues allocated for public health care arc determined by a voting process. We find that the degree of substitutability between public and private health expenditures matters for macroeconomic outcomes of the model. Higher substitutability implies a “crowding-out" effect, which in turn impacts adversely on morality risks and impatience leading to lower public expenditures on health care in the political equilibrium. Consequently, higher substitutability is associated with greater polarization in wealth, and long-run distributions that are bimodal.

A political economy perspective on persistent inequality, inflation, and redistribution

In this paper we examine the dynamics of the link between inequality and inflation from a political economy perspective. We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, and inequality is persistent. Inflation in our model is a mechanism of redistribution, and we find that the link between inequality and inflation within any period or over time depends on institutional and preference related parameters. Furthermore, we find that differences in the initial distributions of wealth can yield a diverse set of patterns for the evolution of the inflation and inequality link. Relative to existing literature, our model leads to more precise predictions about the inflation-inequality correlation. To that end, results in the extant empirical literature on the inflation and inequality link need to be interpreted with caution.

Political theory and theoretical physics

This paper explains, somewhat along a Simmelian line, that political theory may produce practical and universal theories like those developed in theoretical physics. The reasoning behind this paper is to show that the Element of Democracy Theory may be true by way of comparing it to Einstein’s Special Relativity – specifically concerning the parameters of symmetry, unification, simplicity, and utility. These parameters are what make a theory in physics as meeting them not only fits with current knowledge, but also produces paths towards testing (application). As the Element of Democracy Theory meets these same parameters, it could settle the debate concerning the definition of democracy. This will be shown firstly by discussing why no one has yet achieved a universal definition of democracy; secondly by explaining the parameters chosen (as in why these and not others confirm or scuttle theories); and thirdly by comparing how Special Relativity and the Element of Democracy match the parameters.

Political theory and theoretical physics [Revised]

This paper explains, somewhat along a Simmelian line, that political theory may produce practical and universal theories like those developed in theoretical physics. The reasoning behind this paper is to show that the Element of Democracy Theory may be true by way of comparing it to Einstein’s Special Relativity – specifically concerning the parameters of symmetry, unification, simplicity, and utility. These parameters are what make a theory in physics as meeting them not only fits with current knowledge, but also produces paths towards testing (application). As the Element of Democracy Theory meets these same parameters, it could settle the debate concerning the definition of democracy. This will be shown firstly by discussing why no one has yet achieved a universal definition of democracy; secondly by explaining the parameters chosen (as in why these and not others confirm or scuttle theories); and thirdly by comparing how Special Relativity and the Element of Democracy match the parameters.

Top Gear, top journalism : three lessons for political journalists from the world's most popular TV show

This article examines the BBC program Top Gear, discussing why it has become one of the world’s most-watched TV programs, and how it has very successfully captivated an audience who might otherwise not be particularly interested in cars. The analysis of the show is here framed in the form of three ‘lessons’ for journalists, suggesting that some of the entertaining (and highly engaging) ways in which Top Gear presents information to its viewers could be usefully applied in the coverage of politics – a domain of knowledge which, like cars, many citizens find abstract or boring.