Nonlinear Normalization in Limit Theorems for Extremes

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 60G70, 60F05.

Properties of the Bellman Gamma Distribution

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 62H10.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

Stable sets in one-seller assignment games

We consider von Neumann -- Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form bidder rings. We also show that the union of all stable sets can be described as the union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal contribution payoff vectors. Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however, typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.

Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions

We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with polynomial many dually esential coalitions.

A Note on Iterations-based Derivations of High-order Homogenization Correctors for Multiscale Semi-linear Elliptic Equations

This Note aims at presenting a simple and efficient procedure to derive the structure of high-order corrector estimates for the homogenization limit applied to a semi-linear elliptic equation posed in perforated domains. Our working technique relies on monotone iterations combined with formal two-scale homogenization asymptotics. It can be adapted to handle more complex scenarios including for instance nonlinearities posed at the boundary of perforations and the vectorial case, when the model equations are coupled only through the nonlinear production terms.

SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONSTHAT ARE COMPETITIVE OR COOPERATIVE II:CONVERGENCE ALMOST EVERYWHERE*MORRIS W. HIRSCH

A vector field in n-space determines a competitive (or cooperative) system of differential equations provided all of the off-diagonal terms of its Jacobian matrix are nonpositive (or nonnegative). The main results in this article are the following. A cooperative system cannot have nonconstant attracting periodic solutions. In a cooperative system whose Jacobian matrices are irreducible the forward orbit converges for almost every point having compact forward orbit closure. In a cooperative system in 2 dimensions, every solution is eventually monotone.  Applications are made to generalizations of positive feedback loops.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Some results on open-edge and open mobile guarding of polygons and triangulations

This paper focuses on a variation of the Art Gallery problem that considers open-edge guards and open mobile-guards. A mobile guard can be placed on edges and diagonals of a polygon, and the ‘open’ prefix means that the endpoints of such an edge or diagonal are not taken into account for visibility purposes. This paper studies the number of guards that are sufficient and sometimes necessary to guard some classes of simple polygons for both open-edge and open mobile-guards. A wide range of polygons is studied, which include orthogonal polygons with or without holes, spirals, orthogonal spirals and monotone polygons. Moreover, this problem is also considered for planar triangulation graphs using open-edge guards.

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.

Asymptotic analysis of combined breather-kink modes in a Fermi-Pasta-Ulam chain

We find approximations to travelling breather solutions of the one-dimensional Fermi-Pasta-Ulam (FPU) lattice. Both bright breather and dark breather solutions are found. We find that the existence of localised (bright) solutions depends upon the coefficients of cubic and quartic terms of the potential energy, generalising an earlier inequality derived by James [CR Acad Sci Paris 332, 581, (2001)]. We use the method of multiple scales to reduce the equations of motion for the lattice to a nonlinear Schr{\"o}dinger equation at leading order and hence construct an asymptotic form for the breather. We show that in the absence of a cubic potential energy term, the lattice supports combined breathing-kink waveforms. The amplitude of breathing-kinks can be arbitrarily small, as opposed to traditional monotone kinks, which have a nonzero minimum amplitude in such systems. We also present numerical simulations of the lattice, verifying the shape and velocity of the travelling waveforms, and confirming the long-lived nature of all such modes.

Homogenization of the p-Laplacian with nonlinear boundary condition on critical size particles: Identifying the strange term for the some non smooth and multivalued operators

We extend previous papers in the literature concerning the homogenization of Robin type boundary conditions for quasilinear equations, in the case of microscopic obstacles of critical size: here we consider nonlinear boundary conditions involving some maximal monotone graphs which may correspond to discontinuous or non-Lipschitz functions arising in some catalysis problems.

Efficient algorithms for beacon routing in polygons

In a paper by Biro et al. [7], a novel twist on guarding in art galleries is introduced. A beacon is a fixed point with an attraction pull that can move points within the polygon. Points move greedily to monotonically decrease their Euclidean distance to the beacon by moving straight towards the beacon or sliding on the edges of the polygon. The beacon attracts a point if the point eventually reaches the beacon. Unlike most variations of the art gallery problem, the beacon attraction has the intriguing property of being asymmetric, leading to separate definitions of attraction region and inverse attraction region. The attraction region of a beacon is the set of points that it attracts. For a given point in the polygon, the inverse attraction region is the set of beacon locations that can attract the point. We first study the characteristics of beacon attraction. We consider the quality of a "successful" beacon attraction and provide an upper bound of $\sqrt{2}$ on the ratio between the length of the beacon trajectory and the length of the geodesic distance in a simple polygon. In addition, we provide an example of a polygon with holes in which this ratio is unbounded. Next we consider the problem of computing the shortest beacon watchtower in a polygonal terrain and present an $O(n \log n)$ time algorithm to solve this problem. In doing this, we introduce $O(n \log n)$ time algorithms to compute the beacon kernel and the inverse beacon kernel in a monotone polygon. We also prove that $\Omega(n \log n)$ time is a lower bound for computing the beacon kernel of a monotone polygon. Finally, we study the inverse attraction region of a point in a simple polygon. We present algorithms to efficiently compute the inverse attraction region of a point for simple, monotone, and terrain polygons with respective time complexities $O(n^2)$, $O(n \log n)$ and $O(n)$. We show that the inverse attraction region of a point in a simple polygon has linear complexity and the problem of computing the inverse attraction region has a lower bound of $\Omega(n \log n)$ in monotone polygons and consequently in simple polygons.

Solvabilty of generalized Hammerstein integral equations on unbounded domains, with sign-changing kernels

In this work we study an Hammerstein generalized integral equation u(t)=∫_{-∞}^{+∞}k(t,s) f(s,u(s),u′(s),...,u^{(m)}(s))ds, where k:ℝ²→ℝ is a W^{m,∞}(ℝ²), m∈ℕ, kernel function and f:ℝ^{m+2}→ℝ is a L¹-Carathéodory function. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to consider discontinuous nonlinearities with derivatives dependence, without monotone or asymptotic assumptions, on the whole real line. Our method is applied to a fourth order nonlinear boundary value problem, which models moderately large deflections of infinite nonlinear beams resting on elastic foundations under localized external loads.