The effect of incentive reforms upon productivity: Evidence from the Vietnamese rice industry

In this study we use region-level panel data on rice production in Vietnam to investigate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the period since reunification in 1975. Two significant reforms were introduced during this period, one in 1981 allowing farmers to keep part of their produce, and another in 1987 providing improved land tenure. We measure TFP growth using two modified forms of the standard Malmquist data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, which we have named the Three-year-window (TYW) and the Full Cumulative (FC) methods. We have developed these methods to deal with degrees of freedom limitations. Our empirical results indicate strong average TFP growth of between 3.3 and 3.5 per cent per annum, with the fastest growth observed in the period following the first reform. Our results support the assertion that incentive related issues have played a large role in the decline and subsequent resurgence of Vietnamese agriculture.

Economic crisis and counter-reform of universal health care systems: Spanish case

The economic crisis that has been affecting Europe in the 21st century has modified social protection systems in the countries that adopted, in the 20th century, universal health care system models, such as Spain. This communication presents some recent transformations, which were caused by changes in Spanish law. Those changes relate to the access to health care services, mainly in regards to the provision of care to foreigners, to financial contribution from users for health care services, and to pharmaceutical assistance. In crisis situations, reforms are observed to follow a trend which restricts rights and deepens social inequalities.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Evidence-based Economic Policy - Three Essays in Applied Microeconometrics

Over thirty years ago, Leamer (1983) - among many others - expressed doubts about the quality and usefulness of empirical analyses for the economic profession by stating that "hardly anyone takes data analyses seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else's data analyses seriously" (p.37). Improvements in data quality, more robust estimation methods and the evolution of better research designs seem to make that assertion no longer justifiable (see Angrist and Pischke (2010) for a recent response to Leamer's essay). The economic profes- sion and policy makers alike often rely on empirical evidence as a means to investigate policy relevant questions. The approach of using scientifically rigorous and systematic evidence to identify policies and programs that are capable of improving policy-relevant outcomes is known under the increasingly popular notion of evidence-based policy. Evidence-based economic policy often relies on randomized or quasi-natural experiments in order to identify causal effects of policies. These can require relatively strong assumptions or raise concerns of external validity. In the context of this thesis, potential concerns are for example endogeneity of policy reforms with respect to the business cycle in the first chapter, the trade-off between precision and bias in the regression-discontinuity setting in chapter 2 or non-representativeness of the sample due to self-selection in chapter 3. While the identification strategies are very useful to gain insights into the causal effects of specific policy questions, transforming the evidence into concrete policy conclusions can be challenging. Policy develop- ment should therefore rely on the systematic evidence of a whole body of research on a specific policy question rather than on a single analysis. In this sense, this thesis cannot and should not be viewed as a comprehensive analysis of specific policy issues but rather as a first step towards a better understanding of certain aspects of a policy question. The thesis applies new and innovative identification strategies to policy-relevant and topical questions in the fields of labor economics and behavioral environmental economics. Each chapter relies on a different identification strategy. In the first chapter, we employ a difference- in-differences approach to exploit the quasi-experimental change in the entitlement of the max- imum unemployment benefit duration to identify the medium-run effects of reduced benefit durations on post-unemployment outcomes. Shortening benefit duration carries a double- dividend: It generates fiscal benefits without deteriorating the quality of job-matches. On the contrary, shortened benefit durations improve medium-run earnings and employment possibly through containing the negative effects of skill depreciation or stigmatization. While the first chapter provides only indirect evidence on the underlying behavioral channels, in the second chapter I develop a novel approach that allows to learn about the relative impor- tance of the two key margins of job search - reservation wage choice and search effort. In the framework of a standard non-stationary job search model, I show how the exit rate from un- employment can be decomposed in a way that is informative on reservation wage movements over the unemployment spell. The empirical analysis relies on a sharp discontinuity in unem- ployment benefit entitlement, which can be exploited in a regression-discontinuity approach to identify the effects of extended benefit durations on unemployment and survivor functions. I find evidence that calls for an important role of reservation wage choices for job search be- havior. This can have direct implications for the optimal design of unemployment insurance policies. The third chapter - while thematically detached from the other chapters - addresses one of the major policy challenges of the 21st century: climate change and resource consumption. Many governments have recently put energy efficiency on top of their agendas. While pricing instru- ments aimed at regulating the energy demand have often been found to be short-lived and difficult to enforce politically, the focus of energy conservation programs has shifted towards behavioral approaches - such as provision of information or social norm feedback. The third chapter describes a randomized controlled field experiment in which we discuss the effective- ness of different types of feedback on residential electricity consumption. We find that detailed and real-time feedback caused persistent electricity reductions on the order of 3 to 5 % of daily electricity consumption. Also social norm information can generate substantial electricity sav- ings when designed appropriately. The findings suggest that behavioral approaches constitute effective and relatively cheap way of improving residential energy-efficiency.

Multilateral Trade and Agricultural Policy Reforms in Sugar Markets, September 2005

We analyze the impact of trade liberalization, removal of production subsidies, and elimination of consumption distortions in world sugar markets using a partial-equilibrium international sugar model calibrated on 2002 market data and current policies. The removal of trade distortions alone induces a 27% price increase while the removal of all trade and production distortions induces a 48% increase by 2011/12 relative to the baseline. Aggregate trade expands moderately, but location of production and trade patterns change substantially. Protectionist OECD countries (the EU, Japan, the US) experience an import expansion or export reduction and significant contraction in production in unfettered markets. Competitive producers in both OECD countries (Australia) and non-OECD countries (Brazil, Cuba), and even some protected producers (Indonesia, Turkey), expand production when all distortions are removed. Consumption distortions have marginal impacts on world markets and location of production. We discuss the significance of these results in the context of mounting pressures to increase market access in highly protected OECD countries and the impact on non-OECD countries.

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Financial reforms and capital flows: Insights from general equilibrium

As a result of debt enforcement problems, many high-productivity firms in emergingeconomies are unable to pledge enough future profits to their creditors and this constrains thefinancing they can raise. Many have argued that, by relaxing these credit constraints, reformsthat strengthen enforcement institutions would increase capital flows to emerging economies. Thisargument is based on a partial equilibrium intuition though, which does not take into account theorigin of any additional resources that flow to high-productivity firms after the reforms. We showthat some of these resources do not come from abroad, but instead from domestic low-productivityfirms that are driven out of business as a result of the reforms. Indeed, the resources released bythese low-productivity firms could exceed those absorbed by high-productivity ones so that capitalflows to emerging economies might actually decrease following successful reforms. This resultprovides a new perspective on some recent patterns of capital flows in industrial and emergingeconomies.

Economic and legal analysis of mandatory non-recourse mortgages with applications to Spain

“The liquidity crisis of the Spanish banks is largely due to the lack of confidence of foreign investors and, therefore, the changes that occur in the legislation should not affect the credibility, stability, legal certainty, predictability that markets expect”.Sergio Nasarre (2011)In the current situation of economic crisis, many people have found they can no longer pay back the mortgage loans that were granted to them in order to purchase a dwelling. It is for this reason that, in light of the economic, political and social problems this poses, our paper studies the state of the Spanish real-estate system and of foreclosure, paying special attention to the solution that has been proposed recently as the best option for debtors that cannot make their mort-gage payments: non-recourse mortgaging. We analyze this proposal from legal and economic perspectives in order to fully understand the effects that this change could imply. At the same time, this paper will also examine several alternatives we believe would ameliorate the situation of mortgage-holders, among them legal reforms, mortgage insurance, and non-recourse mortgaging itself.

Germany's socio-economic model and the Euro crisis

Germany's socio-economic model, the "social market economy", was established in West Germany after World War II and extended to the unified Germany in 1990. During a prolonged recession after the adoption of the Euro in 1998, major reforms (Agenda 2010) were introduced which many consider as the key of Germany's recent success. The reforms had mixed results: employment increased but has consisted to a large extent of precarious low-wage jobs. Growth depended on export surpluses based on an internal real devaluation (low unit labour costs) which make Germany vulnerable to global recessions as in 2009. Overall inequality increased substantially.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Ordered Model Processes, Reference Declaration And The Economic Organization: Implications For A Balanced Scorecard Contextual Framework

Les Tableaux de Bord de la Performance ont été acclamés avec raison depuis leur introduction en 1992, mais les intellectuels continuent encore à étudier leurs aspects pragmatiques. Ce papier contribue à la littérature sur les Tableaux de Bord de la Performance, tout d’abord, en offrant une explication logique quant à leur succès et ensuite, en présentant un cadre de travail contextuel de tableaux de bord de la performance pour une structure de gestion hiérarchisée. Le cadre de travail contextuel réforme la perspective d’apprentissage et de croissance du tableau de bord de la performance (i) en effectuant la transition de référence (subjective/objective), et (ii) en reconnaissant que la Perspective d’Apprentissage et de Croissance implique avant tout une incidence de formulation stratégique d’une extra-entité. Le transfert de l’incidence (intra-entité/extra-entité) réconcilie l’évolution de la position de politique de gestion non ordonnée [Contenu: (Contenu: Contexte): Contexte] qu’est la Perspective d’Apprentissage et de Croissance Concomitante. Le cadre de travail supplante également les Perspectives des Tableaux de Bord de la Performances développés par Kaplan et Norton en ajoutant la perspective de politique sociale qui manquait. La perspective manquante implique une transition de référence objective [(position endogène, perspective exogène): (position exogène, perspective exogène)]. De tels signaux de transition [Contenu: (Contenu: Contexte): Contexte] ordonnent l’évolution de la position de politique de gestion.

Impact of land reforms on scheduled castes in kerala - a case study

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of our timesis that economic development has become the goal and ambition of people. The needs which this desire creates are immense they are of course urgent everywhere and they cannot be postponded. Consequently there was a frantic search for formulae of rapid economic development. It was claimed that agrarian reform is the indispensable condition for the development of productive forces and industrialization of the state.A key element in the land reform policy is the provision for ownership of land .Measures taken include redistribution of large estates ,assistance to tenants or labourers to acquire holdings and settlement schemes to establish new farming units on reclaimed or developed lands.In this thesis an attempt is made to evaluate the impact of these reforms on the agrarian structure in general and the scheduled caste in particular.