G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, August 2006

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, September 2006

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - October 2006

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - October 2006

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, November 2006

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, December 2006

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, January 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs for January 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, February 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - February 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, April 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - April 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, March 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - March 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, May 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - May 2007

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, June 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, June 2007

Adverse obstetrical and neonatal outcomes in elective and medically indicated inductions of labor at term.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the adverse neonatal and maternal outcomes after medically indicated and elective labor induction. Both induction groups were also compared to women with spontaneous onset of labor. METHOD: Retrospective cohort study of 13 971 women with live, cephalic singleton pregnancies who delivered at term (from 1997 to 2007). Adverse maternal and neonatal outcomes were compared between women who underwent an induction of labor in the presence and absence of standard medical indications. RESULTS: Among 5090 patients with induced labor, 2059 (40.5%) underwent elective labor inductions, defined as inductions without any medical or obstetrical indication. Risks of cesarean or instrumental delivery, postpartum hemorrhage >500 ml, prolonged maternal hospitalization >6 days, Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, arterial umbilical cord pH<7.1, admission in neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and prolonged NICU hospitalization >7 days were similar between nulliparous who underwent elective and medical labor induction. Similar results were obtained for multiparous. All the above mentioned risks, but the Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, were significantly increased after induction in comparison to spontaneous labor. CONCLUSION: Elective induction of labor carries similar obstetrical and neonatal risks as a medically indicated labor induction. Thus, elective induction of labor should be strongly discouraged.

A sequential model for older workers’ labor transitions after a health shock

In this work we study older workers (50 64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50 64 age range and none in the 30 49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.