Katepillarista kauppakassiin : product placement suomalaisessa tv-ohjelmatuotannossa

Product placement has become more and more common in Finnish television programmes lately. Product placement, as with the whole of the television industry, is strictly regulated and monitored by law. Surreptitious advertising, sponsorship, cooperative partnerships and product placement are often confused with each other. Partially these activities are interpenetrative. Present legislation doesn't recognise product placement, therefore it doesn't have any specific position in law, thus causing problems. Product placement in domestic tv-programmes is still relatively modest. More extensive activity is perceivable at the movies where the restrictions are considerably more liberal. In the United States, product placement is a part of a production's budget. Pressure to increase financing has grouwn in both Finland and Europe. There has been considerable preparation in advance of a new television directive in the European Union which would allow more liberal advertising and product placement as a part of financing tv-programmes. The proposal for a new directive is currently only on its first round so product placement probably won't become better defined in law in the near future. Finnish television producers were interviewed as part of the research for this thesis, in order to clarify product placement position and usage in domestic televion programmes. Surreptitious advertising, sponsorship, different kinds of cooperative partnerships and the need for guidance were also discussed in the course of the themed interviews. Even though product placement does not currently play a significant part in the financing of a production, there are certainly pressures in that direktion. In the field of television, the legal boundaries of product placement are presently being explored in order to assess its position as a part of budgeting and covering expenses.

Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

A New Model for Designing a Product Line Using TURF Analysis

This paper introduces the approach of using TURF analysis to design a product line through a binary linear programming model. This improves the efficiency of the search for the solution to the problem compared to the algorithms that have been used to date. Furthermore, the proposed technique enables the model to be improved in order to overcome the main drawbacks presented by TURF analysis in practice.

Discounting Spotted Apples: Investigating Consumers’ Willingness to Accept Cosmetic Damage in an Organic Product, November 2006

Organic producers have limited methods of avoiding plant diseases that result in cosmetic damage to produce. Therefore, the appearance of organic produce is often less than perfect. We use an experimental auction to investigate how cosmetic damage affects consumers’ willingness to pay for organic apples. We find that 75% of the participants are willing to pay more for organic than for conventional apples given identical appearance. However, at the first sight of any imperfection in the appearance of the organic apples, this segment is significantly reduced. Furthermore, we find that there is a significant effect of interaction between cosmetic damage and product methods. Even though most consumers say they buy organic products to avoid pesticides, we find that cosmetic damage has a larger impact on the willingness to pay for organic apples than for conventional apples.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.

Improving Transition Outcomes: MyTransitionIowa.org Resource Mapping Product

Information about Improving Transition Outcomes statewide resource mapping product.

Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.

The effects of uncertainty avoidance on brand performance: Marketing creativity, product innovation and the brand duration

This paper investigates the link between brand performance and cultural primes in high-risk,innovation-based sectors. In theory section, we propose that the level of cultural uncertaintyavoidance embedded in a firm determine its marketing creativity by increasing the complexityand the broadness of a brand. It determines also the rate of firm product innovations.Marketing creativity and product innovation influence finally the firm marketingperformance. Empirically, we study trademarked promotion in the Software Security Industry(SSI). Our sample consists of 87 firms that are active in SSI from 11 countries in the period1993-2000. We use the data coming from SSI-related trademarks registered by these firms,ending up with 2,911 SSI-related trademarks and a panel of 18,213 observations. We estimatea two stage model in which first we predict the complexity and the broadness of a trademarkas a measure of marketing creativity and the rate of product innovations. Among severalcontrol variables, our variable of theoretical interest is the Hofstede s uncertainty avoidancecultural index. Then, we estimate the trademark duration with a hazard model using thepredicted complexity and broadness as well as the rate of product innovations, along with thesame control variables. Our evidence confirms that the cultural avoidance affects the durationof the trademarks through the firm marketing creativity and product innovation.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceuticalmarkets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model canexplain the observation that countries with stronger regulations havesmaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences inobserved regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higherproportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closelyrelated model can account for the observed increase in prices by patentowners after entry of generic producers.

Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Translation to success of surgical innovation.

Contemporary thoracic and cardiovascular surgery uses extensive equipment and devices to enable its performance. As the specialties develop and new frontiers are crossed, the technology needs to advance in a parallel fashion. Strokes of genius or problem-solving brain-storming may generate great ideas, but the metamorphosis of an idea into a physical functioning tool requires a lot more than just a thinking process. A modern surgical device is the end-point of a sophisticated, complicated and potentially treacherous route, which incorporates new skills and knowledge acquisition. Processes including technology transfer, commercialisation, corporate and product development, intellectual property and regulatory routes all play pivotal roles in this voyage. Many good ideas may fall by the wayside for a multitude of reasons as they may not be marketable or may be badly marketed. In this article, we attempt to illuminate the components required in the process of surgical innovation, which we believe must remain in the remit of the modern-day thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon.