Incentivising tenants to stay the term – will clawbacks be enforceable?

Incentives are commonly offered by commercial landlords to tenants in the form of short term rent deductions or contributions to the tenant’s fitout. Usually these incentives are conditional upon the lessee remaining in the premises for the term of the lease with an obligation on the tenant to repay a proportion of the fitout contribution and rent deductions upon early termination or assignment. While the enforceability of clawback provisions has always been unclear, there was commercial benefit to landlords in maintaining high rentals on the face of the lease and attracting good quality tenants through fitout contributions. The use of clawback provisions as part of these incentives was recently analysed by the Queensland Supreme Court through the lens of the penalties doctrine in GWC Property Group Pty Ltd v Higginson & Ors [2014] QSC 264, with a negative outcome for the landlord. Unless the decision is overturned on appeal, the salient message for landlords is that repayment of incentives for any reason, not just a breach of the lease, is unlikely to be enforceable.

Studies on the Effects of Property Taxation, Rent Control and Housing Allowances

Tämä väitöskirja koostuu asuntomarkkinoiden taloustieteellistä analyysia esittelevästä johdantoluvusta ja kolmesta tutkimuksesta, joissa analysoidaan asuntomarkkinoihin vaikuttavia politiikkatoimenpiteitä. Luvussa 2 tutkitaan Suomen kiinteistöverojärjestelmän vaikutusta asuntorakentamiseen. Vuonna 2001 tehtiin uudistus, jonka myötä kunnat voivat verottaa rakentamatonta asuintonttia korkeammalla veroasteella kuin rakennettua tonttia. Maanomistajan rakentamispäätöksen teoreettisen mallin mukaan rakentamattoman tontin korotettu kiinteistöveron pitäisi nopeuttaa rakentamista, mutta toisaalta myös rakentamiseen investoitu rahamäärä saattaa muuttua. Asuintonttien kiinteistöverojen yleinen taso ei vaikuta maanomistajan käyttäytymiseen, sillä tontin verotusarvo ei riipu rakentamispäätöksestä. Vain rakentamattoman ja rakennetun tontin veroasteiden erolla on merkitystä. Empiiriset tulokset ovat sopusoinnussa teorian kanssa. Tulosten mukaan prosenttiyksikön nousu rakentamattoman ja rakennetun tontin veroasteiden erossa lisää omakotialoitusten määrää viidellä prosentilla lyhyellä aikavälillä. Luvussa 3 analysoidaan vuokrasääntelystä vuokralaisille aiheutuvia hyötyjä ja haittoja. Vuokrasäännellyissä asunnoissa asuvat kotitaloudet hyötyvät vuokrasääntelystä alhaisen vuokran muodossa. Heille saattaa kuitenkin koitua myös haittaa siitä, että toiveita vastaavan asunnon löytäminen on vuokrasääntelytilanteessa vaikeaa, koska vapaille asunnoille on suuri määrä ottajia. Vapaarahoitteisen vuokra-asuntokannan vuokrien sääntely purettiin Suomessa asteittain vuosina 1992–1995. Tutkimuksen empiiriset tulokset viittaavat siihen, että vuokrasääntelyn aiheuttamista suurista eroista halutun ja todellisen asuntokulutuksen välillä koituvat hyvinvointitappiot kumosivat merkittävän osan matalien vuokrien hyödyistä vuokralaisille. Luvussa 4 tutkitaan Suomen asumistukijärjestelmän kannustinvaikutuksia. Asumistuen määrää rajoittavat asunnon pinta-alalle ja neliövuokralle asetetut ylärajat. Neliövuokrarajoite voidaan tulkita asumisen laatua rajoittavana tekijänä. Tutkimuksen teoreettisessa osassa osoitetaan, että asumistukijärjestelmä luo vahvat kannustimet muuttaa asuntoihin, joissa pinta-ala- ja laaturajoitteet purevat. Empiiristen tulosten mukaan asumistukeen oikeutetut kotitaloudet eivät näytä reagoivan kannusteisiin. Tukeen oikeutettujen kotitalouksien asumisvalinnat suhteessa pinta-ala ja laaturajoitteisiin vastaavat muiden kotitalouksien valintoja ja asunnonvaihdon mahdollistama potentiaalinen asumistuen lisäys ei nosta muuttotodennäköisyyttä. Muuttamiseen liittyvät kustannukset ja vajavaiset tiedot tukijärjestelmästä saattavat selittää heikkoa reagointia asumistuen luomiin kannustimiin. Toinen mahdollinen selitys on asumistuen vajaakäyttö. Tutkimuksen mukaan vain 70–80 prosenttia asumistukeen oikeutetuista kotitalouksista nostaa tukea. Asumistuen hyödyntämisen todennäköisyys riippuu koulutustasosta, tuen määrästä ja tulo-odotuksista.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

Forestry Sector Reform and Distributional Change of Natural Resource Rent in Indonesia

After the collapse of the centralized Soeharto regime, deforestation caused by over-logging accelerated. To tackle this problem, an IMF/World Bank-led forestry sector reform program adopted a market-friendly approach involving the resumption of round wood exports and raising of the resource rent fee, with the aim to stop rent accumulation by plywood companies, which had enjoyed a supply of round wood at privileged prices. The Indonesian government, for its part, decentralized the forest concession management system to provide incentives for local governments and communities to carry out sustainable forest management. However, neither policy reform worked effectively. The round wood export ban was reimposed and the forest management system centralized again with cooperation from a newly funded industry-led institution. In the midst of the confusion surrounding the policy reversal, the gap between the price of round wood in international and domestic markets failed to contract, although rent allocations to plywood industries were reduced during 1998-2003. The rents were not collected properly by the government, but accumulated unexpectedly in the hands of players in the black market for round wood.

Individual firms and regional business clusters : the HRM advantage in rent generation

Much of the literature on clusters has focused on the economic advantages of clusters and how these can be achieved in terms of competition, regional development and local spillovers. Some studies have focused at the level of the individual firm however human resource management (HRM) in individual clustered firms has received scant attention. This paper innovatively utilises the extended Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm as a framework to conceptualise the human resource processes of individual firms within a cluster. RBV is argued as a useful tool as it explains external rents outside a firm’s boundaries. The paper concludes that HRM can assist in generating rents for firms and clusters more broadly when the function supports valuable interfirm relationships important for realising inter-firm advantages.

Incentives to underprice

an initial public offering, the choices made by issuers, such as the offer price, might not appear to be wealth maximizing. In this article, we argue that the choices are strategic. Based on the model developed by Barry (1989), we show that the average change in the issuer's wealth (4.52 per cent) is lower than the average loss implied by underpricing (12.09 per cent). Our results support the notion that the choices issuers make at the offering generate a compensatory benefit in the aftermarket. That the issuer may well not suffer a net wealth loss from the offering is in accordance with continued initial public offering activity.

Financial incentives and advanced construction procurement systems

Construction clients often use financial incentives to encourage stakeholder motivation and commitment to voluntary higher-order project goals. Despite the increased use of financial incentives, there is little literature addressing means of optimizing outcomes. Using a case study methodology, the examination of a successful Australian construction project demonstrates the features of a positively geared procurement approach that promotes the effectiveness of financial incentives. The research results show that if the incentive system is perceived to be fair and is applied to reward exceptional performance, and not to manipulate, then contractors are more likely to be positively motivated.

Motivating construction organisations through incentives : a case study for client-side project managers

Client-side project managers face challenges in motivating project organisations to pursue exceptional design and construction performance. One approach to improving the motivation of project organisations is by offering a financial incentive reward for the achievement of voluntary performance standards above the minimum required standard. However, little investigation has been undertaken into the features of a successful incentive system as a part of an overall procurement strategy. In response to a lack of information available to client-side project managers tasked with the initial design of an incentive system, the paper explores motivation under a successful incentive and identifies key learnings for client-side project managers to consider when designing incentives. Our findings are based on the results of a large Australian case study which is interpreted against a conceptual framework based on both economic and psychological perspectives of motivation. The results suggest that motivation towards incentive goals is influenced by the value the project organisations place on the incentive reward as a commercial opportunity to increase their profit margins. However, perhaps more important are the relationship management processes that promote commitment to the project; and pride in the achievement of project goals. In the case study, these processes intensified the direct motivational effect of the incentive reward on offer. The findings also highlight the importance of ensuring that incentive goals and performance measurement processes remain relevant to the organisations throughout a project to continuously encourage motivation under changing project conditions.

Client recommendations for financial incentives on construction projects

Purpose: To provide recommendations for construction clients who design and implement financial incentive mechanisms (FIMs) on projects. ---------- Methodology: Four large Australian building projects commissioned by government clients under managing contractor contracts and completed between 2001 and 2005 were examined to explore the ‘drivers’ that promoted motivation toward financial incentive goals. The results were triangulated across data sources, projects and stakeholder types. ---------- Findings: FIM design should incorporate: 1. flexibility to modify goals and measurement procedures over time, 2. multiple goals covering different project areas, 3. distribution of rewards across all the key organizations contributing to team performance (e.g. potentially not just the contractor, but the subcontractors and consultants) and a reward amount sufficient to be valued by potential recipients. FIM benefits are maximized through the following complementary procurement initiatives: 4. equitable contract risk allocation, 5. early contractor involvement in design, 6. value-driven tender selection, 7. relationship workshops, and 8. future work opportunities.---------- Research Limitations: This paper provides practical recommendations to industry and hence does not emphasize theoretical aspects.---------- Practical Implications: The uptake of these recommendations is likely to increase the impact of FIMs on motivation and improve project and industry outcomes. Although the study focuses on government clients of building projects, all the recommendations would seem to apply equally to private-sector clients and to non-building projects.---------- Originality: In order to improve motivation and reward high performance, clients are increasingly using FIM in their construction contracts. Despite the rising use of financial incentives, there is a lack of comprehensive construction-specific knowledge available to help clients maximize outcomes. The study addresses this gap in the literature.

Evaluation of financial incentives as a quality improvement strategy in the public hospital context : clinician attitudes, design variables, and economic costs

In 2008, a three-year pilot ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) program, known as ‘Clinical Practice Improvement Payment’ (CPIP) was introduced into Queensland Health (QHealth). QHealth is a large public health sector provider of acute, community, and public health services in Queensland, Australia. The organisation has recently embarked on a significant reform agenda including a review of existing funding arrangements (Duckett et al., 2008). Partly in response to this reform agenda, a casemix funding model has been implemented to reconnect health care funding with outcomes. CPIP was conceptualised as a performance-based scheme that rewarded quality with financial incentives. This is the first time such a scheme has been implemented into the public health sector in Australia with a focus on rewarding quality, and it is unique in that it has a large state-wide focus and includes 15 Districts. CPIP initially targeted five acute and community clinical areas including Mental Health, Discharge Medication, Emergency Department, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Stroke. The CPIP scheme was designed around key concepts including the identification of clinical indicators that met the set criteria of: high disease burden, a well defined single diagnostic group or intervention, significant variations in clinical outcomes and/or practices, a good evidence, and clinician control and support (Ward, Daniels, Walker & Duckett, 2007). This evaluative research targeted Phase One of implementation of the CPIP scheme from January 2008 to March 2009. A formative evaluation utilising a mixed methodology and complementarity analysis was undertaken. The research involved three research questions and aimed to determine the knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of clinicians; identify improvements to the design, administration, and monitoring of CPIP; and determine the financial and economic costs of the scheme. Three key studies were undertaken to ascertain responses to the key research questions. Firstly, a survey of clinicians was undertaken to examine levels of knowledge and understanding and their attitudes to the scheme. Secondly, the study sought to apply Statistical Process Control (SPC) to the process indicators to assess if this enhanced the scheme and a third study examined a simple economic cost analysis. The CPIP Survey of clinicians elicited 192 clinician respondents. Over 70% of these respondents were supportive of the continuation of the CPIP scheme. This finding was also supported by the results of a quantitative altitude survey that identified positive attitudes in 6 of the 7 domains-including impact, awareness and understanding and clinical relevance, all being scored positive across the combined respondent group. SPC as a trending tool may play an important role in the early identification of indicator weakness for the CPIP scheme. This evaluative research study supports a previously identified need in the literature for a phased introduction of Pay for Performance (P4P) type programs. It further highlights the value of undertaking a formal risk assessment of clinician, management, and systemic levels of literacy and competency with measurement and monitoring of quality prior to a phased implementation. This phasing can then be guided by a P4P Design Variable Matrix which provides a selection of program design options such as indicator target and payment mechanisms. It became evident that a clear process is required to standardise how clinical indicators evolve over time and direct movement towards more rigorous ‘pay for performance’ targets and the development of an optimal funding model. Use of this matrix will enable the scheme to mature and build the literacy and competency of clinicians and the organisation as implementation progresses. Furthermore, the research identified that CPIP created a spotlight on clinical indicators and incentive payments of over five million from a potential ten million was secured across the five clinical areas in the first 15 months of the scheme. This indicates that quality was rewarded in the new QHealth funding model, and despite issues being identified with the payment mechanism, funding was distributed. The economic model used identified a relative low cost of reporting (under $8,000) as opposed to funds secured of over $300,000 for mental health as an example. Movement to a full cost effectiveness study of CPIP is supported. Overall the introduction of the CPIP scheme into QHealth has been a positive and effective strategy for engaging clinicians in quality and has been the catalyst for the identification and monitoring of valuable clinical process indicators. This research has highlighted that clinicians are supportive of the scheme in general; however, there are some significant risks that include the functioning of the CPIP payment mechanism. Given clinician support for the use of a pay–for-performance methodology in QHealth, the CPIP scheme has the potential to be a powerful addition to a multi-faceted suite of quality improvement initiatives within QHealth.