Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.

Complexidade, excesso de opções e paralisia decisória : evidências para a indústria de investimentos brasileira

Esta dissertação busca investigar a hipótese de sobrecarga de opções, denominada em inglês como choice overload, associada ao aumento de complexidade e da quantidade de informações disponíveis, ou information overload, abordada e discutida por pesquisadores como O’Donoghue e Rabin (1998), Iyengar e Lepper (2000), Schwartz (2002), Iyengar, Jiang e Huberman (2003) e Gourville e Soman (2005). Neste trabalho, a investigação será no contexto da indústria de produtos de investimento brasileira. Para isso, através de uma pesquisa empírica, simulamos a decisão de um investidor comum diante de diferentes cenários propostos, com menos ou mais opções e menos ou mais informações. Em linha com as pesquisas citadas, evidências mostraram a importância de se considerar e avaliar esses efeitos, ainda que hipóteses previamente estabelecidas não tenham sido confirmadas e experimentos mais amplos precisem ser realizados. Neste estudo, quando a oferta se resume a apenas um fundo de investimento, mesmo que claramente melhor do que o cenário inicial, um alto índice de 32% ainda decide procrastinar a decisão, ou seja, apresentar apenas uma opção, o extremo oposto de choice overload, não se apresentou como uma solução eficaz. Também foram propostos outros dois cenários, ambos quase idênticos, com cinco alternativas de fundos de investimento e informações de retorno esperado e risco para cada um deles. No entanto, um desses dois cenários disponibilizava hyperlinks direcionando para lâminas com informações adicionais para cada fundo de investimento. Mesmo com a opção de ignorá-las, a sua apresentação fez com que o índice de procrastinação aumentasse de 16% para 28%, resultado diretamente relacionado a regret aversion. Estudos anteriores mostram que há altas chances de que essa procrastinação se perpetue.

An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Game under Ambiguities

Security is a critical concern around the world. Since resources for security are always limited, lots of interest have arisen in using game theory to handle security resource allocation problems. However, most of the existing work does not address adequately how a defender chooses his optimal strategy in a game with absent, inaccurate, uncertain, and even ambiguous strategy profiles' payoffs. To address this issue, we propose a general framework of security games under ambiguities based on Dempster-Shafer theory and the ambiguity aversion principle of minimax regret. Then, we reveal some properties of this framework. Also, we present two methods to reduce the influence of complete ignorance. Our investigation shows that this new framework is better in handling security resource allocation problems under ambiguities.

Inequality Aversion and Performance in and on the Field

The experimental literature and studies using survey data have established that people care a great deal about their relative economic position and not solely, as standard economic theory assumes, about their absolute economic position. Individuals are concerned about social comparisons. However, behavioral evidence in the field is rare. This paper provides an empirical analysis, testing the model of inequality aversion using two unique panel data sets for basketball and soccer players. We find support that the concept of inequality aversion helps to understand how the relative income situation affects performance in a real competitive environment with real tasks and real incentives.

A Stochastic View of Optimal Regret through Minimax Duality

We study the regret of optimal strategies for online convex optimization games. Using von Neumann's minimax theorem, we show that the optimal regret in this adversarial setting is closely related to the behavior of the empirical minimization algorithm in a stochastic process setting: it is equal to the maximum, over joint distributions of the adversary's action sequence, of the difference between a sum of minimal expected losses and the minimal empirical loss. We show that the optimal regret has a natural geometric interpretation, since it can be viewed as the gap in Jensen's inequality for a concave functional--the minimizer over the player's actions of expected loss--defined on a set of probability distributions. We use this expression to obtain upper and lower bounds on the regret of an optimal strategy for a variety of online learning problems. Our method provides upper bounds without the need to construct a learning algorithm; the lower bounds provide explicit optimal strategies for the adversary. Peter L. Bartlett, Alexander Rakhlin

Closing the gap between bandit and full-information online optimization : high-probability regret bound

We demonstrate a modification of the algorithm of Dani et al for the online linear optimization problem in the bandit setting, which allows us to achieve an O( \sqrt{T ln T} ) regret bound in high probability against an adaptive adversary, as opposed to the in expectation result against an oblivious adversary of Dani et al. We obtain the same dependence on the dimension as that exhibited by Dani et al. The results of this paper rest firmly on those of Dani et al and the remarkable technique of Auer et al for obtaining high-probability bounds via optimistic estimates. This paper answers an open question: it eliminates the gap between the high-probability bounds obtained in the full-information vs bandit settings.

Optimistic linear programming gives logarithmic regret for irreducible MDPs

We present an algorithm called Optimistic Linear Programming (OLP) for learning to optimize average reward in an irreducible but otherwise unknown Markov decision process (MDP). OLP uses its experience so far to estimate the MDP. It chooses actions by optimistically maximizing estimated future rewards over a set of next-state transition probabilities that are close to the estimates, a computation that corresponds to solving linear programs. We show that the total expected reward obtained by OLP up to time T is within C(P) log T of the reward obtained by the optimal policy, where C(P) is an explicit, MDP-dependent constant. OLP is closely related to an algorithm proposed by Burnetas and Katehakis with four key differences: OLP is simpler, it does not require knowledge of the supports of transition probabilities, the proof of the regret bound is simpler, but our regret bound is a constant factor larger than the regret of their algorithm. OLP is also similar in flavor to an algorithm recently proposed by Auer and Ortner. But OLP is simpler and its regret bound has a better dependence on the size of the MDP.

High-probability regret bounds for bandit online linear optimization

We present a modification of the algorithm of Dani et al. [8] for the online linear optimization problem in the bandit setting, which with high probability has regret at most O ∗ ( √ T) against an adaptive adversary. This improves on the previous algorithm [8] whose regret is bounded in expectation against an oblivious adversary. We obtain the same dependence on the dimension (n 3/2) as that exhibited by Dani et al. The results of this paper rest firmly on those of [8] and the remarkable technique of Auer et al. [2] for obtaining high probability bounds via optimistic estimates. This paper answers an open question: it eliminates the gap between the high-probability bounds obtained in the full-information vs bandit settings.

Self-gifting guilt : an examination of self-gifting motivations and post-purchase regret

Purpose Self-gifting is a performative process in which consumers purchase products for themselves. The literature to date remains silent on a determination and connection between the extents of post-purchase regret resulting from self-gifting behavior. The purpose of this paper is to examine identification and connection of self-gifting antecedents, self-gifting and the effect on post purchase regret. Design/methodology/approach This study claims the two antecedents of hedonistic shopping and indulgence drive self-gifting behaviors and the attendant regret. A total of 307 shoppers responded to a series of statements concerning the relationships between antecedents of self-gifting behavior and the effect on post-purchase regret. Self-gifting is a multi-dimensional construct, consisting of therapeutic, celebratory, reward and hedonistic imports. Confirmatory factor analysis and AMOS path modeling enabled examination of relationships between the consumer traits of hedonistic shopping and indulgence and the four self-gifting concepts. Findings Hedonic and indulgent shoppers engage in self-gifting for different reasons. A strong and positive relationship was identified between hedonic shoppers and reward, hedonic, therapeutic and celebratory self-gift motivations. hedonic shoppers aligned with indulgent shoppers who also engaged the four self-gifting concepts. The only regret concerning purchase of self-gifts was evident in the therapeutic and celebratory self-gift motivations. Research limitations/implications A major limitation was the age range specification of 18 to 45 years which meant the omission of older generations of regular and experienced shoppers. This study emphasizes the importance of variations in self-gift behaviors and of post-purchase consumer regret. Originality/value This research is the first examination of an hedonic attitude to shopping and indulgent antecedents to self-gift purchasing, the concepts of self-gift motivations and their effect on post-purchase regret.

The Pareto regret frontier

Performance guarantees for online learning algorithms typically take the form of regret bounds, which express that the cumulative loss overhead compared to the best expert in hindsight is small. In the common case of large but structured expert sets we typically wish to keep the regret especially small compared to simple experts, at the cost of modest additional overhead compared to more complex others. We study which such regret trade-offs can be achieved, and how. We analyse regret w.r.t. each individual expert as a multi-objective criterion in the simple but fundamental case of absolute loss. We characterise the achievable and Pareto optimal trade-offs, and the corresponding optimal strategies for each sample size both exactly for each finite horizon and asymptotically.

Surrogate Regret Bounds for Bipartite Ranking via Strongly Proper Losses

The problem of bipartite ranking, where instances are labeled positive or negative and the goal is to learn a scoring function that minimizes the probability of mis-ranking a pair of positive and negative instances (or equivalently, that maximizes the area under the ROC curve), has been widely studied in recent years. A dominant theoretical and algorithmic framework for the problem has been to reduce bipartite ranking to pairwise classification; in particular, it is well known that the bipartite ranking regret can be formulated as a pairwise classification regret, which in turn can be upper bounded using usual regret bounds for classification problems. Recently, Kotlowski et al. (2011) showed regret bounds for bipartite ranking in terms of the regret associated with balanced versions of the standard (non-pairwise) logistic and exponential losses. In this paper, we show that such (non-pairwise) surrogate regret bounds for bipartite ranking can be obtained in terms of a broad class of proper (composite) losses that we term as strongly proper. Our proof technique is much simpler than that of Kotlowski et al. (2011), and relies on properties of proper (composite) losses as elucidated recently by Reid and Williamson (2010, 2011) and others. Our result yields explicit surrogate bounds (with no hidden balancing terms) in terms of a variety of strongly proper losses, including for example logistic, exponential, squared and squared hinge losses as special cases. An important consequence is that standard algorithms minimizing a (non-pairwise) strongly proper loss, such as logistic regression and boosting algorithms (assuming a universal function class and appropriate regularization), are in fact consistent for bipartite ranking; moreover, our results allow us to quantify the bipartite ranking regret in terms of the corresponding surrogate regret. We also obtain tighter surrogate bounds under certain low-noise conditions via a recent result of Clemencon and Robbiano (2011).

Values and actions in aversion

Model-based and model-free controllers can, in principle, learn arbitrary actions to optimize their behavior, at least those actions that can be expressed and explored. Indeed, these are often referred to as instrumental controllers because their choices are learned to be instrumental for the delivery of desired outcomes. Although this flexibility is very powerful, it comes with an attendant cost of learning. Evolution appears to have endowed everything from the simplest organisms to us with powerful, pre-specified, but inflexible alternatives. These responses are termed Pavlovian, after the famous Russian physiologist and psychologist Pavlov. The responses of the Pavlovian controller are determined by evolutionary (phylogenetic) considerations rather than (ontogenetic) aspects of the contingent development or learning of an individual. These responses directly interact with instrumental choices arising from goal-directed and habitual controllers. This interaction has been studied in a wealth of animal paradigms, and can be helpful, neutral, or harmful, according to circumstance. Although there has been less careful or analytical study of it in humans, it can be interpreted as underpinning a wealth of behavioral aberrations. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.