Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Do dividends signal more earnings?

Signaling models have contributed to the corporate finance literature by formalizing "the informational content of dividends" hypothesis. However, these models are under criticism of empirical literature, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predicitions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim thaht the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The models developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show thaht signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

Do dividends signal more earnings? a theoretical analysis

The signaling models have contributed to the literature of corporate finance by the formalization of "the informational content of dividends hypothesis". However, these models are under criticism of empirical works, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predictions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim that the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The mo deIs developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show that signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

The Monotonicity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation of Incentive Structures

Non-monotone incentive structures, which - according to theory - are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled laboratory conditions. Implementing some features relevant to real-world employment relationships, our paper demonstrates that, in fact, the frequency of income-maximizing decisions made by agents is higher under the monotone contract. Although this observed behavior does not change the superiority of the non-monotone contract for principals, they do not choose this contract type in a significant way. This is what we call the monotonicity puzzle. Detailed investigations of decisions provide a clue for solving the puzzle and a possible explanation for the popularity of monotone contracts.

Essais en économie avec frictions financières

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats.

Structures quantiques de certaines sous-variétés lagrangiennes non-monotones

Soit (M,ω) un variété symplectique fermée et connexe.On considère des sous-variétés lagrangiennes α : L → (M,ω). Si α est monotone, c.- à-d. s’il existe η > 0 tel que ημ = ω, Paul Biran et Octav Conea ont défini une version relative de l’homologie quantique. Dans ce contexte ils ont déformé l’opérateur de bord du complexe de Morse ainsi que le produit d’intersection à l’aide de disques pseudo-holomorphes. On note (QH(L), ∗), l’homologie quantique de L munie du produit quantique. Le principal objectif de cette dissertation est de généraliser leur construction à un classe plus large d’espaces. Plus précisément on considère soit des sous-variétés presque monotone, c.-à-d. α est C1-proche d’un plongement lagrangian monotone ; soit les fibres toriques de variétés toriques Fano. Dans ces cas non nécessairement monotones, QH(L) va dépendre de certains choix, mais cela sera irrelevant pour les applications présentées ici. Dans le cas presque monotone, on s’intéresse principalement à des questions de déplaçabilité, d’uniréglage et d’estimation d’énergie de difféomorphismes hamiltoniens. Enfin nous terminons par une application combinant les deux approches, concernant la dynamique d’un hamiltonien déplaçant toutes les fibres toriques non-monotones dans CPn.

Profitability and the poor: corporate strategies, innovation and sustainability

Based on empirical evidence, the article looks at the implications of private sector participation (PSP) for the delivery of water supply and sanitation to the urban and peri-urban poor in developing countries, with particular reference to Africa and Latin America. More precisely, the article addresses the impact produced by multinational companies’ (MNCs) strategies, in light of the pursuit of profitability, on the extension of connections to the pipeline network. It does so by questioning the assumptions that greater private sector efficiency and innovation, together with contract design, will enable the sustainable extension of service coverage to low income dwellers. The strategies of the major water MNCs are considered both in relation to the global expansion of their operations and the adjustment of local strategies to commercial considerations. The latter might result in identifying proWtable markets, modifying contractual provisions, attempting to reduce costs and increase income, reducing risks and exiting from non-performing contracts. The evidence reviewed allows for re-assessing the relative roles of the public and private sectors in extending and delivering water services to the poor. First, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity than from MNCs. Secondly, whenever MNCs are liable to exit from non-profitable contracts, the public sector has no other option than to deal with external risks aVecting continuity of provision. Finally, market limitations affecting MNCs’ ability to serve marginal populations and access cheap capital do not apply to well-organised, politically led public sector undertakings

The Shape of the Risk Premium: Evidence from a Semiparametric Garch Model.

We examine the relationship between the risk premium on the S&P 500 index return and its conditional variance. We use the SMEGARCH - Semiparametric-Mean EGARCH - model in which the conditional variance process is EGARCH while the conditional mean is an arbitrary function of the conditional variance. For monthly S&P 500 excess returns, the relationship between the two moments that we uncover is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. Moreover, we find considerable persistence in the conditional variance as well as a leverage effect, as documented by others. Moreover, the shape of these relationships seems to be relatively stable over time.

Quelques propriétés des sous-variétés lagrangiennes monotones : Rayon de Gromov et morphisme de Seidel

Cette thèse présente quelques propriétés des sous-variétés lagrangiennes monotones. On résoud d'abord une conjecture de Barraud et Cornea dans le cadre monotone en montrant que le rayon de Gromov relatif à deux lagrangiennes dans la même classe d'isotopie hamiltonienne donne une borne inférieure à la distance de Hofer entre ces deux mêmes lagrangiennes. Le cas non-monotone de cette conjecture reste ouvert encore. On définit toutes les structures nécessaires à l'énoncé et à la preuve de cette conjecture. Deuxièmement, on définit une nouvelle version d'un morphisme de Seidel relatif à l'aide des cobordismes lagrangiens de Biran et Cornea. On montre que cette version est chaîne-homotope aux différentes autres versions apparaissant dans la littérature. Que toutes ces définitions sont équivalentes fait partie du folklore mais n'apparaît pas dans la littérature. On conclut par une conjecture qui identifie un triangle exact obtenu par chirurgie lagrangienne et un autre dû à Seidel et faisant intervenir le twist de Dehn symplectique.

Méthode de simulation avec les variables antithétiques

Les fichiers qui accompagnent mon document ont été réalisés avec le logiciel Latex et les simulations ont été réalisés par Splus(R).

Analyse de la structure logique des inférences légales et modélisation du discours juridique

Thèse par articles.

CD-Systems of Restarting Automata Governed by Explicit Enable and Disable Conditions

We introduce a new mode of operation for CD-systems of restarting automata by providing explicit enable and disable conditions in the form of regular constraints. We show that, for each CD-system M of restarting automata and each mode m of operation considered by Messerschmidt and Otto, there exists a CD-system M' of restarting automata of the same type as M that, working in the new mode ed, accepts the language that M accepts in mode m. Further, we prove that in mode ed, a locally deterministic CD-system of restarting automata of type RR(W)(W) can be simulated by a locally deterministic CD-system of restarting automata of the more restricted type R(W)(W). This is the first time that a non-monotone type of R-automaton without auxiliary symbols is shown to be as expressive as the corresponding type of RR-automaton.

Motivational interviewing and feedback for college drinkers: Handling missing values with complete case analysis and multiple imputation

Objective: In this secondary data analysis, three statistical methodologies were implemented to handle cases with missing data in a motivational interviewing and feedback study. The aim was to evaluate the impact that these methodologies have on the data analysis. ^ Methods: We first evaluated whether the assumption of missing completely at random held for this study. We then proceeded to conduct a secondary data analysis using a mixed linear model to handle missing data with three methodologies (a) complete case analysis, (b) multiple imputation with explicit model containing outcome variables, time, and the interaction of time and treatment, and (c) multiple imputation with explicit model containing outcome variables, time, the interaction of time and treatment, and additional covariates (e.g., age, gender, smoke, years in school, marital status, housing, race/ethnicity, and if participants play on athletic team). Several comparisons were conducted including the following ones: 1) the motivation interviewing with feedback group (MIF) vs. the assessment only group (AO), the motivation interviewing group (MIO) vs. AO, and the intervention of the feedback only group (FBO) vs. AO, 2) MIF vs. FBO, and 3) MIF vs. MIO.^ Results: We first evaluated the patterns of missingness in this study, which indicated that about 13% of participants showed monotone missing patterns, and about 3.5% showed non-monotone missing patterns. Then we evaluated the assumption of missing completely at random by Little's missing completely at random (MCAR) test, in which the Chi-Square test statistic was 167.8 with 125 degrees of freedom, and its associated p-value was p=0.006, which indicated that the data could not be assumed to be missing completely at random. After that, we compared if the three different strategies reached the same results. For the comparison between MIF and AO as well as the comparison between MIF and FBO, only the multiple imputation with additional covariates by uncongenial and congenial models reached different results. For the comparison between MIF and MIO, all the methodologies for handling missing values obtained different results. ^ Discussions: The study indicated that, first, missingness was crucial in this study. Second, to understand the assumptions of the model was important since we could not identify if the data were missing at random or missing not at random. Therefore, future researches should focus on exploring more sensitivity analyses under missing not at random assumption.^

A tale of oversimplification and deregulation: the mainstream approach to labour market segmentation and the recent responses to the crisis in European countries. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 102/2013

After advocating flexibilization of non-standard work contracts for many years, some European and international institutions and several policy makers now indicate the standard employment relationship and its regulation as a cause of segmentation between the labour market of "guaranteed" insiders, employed under permanent contracts with effective protection against unfair dismissal, and the market of the “not-guaranteed” outsiders, working with non-standard contracts. Reforms of employment legislation are therefore being promoted and approved in different countries, allegedly aiming to balance the legal protection afforded to standard and non-standard workers. This article firstly argues that this approach is flawed as it oversimplifies reasons of segmentation as it concentrates on an “insiders-outsiders” discourse that cannot easily be transplanted in continental Europe. After reviewing current legislative changes in Italy, Spain and Portugal, it is then argued that lawmakers are focused on “deregulation” rather than “balancing protection” when approving recent reforms. Finally, the mainstream approach to segmentation and some of its derivative proposals, such as calls to introduce a “single permanent contract”, are called into question, as they seem to neglect the essential role of job protection in underpinning the effectiveness of fundamental and constitutional rights at the workplace.