The Illinois Limited Liability Company Act.

Description based on: June 1994; title from cover.

The special rights other than shares in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union. A perspective from the Spanish Law

The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.

A guide for organizing domestic limited liability companies /

"April 2011"--Colophon.

Osakeyhtiölain maksukykytesti pienissä osakeyhtiöissä - tilitoimiston rooli neuvonantajana

Osakeyhtiölakiin on vuodesta 2006 asti sisältynyt maksukykytesti (OYL 13:2), jonka tulkinnallinen epäselvyys on motivoinut useita tutkimuksia ja melko kriittistäkin kirjoittelua. Säännöksen tarkoituksena on ehkäistä osakeyhtiön velkojia uhkaava varojenjako velvoittamalla yhtiön johto huolellisuusvelvoitteensa nojalla arvioimaan varojenjaon vaikutukset yhtiön maksukyvyn säilymiseen. Oikeuskäytännön puuttuessa maksukykytestin toteuttamistapaan liittyy kuitenkin edelleenkin merkittävää epävarmuutta. Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on pyrkiä selvittämään, miten osakeyhtiölain mukainen maksukykytesti pitäisi toteuttaa pienissä osakeyhtiöissä, joiden taloushallinto on kokonaan tai osittain ulkoistettu tilitoimistolle. Olennainen osa tutkimuksen tavoitetta on ottaa kantaa tilitoimiston rooliin maksukykytestin toteuttamisessa. Tutkimuksen johtopäätöksenä voidaan todeta, että yksityiskohtaisten tilinpäätöksen tunnuslukuihin perustuvien maksukykyarvioiden laatiminen maksukykytestin toteuttamiseksi on pienissä osakeyhtiöissä pääsääntöisesti tarpeetonta. Merkitystä tulisi sen sijaan antaa yhtiön johdolla olevalle hiljaiselle tiedolle, sillä yhtiön johto tuntee yrityksen tilanteen parhaiten ja kykenee siten myös arvioimaan tuleva kehitystä. Tilitoimiston rooliksi jää tällöin varmistaa, että asiakasyrityksen johto tuntee oman vastuuasemansa. Tutkimuksen perusteella tilitoimistot voisivat myös hyödyntää omaa asemaansa pienten yhtiöiden neuvonantajina nykyistä paremmin ohjeistamalla asiakasyrityksiään dokumentoimaan maksukykytestin hallituksen kokouspöytäkirjaan esimerkiksi osana hallituksen osingonjakoehdotusta.

Report of the departmental committee appointed by the Board of trade to inquire what amendments are necessary in the acts relating to joint stock companies incorporated with limited liability under the Companies acts, 1862 to 1890 : with appendix.

At head of title: Companies acts 1862 to 1890 (Amendment).

Limited liability corporations : administrative rules.

This booklet was published to help citizens to understand the rights, requirements, availability, and the use of names for registering a Limited Liability Company in Illinois and to explain what must be done to keep a limited liability company in good standing with the Office of the Secretary of State.

Why should Restrictive Clauses be applicable in Cases of Forced Selling of Limited Liability Company Shares?

In many European countries, one of the most complex and widely discussed issues addressed by legal systems with respect to forced selling of limited liability and public limited company shares is the impact of possible statutory restrictions on transfers . Thus, while some authors deny the applicability of such provisions (as a possible avenue for commission of creditor fraud) , others support their validity (on the basis of prevention of possible fraudulent actions affecting interests protected by restrictive causes). In my opinion, a solution must be found in which prosecution of creditor fraud co-exists with respect for the rights scheme. As a general rule, this solution would call for applicability of restrictive clauses to cases of forced selling, regardless of whether such statutory provisions are viewed in terms of order or alienation.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.