Relationship banking: does it lower information asymmetry or increase lender monopoly power?

A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

Monopoly, monopsony, and the value of culture in a digital age: An axiology of two multimedia resource repositories

Broadly speaking, axiology is the study of values. Axiologies are expressed materially in patterns of choices that are both culture-bound and definitive of different cultures. They are expressed in the language we use; in the friends we keep; in the clothes we wear; in what we read, write, and watch; in the technologies we use; in the gods we believe in and pray to; in the music we make and listen to—indeed, in every kind of activity that can be counted as a definitive element of culture. In what follows, I describe the axiological underpinnings of two closely related multimedia repository projects— Australian Creative Resources Online (ACRO) and The Canadian Centre for Cultural Innovation (CCCI)—and how these are oriented towards a potentially liberating role for digital repositories.

La preuve et la conservation de l'écrit dans la société de l'information

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.)"

La preuve et la conservation de l'écrit dans la société de l'information

Il est devenu commun de dire que notre société se transforme inexorablement en une société dite de « l'information ». Cette transformation se caractérise entre autres par une utilisation accrue des technologies de l’information afin de communiquer, d’échanger ou de transiger. Les supports traditionnels de communication (tel que le papier) cèdent progressivement leur place à de nouveaux supports technologiques favorisant l’efficacité et la rapidité des échanges, et par la même occasion le développement du commerce électronique. Qu’on le souhaite ou non, un constat s’impose : la montée en puissance des réseaux virtuels a eu raison du monopole du papier. Sur le plan juridique, cette nouvelle réalité bouleverse aussi considérablement les règles de droit civil largement pensées et ancrées dans un contexte papier. L’avènement de la numérisation et du phénomène de la dématérialisation des supports ont effectivement soulevé plusieurs questions d’ordre juridique tout à fait nouvelles que nous pourrions résumer de la manière suivante : Quels sont les rapports entre l’écrit et son support autre que le papier? Quelles sont les caractéristiques de l’écrit faisant appel aux technologies de l’information? Ce type d’écrit peut-il être admis en tant que moyen de preuve? Si oui, quelle sera sa force probante? Ce type d’écrit doit-il être conservé? Le présent mémoire vise précisément à identifier certains éléments de réponses à ces diverses questions en étudiant spécifiquement les cadres juridiques français et québécois. Ce mémoire traite d’une part des enjeux liés à l’évolution et au rôle de l’écrit face à l’avènement des technologies de l’information et d’autre part du cadre juridique de la preuve et de la conservation de l’écrit dans la société de l’information.

Asymmetric information, credit market condition, and entrepreneurial finance

The issue of imperfect information plays a much more important role in financing “informationally opaque” small businesses than in financing large companies.1 This chapter examines the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: the effects of relationship lending and the impacts of credit market concentration on entrepreneurial financial behavior. These two perspectives are strongly linked to each other via the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance. Existing literature has recognized the important role played by relationship lending in alleviating the problem of asymmetric information. However, mixed empirical results have been reported. For example, it has been found that the development of relationship lending can improve the availability of finance for small businesses borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reduce the costs of finance (Berger and Udell, 1995). Meanwhile, with monopoly power, banks may extract rents, in terms of charging higher-than-market interest rates, from small businesscustomers who have very concentrated banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001). In addition, both favorable and unfavorable effects of credit market concentration on financing small businesses have been acknowledged. Small business borrowers may have to pay a higher-than-market price on loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and are more likely to be financially constrained (Cetorelli, 2004) than in competitive markets. On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that market concentration create a strong motive for lenders to invest in private information from small business customers, and therefore a concentrated market is more efficient in terms of private information acquisition (Han et al., 2009b). The objective of this chapter is to investigate, by reviewing existing literature, the role played by relationship lending and the effects of market concentration on financing entrepreneurial businesses that are supposed to be informationally opaque. In the first section we review literature on the important role played by asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: asymmetric information and relationship lending, and the theoretical modeling of asymmetric information. Then we examine the relationship between capital market conditions and entrepreneurial finance and attempt to answer two questions: Why is the capital market condition important for entrepreneurial finance? and What are the effects of capital market conditions on entrepreneurial financial behavior in terms of discouraged borrowers, cash holding, and the availability and costs of finance?

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Health information management : What business are we in?

Developments in information technology will drive the change in records management; however, it should be the health information managers who drive the information management change. The role of health information management will be challenged to use information technology to broker a range of requests for information from a variety of users, including he alth consumers. The purposes of this paper are to conceptualise the role of health information management in the context of a technologically driven and managed health care environment, and to demonstrat e how this framework has been used to review and develop the undergraduate program in health information management at the Queensland University of Technology.