Foreign-currency and monetary geopolitics of United States and its effects on the future of the international system

The US dollar is still considered as the main strategic deposit among the currencies of different countries of the world and the policies of the World Bank and the International Financial Organizations have been and will always be influenced by the US economy. Despite the economic crises and commercial balance deficits in the United States, dollar has maintained its high position in and its domination over foreign exchanges and foreign-currency deposits of the countries. The novelty of the present research relies on its consideration of the political properties of the governments and the geopolitical effects of these countries on the position of their monetary and foreign-currency policies and consequently, on the international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which can determine the future of international economy and the political relations among countries. Our research proves that the political development of the United States and its geopolitical situation have been of the effective factors on dollar growth; and unless the competitors acquire such a relative advantage, they will not be able to seriously challenge the currency of dollar and the monetary policies of the United States, at least in a short time

Do equity and foreign currency risk premiums display common patterns?

In da Costa et al. (2006) we have shown how a same pricing kernel can account for the excess returns of the S&:P500 over the US short term bond and of the uncovered over the covered trading of foreign government bonds. In this paper we estimate and test the overidentifying restrictiom; of Euler equations associated with "ix different versions of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing I\Iodel. Our main finding is that the same (however often unreasonable) values for the parameters are estimated for ali models in both nmrkets. In most cases, the rejections or otherwise of overidentifying restrictions occurs for the two markets, suggesting that success and failure stories for the equity premium repeat themselves in foreign exchange markets. Our results corroborate the findings in da Costa et al. (2006) that indicate a strong similarity between the behavior of excess returns in the two markets when modeled as risk premiums, providing empirical grounds to believe that the proposed preference-based solutions to puzzles in domestic financiaI markets can certainly shed light on the Forward Premium Puzzle.

Do Foreign Currency Deposits Promote or Deter Financial Development in Low-Income Countries? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Country Data

Foreign currency deposits (FCD) are prevalent in many low-income developing countries, but their impact on bank lending has rarely been examined. An examination of cross-country data indicates that a higher proportion of FCD in total deposits is associated with growth in private credit only in inflationary circumstances (over 24 percent of the annual inflation rate). FCD can lead to a decline in private credit below this threshold level of inflation. Given that FCD exhibit persistence, deregulating them in low-income countries may do more harm than good on financial development in the long term, notably after successful containment of inflation.

The Euro as a Foreign Currency for Greece Friday, 19 June 2015

In contrast to his contribution just a month ago, which examined how a Greek parallel currency to the euro could allow the Greek government to gain some room for manoeuver in fiscal policy while at the same time continuing the adjustment programme demanded by the country’s creditors, Thomas Mayer explores in the present note the question of how the Greek population could still keep the euro after a default of its government. Contrary to general belief, he finds that Grexit and the reintroduction of the euro as a foreign currency would probably be positive for the Greek economy, although its creditors would be hard hit. It is therefore primarily in their interest that default and Grexit are avoided.

Special Foreign Currency Science Information Program list of translations in process.

At head of title: SFCSI

Efeitos da utilização de hedges cambiais nos resultados de empresas não financeiras: uma abordagem empírica

A realização de negócios em um mundo globalizado implica em aumentar a exposição das empresas não-financeiras a diversos riscos de origem financeira como câmbio, commodities e taxas de juros e que, dependendo da evolução destas variáveis macroeconômicas, podem afetar significativamente os resultados destas empresas. Existem diversas teorias acadêmicas que abordam sobre os benefícios gerados por programas de gestão de riscos em empresas não-financeiras como redução dos custos de financial distress e custos de agência bem como o uso de estratégias de hedge para fins fiscais. Tais iniciativas contribuiriam, em última instância, para a criação de valor para o negócio e poderiam garantir uma melhor previsibilidade dos fluxos de caixa futuros, tornando as empresas menos vulneráveis a condições adversas de mercado. Este trabalho apresenta dois estudos de caso com empresas não-financeiras brasileiras que possuíam exposições em moeda estrangeira e que não foram identificadas operações com derivativos cambiais durante o período de 1999 a 2005 que foi caracterizado pela alta volatilidade da taxa de câmbio. Através de modelos de simulação, algumas estratégias com o uso de derivativos foram propostas para as exposições cambiais identificadas para cada empresa com o objetivo de avaliar os efeitos da utilização destes derivativos cambiais sobre os resultados das empresas no que se refere à agregação de valor para o negócio e redução de volatilidade dos fluxos de caixa esperados. O trabalho não visa recomendar estratégias de hedge para determinada situação de mercado mas apenas demonstra, de forma empírica, quais os resultados seriam obtidos caso certas estratégias fossem adotadas, sabendo-se que inúmeras outras poderiam ser criadas para a mesma situação de mercado. Os resultados sugerem alguns insights sobre a utilização de derivativos por empresas não-financeiras sendo um tema relativamente novo para empresas brasileiras.

CEPAL Review no. 118

Special issue: 40 years of CEPAL Review

Essays in corporate risk management

This research investigates the factors that lead Latin American non-financial firms to manage risks using derivatives. The main focus is on currency risk management. With this purpose, this thesis is divided into an introduction and two main chapters, which have been written as stand-alone papers. The first paper describes the results of a survey on derivatives usage and risk management responded by the CFOs of 74 Brazilian non-financial firms listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), and the main evidence found is: i) larger firms are more likely to use financial derivatives; ii) foreign exchange risk is the most managed with derivatives; iii) Brazilian managers are more concerned with legal and institutional aspects in using derivatives, such as the taxation and accounting treatment of these instruments, than with issues related to implementing and maintaining a risk management program using derivatives. The second paper studies the determinants of risk management with derivatives in four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). I investigate not only the decision of whether to use financial derivatives or not, but also the magnitude of risk management, measured by the notional value of outstanding derivatives contracts. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to use derivatives holdings information in emerging markets. The use of a multi-country setting allows the analysis of institutional and economic factors, such as foreign currency indebtedness, the high volatility of exchange rates, the instability of political and institutional framework and the development of financial markets, which are issues of second-order importance in developed markets. The main contribution of the second paper is on the understanding of the relationship among currency derivatives usage, foreign debt and the sensitivity of operational earnings to currency fluctuations in Latin American countries. Unlikely previous findings for US firms, my evidence shows that derivatives held by Latin American firms are capable of producing cash flows comparable to financial expenses and investments, showing that derivatives are key instruments in their risk management strategies. It is also the first work to show strong and robust evidence that firms that benefit from local currency devaluation (e.g. exporters) have a natural currency hedge for foreign debt that allows them to bear higher levels of debt in foreign currency. This implies that firms under this revenue-cost structure require lower levels of hedging with derivatives. The findings also provide evidence that large firms are more likely to use derivatives, but the magnitude of derivatives holdings seems to be unrelated to the size of the firm, consistent with findings for US firms.

Capital flows to Latin America: recent developments

The external environment has deteriorated sharply as a result of the spiraling financial turmoil, and has led to a weakening in commodity prices and fears of a worldwide recession. Latin America and the Caribbean's fastest expansion in 40 years may be threatened as the global credit crunch makes financing scarce and squeezes demand for the region's commodities. This time around the region is better positioned to weather the crisis than in the past, given improvements in macroeconomic and financial policies as well as a reduced net dependency on external capital inflows. However, Latin American markets are feeling the effects of the crisis through a slowdown in capital inflows, large declines in stock price indexes, significant currency adjustments and an increase in debt spreads. Volatility has soared, with the closely watched Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index moving to an all-time high of 70.33 on October 17, indicating that fear (rather than greed) has been ruling the markets.After reaching record lows in May 2007, emerging markets bond spreads are now above pre-Asian crisis levels. The JPMorgan EMBI+ Latin American composite widened by 146 basis points in the third quarter, with spreads reaching 448 basis points at the end of September. Spreads have widened sharply in recent weeks as foreign investors cut back regional exposure for the safety of U.S. Treasuries. The ongoing lack of liquidity and subsequent liquidation of assets is leading to a collapse in asset prices and a sharp widening in spreads. Daily spreads in October have risen to levels not seen since December 2002, making it much more difficult for governments that need financing to get it. Risk premiums for Latin corporates and sovereigns have risen substantially, but have remained well below U.S. junk (high-yield) bonds. Latin corporates are facing a steep rise in foreign exchange borrowing costs (although less than firms in other emerging markets), which raises concerns that refinancing risks will climb.So far, emerging markets vulnerabilities have been more focused on corporates, as sovereigns have improved public debt dynamics and countries' financing needs are under control. Market performance has been driven by the rapid deterioration of emerging markets bank and corporate market, as well as ongoing losses in emerging markets equities. From January to September 2008, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Latin American Index lost almost 28%, while the Emerging Markets Index lost 37% and the G-7 Index lost 24%. While in 2007 the Latin America component gained 47%, almost nine times as much as the MSCI-G7 index for developed markets, since mid-September 2008 stocks in Latin America have been doing worse than stocks in developed countries, as concerns about access to credit and the adverse impact of sharp falls in commodity prices and in local currencies contribute to increased risk aversion and to outflows of capital. Many governments in the region have used revenue from the commodity boom to pay down debt and build reserves. Now, facing a global financial crisis and the threat of recession in developed countries, the biggest question for Latin America is how long and deep this cyclical downturn will be, and how much it is going to reduce commodity prices. Prices for commodities such as soy, gold, copper and oil, which helped fund the region's boom, have fallen 28% since their July 2 high, according to the RJ/CRB Commodity Price Index. According to Morgan Stanley (in a September 29 report), should prices return to their 10-year average, Latin America's balanced budgets would quickly revert to a deficit of 4.1% of GDP. As risk aversion increases, investors are rapidly pulling out massive amounts of money, creating problems for local markets and banks. There is an ongoing shortage of dollars (as investors liquidate assets in Latin American markets), and as currencies depreciate, inflation concerns increase despite the global slowdown. In Brazil and Mexico, central banks deployed billions of dollars of reserves to stem steep currency declines, as companies in these countries, believing their local currencies would continue to strengthen against the U.S. dollar, took debts in dollars. Some companies also made bets using currency derivatives that have led to losses in the billions of dollars. Dramatic currency swings have caused heavy losses for many companies, from Mexico's cement giant Cemex SAB to the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Votorantim. Mexico's third-largest retailer, Controladora Comercial Mexicana, declared bankruptcy recently after reporting huge losses related to exchange rate bets. As concerns about corporate exposure to dollar-denominated derivatives increases, yields on bonds issued by many of Brazil's and Mexico's leading companies have started to rise, sharply raising the cost of issuing new debt. Latin American external debt issuance came to a halt in the third quarter of 2008, totaling only US$ 690 million. The cost of obtaining loans for capital expenditures, M&A and debt refinancing is also rising substantially for Latin American corporates amid contagion from the U.S. financial crisis. According to bankers, a protracted trend of shortening tenors and widening spreads has intensified in the past few weeks, indicating that bank lending is quickly following the way of bonds and equity. Finally, money transfers from Latin American migrants are expected to decline for the first time this decade, as a result of economic downturns in the U.S. and Spain, inflation and a weaker dollar. The Mexican Central Bank announced that money transfers from Mexicans living in the U.S. dropped a record 12.2% in August. In 2008, migrants from the region will send some 1.7% less in remittances year-on-year when adjusted for inflation, according to the IADB, compounding the adverse effects of the deepening financial turmoil.

Firms, do you know your currency risk exposure? Survey results

This paper surveys the currency risk management practices of Swiss industrial corporations. We find tha industrials do not quantify their currency risk exposure and investigate possible reasons. One possibility is that firms do not think they need to know because they use on-balance-sheet instruments to protect themselves before and after currency rates reach troublesome levels. This is puzzling because a rough estimate of at least cash flow exposure is not a prohibitive task and could be helpful. It is also puzzling that firms use currency derivatives to hedge/insure individual short-term transactions, without apparently trying to estimate aggregate transaction exposure.

Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid ‘Land Grab’

Food security is important. A rising world population coupled with climate change creates growing pressure on global world food supplies. States alleviate this pressure domestically by attracting agri-foreign direct investment (agri-FDI). This is a high-risk strategy for weak states: the state may gain valuable foreign currency, technology and debt-free growth; but equally, investors may fail to deliver on their commitments and exploit weak domestic legal infrastructure to ‘grab’ large areas of prime agricultural land, leaving only marginal land for domestic production. A net loss to local food security and to the national economy results. This is problematic because the state must continue to guarantee its citizens’ right to food and property. Agri-FDI needs close regulation to maximise its benefit. This article maps the multilevel system of governance covering agri-FDI. We show how this system creates asymmetric rights in favour of the investor to the detriment of the host state’s food security and how these problems might be alleviated.