Biosecurity threats : the design of surveillance systems, based on power and risk

We consider the problem of designing a surveillance system to detect a broad range of invasive species across a heterogeneous sampling frame. We present a model to detect a range of invertebrate invasives whilst addressing the challenges of multiple data sources, stratifying for differential risk, managing labour costs and providing sufficient power of detection.We determine the number of detection devices required and their allocation across the landscape within limiting resource constraints. The resulting plan will lead to reduced financial and ecological costs and an optimal surveillance system.

Improved design method for biosecurity surveillance and early detection of non-indigenous rats

A recent advance in biosecurity surveillance design aims to benefit island conservation through early and improved detection of incursions by non-indigenous species. The novel aspects of the design are that it achieves a specified power of detection in a cost-managed system, while acknowledging heterogeneity of risk in the study area and stratifying the area to target surveillance deployment. The design also utilises a variety of surveillance system components, such as formal scientific surveys, trapping methods, and incidental sightings by non-biologist observers. These advances in design were applied to black rats (Rattus rattus) representing the group of invasive rats including R. norvegicus, and R. exulans, which are potential threats to Barrow Island, Australia, a high value conservation nature reserve where a proposed liquefied natural gas development is a potential source of incursions. Rats are important to consider as they are prevalent invaders worldwide, difficult to detect early when present in low numbers, and able to spread and establish relatively quickly after arrival. The ‘exemplar’ design for the black rat is then applied in a manner that enables the detection of a range of non-indigenous species of rat that could potentially be introduced. Many of the design decisions were based on expert opinion as data gaps exist in empirical data. The surveillance system was able to take into account factors such as collateral effects on native species, the availability of limited resources on an offshore island, financial costs, demands on expertise and other logistical constraints. We demonstrate the flexibility and robustness of the surveillance system and discuss how it could be updated as empirical data are collected to supplement expert opinion and provide a basis for adaptive management. Overall, the surveillance system promotes an efficient use of resources while providing defined power to detect early rat incursions, translating to reduced environmental, resourcing and financial costs.

Barrow Island's biosecurity : catching the unknown invader

When industry meets a conservation area, animals or plants from outside may hitch a lift and potentially wreak havoc. How can you be sure of catching the intruders – or at least 80% sure? A government directive instructed Frith Jarrad, Peter Whittle, Susan Barrett and Kerrie Mengersen to come up with a statistically measurable scheme.

Ecological aspects of biosecurity surveillance design for the detection of multiple invasive animal species

Complex surveillance problems are common in biosecurity, such as prioritizing detection among multiple invasive species, specifying risk over a heterogeneous landscape, combining multiple sources of surveillance data, designing for specified power to detect, resource management, and collateral effects on the environment. Moreover, when designing for multiple target species, inherent biological differences among species result in different ecological models underpinning the individual surveillance systems for each. Species are likely to have different habitat requirements, different introduction mechanisms and locations, require different methods of detection, have different levels of detectability, and vary in rates of movement and spread. Often there is a further challenge of a lack of knowledge, literature, or data, for any number of the above problems. Even so, governments and industry need to proceed with surveillance programs which aim to detect incursions in order to meet environmental, social and political requirements. We present an approach taken to meet these challenges in one comprehensive and statistically powerful surveillance design for non-indigenous terrestrial vertebrates on Barrow Island, a high conservation nature reserve off the Western Australian coast. Here, the possibility of incursions is increased due to construction and expanding industry on the island. The design, which includes mammals, amphibians and reptiles, provides a complete surveillance program for most potential terrestrial vertebrate invaders. Individual surveillance systems were developed for various potential invaders, and then integrated into an overall surveillance system which meets the above challenges using a statistical model and expert elicitation. We discuss the ecological basis for the design, the flexibility of the surveillance scheme, how it meets the above challenges, design limitations, and how it can be updated as data are collected as a basis for adaptive management.

Book reviews : "Biosecurity interventions: global health and security in question"

International Relations’ engagement with global health governance has proliferated in the last decade. There are a number of excellent works that seek to understand how the relationship between politics and health shapes and informs people’s lives and governments’ policies. However, the overt securitization of health by the IR field has, Biosecurity interventions argues, remained relatively unproblematized...

Evaluating unmanned aircraft systems for deployment in plant biosecurity

This report provides a qualitative evaluation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and on-board sensor technology for use in plant biosecurity in the Australian context. The more general term UAS describes both the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and all supporting components required to operate it. This may include a ground station, operator or pilot, and a launch and recovery device for example. The focus is to identify how and under what circumstances UAS may be useful for plant biosecurity. This can be used to help guide future decisions regarding investment in UAS for plant biosecurity.

Development of multi-rotor localised surveillance using multi-spectral sensors for plant biosecurity

This report describes a proof of concept for multi-rotor localised surveillance using a multi-spectral sensor for plant biosecurity applications. A literature review was conducted on previous applications using airborne multispectral imaging for plant biosecurity purposes. A ready built platform was purchased and modified in order to fit and provide suitable clearance for a Tetracam Mini-MCA multispectral camera. The appropriate risk management documents were developed allowing the platform and the multi-spectral camera to be tested extensively. However, due to technical difficulties with the platform the Mini- MCA was not mounted to the platform. Once a suitable platform is developed, future extensions can be conducted into the suitability of the Mini-MCA for airborne surveillance of Australian crops.

Strategic banana tissue culture industry development and biosecurity act

Application and development of activities based on in vitro technologies delivering research, industry development and biosecurity activities to sustain and improve the Australian banana industry.

Biosecurity capacity building for the Australian avocado industry

Project aims to develop diagnostic capacity for laurel wilt and associated ambrosia beetle in Australia.

CRC60125 Grain Biosecurity Training Program

CRC60125 Grain Biosecurity Training Program. Stored grain is subject to major biosecurity problems which have the potential to significantly reduce the quality of the stored grain and to make it unsuitable for both domestic and international markets. The problems include attack by insect pests, rodents, birds and pathogens like fungi, as well as contamination by weed seeds, mycotoxins and pest faeces.

An audit of forest biosecurity arrangements and preparedness in Australia.

Current biosecurity arrangements for plantation forestry are poorly defined, at least relative to other plant-based industries. Serious pest and disease outbreaks in forestry are relatively rare events. Preparedness for rare events is difficult. Part of the difficulty stems from the competing views of managers and stakeholders. This project sought to directly capture alternative views concerning the key objectives of plantation forest biosecurity, alternative strategies for achieving those objectives, and ultimately recommend preferred actions that might be broadly supported by stakeholders. The outcomes from the workshop were used as a basis to draft a list of strategic actions required to improve forest biosecurity in Australia and to be implemented over the next 2-5 years. Research priorities were identified as research to support cost benefit analyses; investigating the effects of changed environmental conditions on forest biosecurity; pathway analysis for functional pest guilds. Integration of this research within a CRC would also permit the effective development and extension of this research as well as providing training urgently required to maintain forest biosecurity and health expertise.

Description of the pig production systems, biosecurity practices and herd health providers in two provinces with high swine density in the Philippines

A cross-sectional study was conducted between October 2011 and March 2012 in two major pig producing provinces in the Philippines. Four hundred and seventy one pig farms slaughtering finisher pigs at government operated abattoirs participated in this study. The objectives of this study were to group: (a) smallholder (S) and commercial (C) production systems into patterns according to their herd health providers (HHPs), and obtain descriptive information about the grouped S and C production systems; and (b) identify key HHPs within each production system using social network analysis. On-farm veterinarians, private consultants, pharmaceutical company representatives, government veterinarians, livestock and agricultural technicians, and agricultural supply stores were found to be actively interacting with pig farmers. Four clusters were identified based on production system and their choice of HHPs. Differences in management and biosecurity practices were found between S and C clusters. Private HHPs provided a service to larger C and some larger S farms, and have little or no interaction with the other HHPs. Government HHPs provided herd health service mainly to S farms and small C farms. Agricultural supply stores were identified as a dominant solitary HHP and provided herd health services to the majority of farmers. Increased knowledge of the routine management and biosecurity practices of S and C farmers and the key HHPs that are likely to be associated with those practices would be of value as this information could be used to inform a risk-based approach to disease surveillance and control. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.