1000 resultados para U.S. Congress
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"October 1990"
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"B-238025"--p.1.
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The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is of great importance to both parties. Taiwan offers certain strategic opportunities for the promotion of American national security interests, and the U.S. accordingly provides Taiwan with support of both a defensive and diplomatic nature. The official U.S. policies regarding relations with Taiwan are enumerated in the Taiwan Relations Act (United States Code Title 22 Chapter 48 Sections 3301 - 3316). The act, approved by the U.S. Congress in 1967, stipulates the terms of the bilateral relationship with regard to national defense and diplomatic relations among other factors. This paper seeks to obtain a more developed picture of sentiments on both sides of this relationship in order to understand better the U.S.'s influence and power in Taiwan and in the region.
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At head of title: 99th Congress, 1st session. Joint committee print.
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With U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Indian affairs. Palm Springs band of mission Indians. Hearings ... 1937.
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Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.
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RÉSUMÉ : Avec le dénouement de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le problème des réfugiés en Europe devient un enjeu international. Plusieurs millions de personnes, que l’on nomme les Displaced Persons (DP), sont sans refuge et doivent recevoir une aide immédiate pour survivre. Même si la majorité de ces gens retourneront dans leurs pays d’origine, il reste encore des centaines de milliers de réfugiés en 1948. La seule solution concrète pour régler cette problématique est l’émigration des réfugiés dans des pays prêts à les accepter. Les Américains jouent un rôle crucial en acceptant 415 000 DP entre 1948 et 1952 grâce au Displaced Persons Act de 1948 et ses amendements en 1950 et 1951. Après d’âpres discussions entre les restrictionnistes et ceux qui défendent la libéralisation des lois d’immigration, naîtra le Displaced Persons Act (DP Act) signé avec beaucoup de réticence, le 25 juin 1948, par le président Harry S. Truman. Cette loi qui prévoit la venue de 202 000 DP en deux ans, contient des mesures jugées discriminatoires à l'endroit de certaines ethnies. Afin d'améliorer le DP Act, le Congrès effectue des recherches sur la situation des réfugiés toujours dans les camps en 1949 tout en étudiant l’impact de la venue des DP aux États-Unis entre 1948 et 1950. Cette étude est soumise sous forme de rapport, le Displaced Persons and Their Resettlement in the United States, le 20 janvier 1950. Ce mémoire propose une analyse minutieuse du rapport et de son contexte politique afin de démontrer le rôle important de cette étude dans le processus décisionnel du Congrès américain visant à accueillir un plus grand nombre de DP tout en posant les bases pour une politique d’accueil en matière de refugiés.
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Notes d'analyse de la Chaire d’études politiques et économiques américaines (CÉPÉA)
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Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar, la incidencia que tienen actualmente las ONG s internacionales sobre la toma de decisiones de los gobiernos de diferentes Estados. Con el fin de hacer más específico dicho análisis, el trabajo se centra en el estudio del caso de la firma del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos cuyo proceso, según se explica a lo largo del texto, se vio afectado de manera significativa por la acción de Human Rights Watch. El artículo presenta una exposición de la mecánica política requerida para la aprobación de este tipo de tratados en ambos países involucrados, así como la forma en que las asimetrías de poder entre ellos abrieron el campo a la acción de Human Rights Watch.
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Como choques econômicos afetam eleições em democracias? Usando dados eleitorais do Congresso dos Estados Unidos, eu testo se choques adversos podem afetar desigualmente partidos incumbentes e oponentes. Esse efeito é identificado, entre vários procedimentos, por uma regressão em descontinuidade. Eu considero possibilidades teóricas para esse efeito, quando cidadãos não conseguem observar perfeitamente se a falta de bens públicos é devido a um choque adverso, ou a consumo privado do político. Quando o choque é observável, não há efeito; enquanto se não fosse, haveria. As evidências empíricas são consistentes com a teoria.
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También en: Comercio Exterior, México, DF, v. 36, No 5, p. 382, mayo 1986 (78609); y en: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs: The costs of foreign debt for the United States and the Third World, Washington, DC, GPO, 198