The traditional rationale of the arm’s length approach to transfer pricing : should the separate accounting model be maintained for modern multinational entities?

This article examines the current transfer pricing regime to consider whether it is a sound model to be applied to modern multinational entities. The arm's length price methodology is examined to enable a discussion of the arguments in favour of such a regime. The article then refutes these arguments concluding that, contrary to the very reason multinational entities exist, applying arm's length rules involves a legal fiction of imagining transactions between unrelated parties. Multinational entities exist to operate in a way that independent entities would not, which the arm's length rules fail to take into account. As such, there is clearly an air of artificiality in applying the arm's length standard. To demonstrate this artificiality with respect to modern multinational entities, multinational banks are used as an example. The article concluded that the separate entity paradigm adopted by the traditional transfer pricing regime is incongruous with the economic theory of modern multinational enterprises.

International transfer pricing : the Australian approach and lessons for Canada

In response to developments in international trade and an increased focus on international transfer-pricing issues, Canada’s minister of finance announced in the 1997 budget that the Department of Finance would undertake a review of the transfer-pricing provisions in the Income Tax Act. On September 11, 1997, the Department of Finance released draft transfer-pricing legislation and Revenue Canada released revised draft Information Circular 87-2R. The legislation was subsequently amended and included in Bill C-28, which received first reading on December 10, 1997. The new rules are intended to update Canada’s international transfer-pricing practices. In particular, they attempt to harmonize the standards in the Income Tax Act with the arm’s-length principle established in the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines. The new rules also set out contemporaneous documentation requirements in respect of cross-border related-party transactions, facilitate administration of the law by Revenue Canada, and provide for a penalty where transfer prices do not comply with the arm’s-length principle. The Australian tax authorities have similarly reviewed and updated their transfer-pricing practices. Since 1992, the Australian commissioner of taxation has issued three rulings and seven draft rulings directly relating to international transfer pricing. These rulings outline the selection and application of transfer pricing methodologies, documentation requirements, and penalties for non-compliance. The Australian Taxation Office supports the use of advance pricing agreements (APAs) and has expanded its audit strategy by conducting transfer-pricing risk assessment reviews. This article presents a detailed review of Australia’s transfer-pricing policy and practices, which address essentially the same concerns as those at which the new Canadian rules are directed. This review provides a framework for comparison of the approaches adopted in the two jurisdictions. The author concludes that although these approaches differ in some respects, ultimately they produce a similar result. Both regimes set a clear standard to be met by multinational enterprises in establishing transfer prices. Both provide for audits and penalties in the event of noncompliance. And both offer the alternative of an APA as a means of avoiding transfer-pricing disputes with Australian and Canadian tax authorities.

Transfer pricing and multinational financial institutions : the case for replacing arm’s length price with a unitary approach

The international tax system, designed a century ago, has not kept pace with the modern multinational entity rendering it ineffective in taxing many modern businesses according to economic activity. One of those modern multinational entities is the multinational financial institution (MNFI). The recent global financial crisis provides a particularly relevant and significant example of the failure of the current system on a global scale. The modern MNFI is increasingly undertaking more globalised and complex trading operations. A primary reason for the globalisation of financial institutions is that they typically ‘follow-the-customer’ into jurisdictions where international capital and international investors are required. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently reported that from 1995-2009, foreign bank presence in developing countries grew by 122 per cent. The same study indicates that foreign banks have a 20 per cent market share in OECD countries and 50 per cent in emerging markets and developing countries. Hence, most significant is that fact that MNFIs are increasingly undertaking an intermediary role in developing economies where they are financing core business activities such as mining and tourism. IMF analysis also suggests that in the future, foreign bank expansion will be greatest in emerging economies. The difficulties for developing countries in applying current international tax rules, especially the current traditional transfer pricing regime, are particularly acute in relation to MNFIs, which are the biggest users of tax havens and offshore finance. This paper investigates whether a unitary taxation approach which reflects economic reality would more easily and effectively ensure that the profits of MNFIs are taxed in the jurisdictions which give rise to those profits. It has previously been argued that the uniqueness of MNFIs results in a failure of the current system to accurately allocate profits and that unitary tax as an alternative could provide a sounder allocation model for international tax purposes. This paper goes a step further, and examines the practicalities of the implementation of unitary taxation for MNFIs in terms of the key components of such a regime, along with their their implications. This paper adopts a two-step approach in considering the implications of unitary taxation as a means of improved corporate tax coordination which requires international acceptance and agreement. First, the definitional issues of the unitary MNFI are examined and second, an appropriate allocation formula for this sector is investigated. To achieve this, the paper asks first, how the financial sector should be defined for the purposes of unitary taxation and what should constitute a unitary business for that sector and second, what is the ‘best practice’ model of an allocation formula for the purposes of the apportionment of the profits of the unitary business of a financial institution.

A nation's role in addressing base erosion and profit shifting : sovereignty in relation to transfer pricing

The notion of sovereignty is central to any international tax issue. While a nation is free to design its tax laws as it sees fit and raise revenue in accordance with the needs of its citizens, it is not possible to undertake such a task in isolation. Tax interactions between sovereign states cannot be avoided. Ultimately, the interactions mean that a nation must decide whether or engage in both collaboration and co ordination with other nations and supranational bodies alike or maintain a unilateral stance in relation to its tax policy. This article considers a modern conceptualisation of sovereignty to argue that a move towards a more unified approach to addressing international base erosion and profit sharing may be the ultimate exercise of national fiscal sovereignty.

Formula apportionment and transfer pricing under oligopolistic competition

This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via transfer pricing. In particular, if affiliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic competition, it is beneficial for the multinational to manipulate transfer prices for tax–saving as well as strategic reasons under both FA and SA. The analysis shows that a switch from SA rules to FA rules may actually strengthen profit shifting activities by multinationals.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.

The system of Transfer Pricing in a multinational

Transfer prices are used by the majority of firms worldwide when intermediate products or services are transferred within the same organization. These prices are reported as revenue for the selling entity (division, unit, department etc.) and as cost for the buying entity. Nevertheless, transfer prices lead to many disputes among managers in the same organization as transfer prices influence the performance of their entities. In cross-border transactions, transfer prices can be used by firms to reduce corporate taxes and thus, increase total firm profits. In order to fight against this firms’ practice, tax authorities require firms to establish a transfer pricing system in accordance with OECD1 Transfer Pricing Guidelines.