Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

In search of Chinese jurisprudence : does Chinese legal tradition have a place in China's future?

Questions the extent to which Westerrn commercial laws adopted by China, particularly in its Company Laws of 1993 and 1995, are comptaible with China's different cultural and legal traditions. Suggests that Western concepts of the rule of law and of corporate governance are alient to China. Outlines the development of the Western legal tradition. based on Judaeo-Christian beliefs and legal rationalism. Compares this with the deveopment of the Chinese legal tradtion, based on Confucianism and legalism. Proposes ways in which the two traditions could be reconciled more effectively.

Modernising charity : steps to an alternative architecture for common law charity jurisprudence

This chapter addresses the question, how can the common law concept of charity law be modernised? There are difficulties with the present jurisprudential conception. The focus of the chapter is not on those difficulties, however, but rather on the development of an alternative architecture for common law jurisprudence. The conclusion to which the chapter comes is that charity law can be modernised by a series of steps to include all civil society organisations. It is possible if the ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose is abandoned in favour of a contemporary, not technical concept of charitiable purpose. This conclusion is reached by proposing a framework, developed from the common law concept of charities, that reconciles into a cohesive jurisprudential architecture all of the laws applying to civil society organisations, not just charities. In this section, first the argument is contextualised in an idea of society and located in a gap in legal theory. An analogy is then offered to introduce the problems in the legal theory applying, not just to charities, but more broadly to civil society organisations. The substantive challenge of mapping an alternative jurisprudence is then taken in steps. The final substantive section conceptualises the changes inherent in a move beyond charities to a jurisprudence centred on civil society organisations and how this would bring legal theory into line with sectoral analysis in other disciplines.

The nature of juristic paradigms : exploring the theoretical and conceptual relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence

Problem solving courts appear to achieve outcomes which are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more “therapeutic” and “problem solving” practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is quite likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and, arguably, from outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, his work is tolerated but marginalized. But do therapeutic and problem solving functions have the potential to define, rather than complement, the role of judicial officers? The basic question addressed in this paper is, therefore, whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see--or are we seeing--a paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn?

Problem-solving courts, therapeutic jurisprudence and the constitution : if two is company, is three a crowd?

Court costs, resource-intensive trials, booming prison populations and the obduracy of recidivism rates all present as ugly excesses of the criminal law adversarial paradigm. To combat these excesses, problem-solving courts have evolved with an edict to address the underlying issues that have caused an individual to commit a crime. When a judge seeks to help a problem-solving court participant deal with issues like addiction, mental health or poverty, they are performing a very different role to that of a judicial officer in the traditional court hierarchy. They are no longer the removed, independent arbiter — a problem-solving court judge steps into the ‘arena’ with the participant and makes active use of their judicial authority to assist in rehabilitation and positive behavioural change. Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence appreciate that their interaction with participants can have therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences. This article will consider how the deployment of therapeutic measures (albeit with good intention) can lead to the behavioural manifestation of partiality and bias on the part of problem-solving court judges. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will then be analysed to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem solving courts may be deemed unconstitutional. Part IV of this article will explain how a problem-solving court judge who is not acting impartially or independently will potentially contravene the requirements of the Constitution. It will finally be suggested that judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most successful in administering an independent and impartial problem solving court.

Proportionality of sanctions under the WADA Code : CAS jurisprudence and the need for a strict approach

This article suggests that the issue of proportionality in anti-doping sanctions has been inconsistently dealt with by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Given CAS’s pre-eminent role in interpreting and applying the World Anti-Doping Code under the anti-doping policies of its signatories, an inconsistent approach to the application of the proportionality principle will cause difficulties for domestic anti-doping tribunals seeking guidance as to the appropriateness of their doping sanctions.

The Role of the Judiciary in Earth Jurisprudence : An Analysis of Judicial Approaches to Standing in Climate Change and Environmental Justice Litigation

The role of the judiciary in common law systems is to create law, interpret law and uphold the law. As such decisions by courts on matters related to ecologically sustainable development, natural resource use and management and climate change make an important contribution to earth jurisprudence. There are examples where judicial decisions further the goals of earth jurisprudence and examples where decisions go against the principles of earth jurisprudence. This presentation will explore judicial approaches to standing in Australia and America. The paper will explore two trends in each jurisdiction. Approaches by American courts to standing will be examined in reference to climate change and environmental justice litigation. While Australian approaches to standing will be examined in the context of public interest litigation and environmental criminal negligence cases. The presentation will draw some conclusions about the role of standing in each of these cases and implications of this for earth jurisprudence.

Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence and the adversarial paradigm—incommensurability and the possibility of a shared disciplinary matrix

Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised. However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn? This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence. The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix.

Talking the talk : therapeutic jurisprudence and oral competence

In Australian criminal justice systems, a wide range of pathways to sentencing and punishment exist alongside traditional court processes. In particular, therapeutic jurisprudence ('TJ') processes have emerged during the last quarter of a century and now occupy a key position in the criminal justice landscape. This article provides an introduction to TJ, highlighting in particular the emphasis it places on the active participation of offenders, before critically discussing offenders' capacity to engage with TJ processes. The article then summarises the research on the oral competence of offenders, and argues that offenders who lack oral competence may be disadvantaged in TJ processes. Finally, we provide an overview of the limited guidance that has been provided to TJ practitioners on how to maximise the participation of offenders with limited oral competence.

When coroners care too much: Therapeutic jurisprudence and suicide findings

In common law countries such as England and Australia, violent and otherwise unnatural deaths are investigated by coroners who make findings as to the “manner of death”. This includes determining whether the deceased person intentionally caused their own death. Previous research (Tait and Carpenter 2013a, 2013b, 2014) has suggested that coroners are reluctant to reach such determinations, citing the stigma of suicide and a need for sensitivity to grieving and traumatized families. Based on interviews with both English and Australian coroners, this paper explores whether an ‘ethic of care’ evident in English and Australian coronial suicide determinations, can be understood as an application of the ‘practices and techniques’ of therapeutic jurisprudence. Based on the ways in which coroners position the law as a potential therapeutic agent, we investigate how they understand their role and position as legal actors, and the effects of their decision making in the context of suspected suicides.

Eastern twists on Western concepts: Equality jurisprudence and sexual harassment in Japan

A rich source of Japanese jurisprudence on sexual equality underlies Japan's emerging law against sexual harassment. With no law specifically outlawing sexual harassment, academics and the courts have invoked the principle of sexual equality to support their conclusion that Japanese law carries an implicit prohibition against acts of sexual harassment. In developing a legal case against sexual harassment, Japanese courts and academic commentators have introduced novel constructions of equality. The key innovations include relational equality, inherent equality and quantifiable equality. In presenting some of these Japanese contributions to equality jurisprudence, the hope is that feminist discourse on equality can take place in a broader context-a context that does not ignore the Eastern cultural experience.

What is a “Christian” jurisprudence?

The term ‘jurisprudence’ is derived etymologically from the Latin juris, meaning law, and prudentia, meaning wisdom. So jurisprudence simply means the wisdom of the law, or, as it has come to mean in scholarly legal circles these days, the theory of law. It asks fundamental questions regarding the nature and definition of law. And so, the question I wish to pose to us today is what does a truly “Christian” theory of law look like? One that is faithful to, as taken from the conference brochure, the “historic Christian faith” in its “principles and practice”. To contextualise this question, I must give you a deceptively brief and superficial overview of prevailing theories of law – and for those of you who know more about the topic, I apologise for the crass nature of my summary – time prevents me from doing any more...