A dynamic model of price competition with switching and search costs

Em modelos de competição de preços, somente um custo de procura positivo por parte do consumidor não gera equilíbrio com dispersão de preços. Já modelos dinâmicos de switching cost consistentemente geram este fenômeno bastante documentado para preços no varejo. Embora ambas as literaturas sejam vastas, poucos modelos tentaram combinar as duas fricções em um só modelo. Este trabalho apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição de preços em que consumidores idênticos enfrentam custos de procura e de switching. O equilíbrio gera dispersão nos preços. Ainda, como os consumidores são obrigados a se comprometer com uma amostra fixa de firmas antes dos preços serem definidos, somente dois preços serão considerados antes de cada compra. Este resultado independe do tamanho do custo de procura individual do consumidor.

A dynamic model of simultaneous price competition with switching and search costs

Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.

The meeting place problem: Salience and search.

The notion of salience was developed by Schelling in the context of the meeting-place problem of locating a partner in the absence of a pre-agreed meeting place. In this paper, we argue that a realistic specification of the meeting place problem involves allowing a strategy of active search over a range of possible meeting places. We solve this extended problem, allowing for extensions such as repeated play, search costs and asymmetric payoffs. The result is a considerably richer, but more complex, notion of salience. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.

Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs thatcan be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential searchamong firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. Anoffering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extentto which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathethe product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. Inequilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We performcomparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead tohigher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is relatedto discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the"long tail" phenomenon.

Directed search with real options

While search is normally modelled by economists purely in terms of decisions over making observations, this paper models it as a process in which information is gained through feedback from innovatory product launches. The information gained can then be used to decide whether to exercise real options. In the model the initial decisions involve a product design and the scale of production capacity. There are then real options to change these factors based on what is learned. The case of launching product variants in parallel is also considered. Under ‘true’ uncertainty, the model can be seen in terms of heuristic decision-making based on subjective beliefs with limited foresight. Search costs, the values of the real options, beliefs, and the cost of capital are all shown to be significant in determining the search path.

Using consumer search cost and loyalty to explain dispersion in banking fees

Pode-se observar uma considerável dispersão entre os preços que diferentes bancos comerciais no Brasil cobram por um mesmo pacote homogêneo de serviços— dispersão esta que é sustentada ao longo do tempo. Em uma tentativa de replicar esta observação empírica, foi desenvolvido um simples modelo que lança mão do arcabouço da literatura de custos de procura (search costs) e que baseia-se também na lealdade por parte dos consumidores. Em seguida, dados de preços referentes ao setor bancário brasileiro são aplicados ao modelo desenvolvido e alguns exercícios empíricos são então realizados. Esses exercícios permitem que: (i) os custos de procura incorridos pelos consumidores sejam estimados, ao fixar-se os valores dos demais parâmetros e (ii) as correspondentes perdas de peso-morto que surgem como consequência dos custos de procura incorridos pelos consumidores sejam também estimadas. Quando apenas 80% da população é livre para buscar por bancos que cobrem menores tarifas, à taxa de juros mensal de 0,5%, o valor estimado do custo de procura médio incorrido pelos consumidores chega a 1805,80 BRL, sendo a correspondente perda de peso-morto média na ordem de 233,71 BRL por consumidor.

Inbreeding avoidance through kin recognition: choosy females boost male dispersal.

Inbreeding avoidance is predicted to induce sex biases in dispersal. But which sex should disperse? In polygynous species, females pay higher costs to inbreeding and thus might be expected to disperse more, but empirical evidence consistently reveals male biases. Here, we show that theoretical expectations change drastically if females are allowed to avoid inbreeding via kin recognition. At high inbreeding loads, females should prefer immigrants over residents, thereby boosting male dispersal. At lower inbreeding loads, by contrast, inclusive fitness benefits should induce females to prefer relatives, thereby promoting male philopatry. This result points to disruptive effects of sexual selection. The inbreeding load that females are ready to accept is surprisingly high. In absence of search costs, females should prefer related partners as long as delta<r/(1+r) where r is relatedness and delta is the fecundity loss relative to an outbred mating. This amounts to fitness losses up to one-fifth for a half-sib mating and one-third for a full-sib mating, which lie in the upper range of inbreeding depression values currently reported in natural populations. The observation of active inbreeding avoidance in a polygynous species thus suggests that inbreeding depression exceeds this threshold in the species under scrutiny or that inbred matings at least partly forfeit other mating opportunities for males. Our model also shows that female choosiness should decline rapidly with search costs, stemming from, for example, reproductive delays. Species under strong time constraints on reproduction should thus be tolerant of inbreeding.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

Labor Mobility and Productivity Growth

[cat] Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota l'economia. En con- seqüència, l'economia presenta economies d'escala creixents i el creixement de la productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins d'un sector. La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral modifiquen l'equilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més, demostrem que d'altres ineficiències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modificar la TFP.

Labor Mobility and Productivity Growth

[cat] Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota l'economia. En con- seqüència, l'economia presenta economies d'escala creixents i el creixement de la productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins d'un sector. La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral modifiquen l'equilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més, demostrem que d'altres ineficiències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modificar la TFP.

The location of manufacturing firms and imperfect information in transport market

It is well know that transport charges are not symmetric: fronthaul and backhaul costs on a route may differ, because they are affected by the distribution of economic acitivities. This paper develops a two-regional general equilibrium model in which transport costs are determined endogenously as a result of a search and matching process. It is shown that economies or diseconomies of transport density emerge, depending on the search costs of transport firms and the relative importance of the possibility of backhaul transportation. It is found that the symmetry of the distribution of economic activity may break owing to economies of transport density when the additional search costs are small enough.

Understanding traders' regional arbitage : the case of rice traders in Antananarivo, Madagascar

Many studies find that agricultural markets in developing countries are poorly integrated spatially. Traders' regional arbitrage plays a key role in integrating markets across space. We investigate the performance of regional arbitrage and the associated obstacles for rice traders in Antananarivo, Madagascar. On the basis of a trader-level biweekly survey spanning 2012–2013, we find that traders are not fully exploiting the regional arbitrage opportunities: most of them fail to purchase from the cheapest district and are paying higher prices than those in the cheapest district. One apparent obstacle is obtaining price information from many different regions. To reduce search costs, we provided regional price information via SMS to randomly selected traders, but found that this had a null-effect on improving arbitrage performance. Traders tend to concentrate on trading with a few fixed districts, even if they are informed about cheaper prices in other new districts, because they worry about quality uncertainty and the trustworthiness of new partners. These findings suggest that not only transmission of price information but also issues related to produce quality and matching prevent the performance of arbitrage and market integration.

Does online information drive offline revenues? Only for specific products and consumer segments!

While many offline retailers have developed informational websites that offer information on products and prices, the key question for such informational websites is whether they can increase revenues via web-to-store shopping. The current paper draws on the information search literature to specify and test hypotheses regarding the offline revenue impact of adding an informational website. Explicitly considering marketing efforts, a latent class model distinguishes consumer segments with different short-term revenue effects, while a Vector Autoregressive model on these segments reveals different long-term marketing response. We find that the offline revenue impact of the informational website critically depends on the product category and customer segment. The lower online search costs are especially beneficial for sensory products and for customers distant from the store. Moreover, offline revenues increase most for customers with high web visit frequency. We find that customers in some segments buy more and more expensive products, suggesting that online search and offline purchases are complements. In contrast, customers in a particular segment reduce their shopping trips, suggesting their online activities partially substitute for experiential shopping in the physical store. Hence, offline retailers should use specific online activities to target specific product categories and customer segments.

Benefits, harms and costs of screening mammography in women 70 years and over: a systematic review

Objective: To assess the (i) benefits, (ii) harms and (iii) costs of continuing mammographic screening for women 70 years and over. Data sources and synthesis: (i) We conducted a MEDLINE search (1966 - July 2000) for decision-analytic models estimating life-expectancy gains from screening in older women. The five studies meeting the inclusion criteria were critically appraised using standard criteria. We estimated relative benefit from each model's estimate of effectiveness of screening in older women relative to that in women aged 50-69 years using the same model. (ii) With data from BreastScreen Queensland, we constructed balance sheets of the consequences of screening for women in 10-year age groups (40-49 to 80-89 years), and (iii) we used a validated model to estimate the marginal cost-effectiveness of extending screening to women 70 years and over. Results: For women aged 70-79 years, the relative benefit was estimated as 40%-72%, and 18%-62% with adjustment for the impact of screening on quality of life. For women over 80 years the relative benefit was about a third, and with quality-of-life adjustment only 14%, that in women aged 50-69 years. (ii) Of 10 000 Australian women participating in ongoing screening, about 400 are recalled for further testing, and, depending on age, about 70-112 undergo biopsy and about 19-80 cancers are detected. (iii) Cost-effectiveness estimates for extending the upper age limit for mammographic screening from 69 to 79 years range from $8119 to $27 751 per quality-adjusted life-year saved, which compares favourably with extending screening to women aged 40-49 years (estimated at between $24 000 and $65 000 per life-year saved). Conclusions: Women 70 years and over, in consultation with their healthcare providers, may want to decide for themselves whether to continue mammographic screening. Decision-support materials are needed for women in this age group.