Ethical Dimension of Time in Plato’s Apology of Socrates

The aim of the present article is to analyse the Apology in its aspect of time. When defending himself against the charges, Socrates appeals to the past, the present and the future. Furthermore, the philosopher stresses the meaning of the duration of time. Thus, the seems to suggest that all really important activities demand a long time to benefit, since they are almost invariably connected with greater efforts. While the dialogue proves thereby to be an ethical one, the various time expressions also gain an ethical dimension.

Socrates and Plato on asking ‘what is x?’

The Socratic elenchus is a method of philosophical enquiry attributed by Plato, in his dialogues, to his teacher Socrates. It is a method that uses a dialectic technique of questioning and answering to try to discover the truth of the issue under investigation. For Plato’s Socrates, the fundamental question for human beings is that of how to live, thus the enquiries he initiates concern our understanding of what it is to act ethically. In order to begin to enquire into how to act in a virtuous manner, however, Socrates claimed that we must first know what virtue is. We must, that is, first understand the meaning of virtue before we can consider its application it to any particular kind of action; we must first be able to answer the question “what is x?” before considering whether a particular action or kind of action is an instance of x. This requirement leads to what is known as the ‘Socratic Paradox’: if we have to first establish what x means before we confirm or discount cases of it, then how can our enquiry ever commence; how can we begin in asking questions about x if we don’t yet know what x is? Philosophy has continued to grapple with the Socratic paradox since Plato’s formulation of it. This presentation will explain how the paradox is produced out of the elenchus and consider the ways in which Wittgenstein’s account of family resemblance sheds new light upon this age-old issue. [From the Author]

Demagogia y razón, la Atenas de Perciles : Socrates versus sofistas.

Resumen basado en el de la publicación

Mus Hs 771 - No 1.: während der Reise : im Auftrag S:. Ehrw:. M: v.: St. componirte ich diese zwei Lieder zum 2ten Grad um, und [unleserlich] führte selbige den 27ten August 5830 [!], zum erstenmale aus. in [Stein als ein Symbol für Freimaurerei] Socrates

[Carl Oestreich]

Mus Hs 764 - Lied : Lehre des Lebens ; für eine Singstimme mit Begleitung des Pasetthorn und Piano=Forte ; zur Jahres=Schluß-Tafel im Jah [!]: 5833 [!], den 28 December, Socrates

von C. Oestreich

Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.

Mus Hs 759 - Andante für Flauto 1mo et 2do, Br[uder]: Herbolt, Oechs, Clarinetto in A, Lause, Corno in E, Oestreich, Corno Pasetto in E, Bretschneider : No 17 ; dieses Andante haben wir in der [das Logensymbol eines Steines] Socrates beÿ der Aufnahme in 2|t|e Gr:. aufgeführt ; d 27|t|e August 5830

[Carl Oestreich]

Roslyn Weiss, Socrates dissatisfied. An Analysis of Plato’s Crito, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 187 pp.

Fil: Santa María, Andrés.

Socrates [Material gráfico] : ex marmore antiquo apud Ios. Nic. de Azara

Resumen: Descripción: retrato de busto de Sócrates basado en una escultura