192 resultados para SELFISH OPERONS
Resumo:
The role of lateral gene transfer (LGT) in prokaryotes has been shown to rapidly change the genome content, providing new gene tools for environmental adaptation. Features related to pathogenesis and resistance to strong selective conditions have been widely shown to be products of gene transfer between bacteria. The genomes of the gamma-proteobacteria from the genus Xanthomonas, composed mainly of phytopathogens, have potential genomic islands that may represent imprints of such evolutionary processes. In this work, the evolution of genes involved in the pathway responsible for arginine biosynthesis in Xanthomonadales was investigated, and several lines of evidence point to the foreign origin of the arg genes clustered within a potential operon. Their presence inside a potential genomic island, bordered by a tRNA gene, the unusual ranking of sequence similarity, and the atypical phylogenies indicate that the metabolic pathway for arginine biosynthesis was acquired through LGT in the Xanthomonadales group. Moreover, although homologues were also found in Bacteroidetes (Flavobacteria group), for many of the genes analyzed close homologues are detected in different life domains (Eukarya and Archaea), indicating that the source of these arg genes may have been outside the Bacteria clade. The possibility of replacement of a complete primary metabolic pathway by LGT events supports the selfish operon hypothesis and may occur only under very special environmental conditions. Such rare events reveal part of the history of these interesting mosaic Xanthomonadales genomes, disclosing the importance of gene transfer modifying primary metabolism pathways and extending the scenario for bacterial genome evolution.
Resumo:
The ultimate goal of an authorisation system is to allocate each user the level of access they need to complete their job - no more and no less. This proves to be challenging in an organisational setting because on one hand employees need enough access to perform their tasks, while on the other hand more access will bring about an increasing risk of misuse - either intentionally, where an employee uses the access for personal benefit, or unintentionally through carelessness, losing the information or being socially engineered to give access to an adversary. With the goal of developing a more dynamic authorisation model, we have adopted a game theoretic framework to reason about the factors that may affect users’ likelihood to misuse a permission at the time of an access decision. Game theory provides a useful but previously ignored perspective in authorisation theory: the notion of the user as a self-interested player who selects among a range of possible actions depending on their pay-offs.
Resumo:
Pathogenic bacteria have a large repertoire of surface organelles involved in adherence, motility and protein export, but how individual bacteria co-ordinate surface organelle expression to prevent interference and excessive immune stimulation is unclear. Phase variation is a mechanism by which expression of surface factors is limited to a fraction of the bacterial population; however, the presence of multiple homologous surface structures controlled by related mechanisms and regulators antagonizes the independent expression achieved by phase variation. To investigate whether other mechanisms have evolved to sort out the bacterial cell surface, we examined regulatory cross-talk between multiple phase-variable pyelonephritis-associated pili (pap) operons in Escherichia coli isolates associated with urinary tract infections. Allelic variation identified in the regulatory regions and regulators acts synergistically to limit coexpression of homologous fimbrial operons. In particular, there is evidence that papI is under positive selection and PapI variants displayed differences in their capacity to activate related pap operons. Alleles of the high-affinity binding site for PapB were shown to contain a variable number of (T/A)3 repeats occurring every 9 bp that altered the sensitivity of pap operon activation. Taken together with other examples of surface organelle cross-talk, we illustrate how this regulation could promote sequential expression.
Resumo:
We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoe wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to he bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.
Resumo:
The IEEE 802.1le medium access control (MAC) standard provides distributed service differentiation or Quality-of- Service (QoS) by employing a priority system. In 802.1 le networks, network traffic is classified into different priorities or access categories (ACs). Nodes maintain separate queues for each AC and packets at the head-of-line (HOL) of each queue contend for channel access using AC-specific parameters. Such a mechanism allows the provision of differentiated QoS where high priority, performance sensitive traffic such as voice and video applications will enjoy less delay, greater throughput and smaller loss, compared to low priority traffic (e. g. file transfer). The standard implicitly assumes that nodes are honest and will truthfully classify incoming traffic into its appropriate AC. However, in the absence of any additional mechanism, selfish users can gain enhanced performance by selectively classifying low priority traffic as high priority, potentially destroying the QoS capability of the system.
Broadcast in Adhoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach
Resumo:
We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.
Resumo:
A foundational issue underlying many overlay network applications ranging from routing to P2P file sharing is that of connectivity management, i.e., folding new arrivals into the existing mesh and re-wiring to cope with changing network conditions. Previous work has considered the problem from two perspectives: devising practical heuristics for specific applications designed to work well in real deployments, and providing abstractions for the underlying problem that are tractable to address via theoretical analyses, especially game-theoretic analysis. Our work unifies these two thrusts first by distilling insights gleaned from clean theoretical models, notably that under natural resource constraints, selfish players can select neighbors so as to efficiently reach near-equilibria that also provide high global performance. Using Egoist, a prototype overlay routing system we implemented on PlanetLab, we demonstrate that our neighbor selection primitives significantly outperform existing heuristics on a variety of performance metrics; that Egoist is competitive with an optimal, but unscalable full-mesh approach; and that it remains highly effective under significant churn. We also describe variants of Egoist's current design that would enable it to scale to overlays of much larger scale and allow it to cater effectively to applications, such as P2P file sharing in unstructured overlays, based on the use of primitives such as scoped-flooding rather than routing.
Resumo:
A foundational issue underlying many overlay network applications ranging from routing to P2P file sharing is that of connectivity management, i.e., folding new arrivals into an existing overlay, and re-wiring to cope with changing network conditions. Previous work has considered the problem from two perspectives: devising practical heuristics for specific applications designed to work well in real deployments, and providing abstractions for the underlying problem that are analytically tractable, especially via game-theoretic analysis. In this paper, we unify these two thrusts by using insights gleaned from novel, realistic theoretic models in the design of Egoist – a prototype overlay routing system that we implemented, deployed, and evaluated on PlanetLab. Using measurements on PlanetLab and trace-based simulations, we demonstrate that Egoist's neighbor selection primitives significantly outperform existing heuristics on a variety of performance metrics, including delay, available bandwidth, and node utilization. Moreover, we demonstrate that Egoist is competitive with an optimal, but unscalable full-mesh approach, remains highly effective under significant churn, is robust to cheating, and incurs minimal overhead. Finally, we discuss some of the potential benefits Egoist may offer to applications.
Resumo:
Overlay networks have been used for adding and enhancing functionality to the end-users without requiring modifications in the Internet core mechanisms. Overlay networks have been used for a variety of popular applications including routing, file sharing, content distribution, and server deployment. Previous work has focused on devising practical neighbor selection heuristics under the assumption that users conform to a specific wiring protocol. This is not a valid assumption in highly decentralized systems like overlay networks. Overlay users may act selfishly and deviate from the default wiring protocols by utilizing knowledge they have about the network when selecting neighbors to improve the performance they receive from the overlay. This thesis goes against the conventional thinking that overlay users conform to a specific protocol. The contributions of this thesis are threefold. It provides a systematic evaluation of the design space of selfish neighbor selection strategies in real overlays, evaluates the performance of overlay networks that consist of users that select their neighbors selfishly, and examines the implications of selfish neighbor and server selection to overlay protocol design and service provisioning respectively. This thesis develops a game-theoretic framework that provides a unified approach to modeling Selfish Neighbor Selection (SNS) wiring procedures on behalf of selfish users. The model is general, and takes into consideration costs reflecting network latency and user preference profiles, the inherent directionality in overlay maintenance protocols, and connectivity constraints imposed on the system designer. Within this framework the notion of user’s "best response" wiring strategy is formalized as a k-median problem on asymmetric distance and is used to obtain overlay structures in which no node can re-wire to improve the performance it receives from the overlay. Evaluation results presented in this thesis indicate that selfish users can reap substantial performance benefits when connecting to overlay networks composed of non-selfish users. In addition, in overlays that are dominated by selfish users, the resulting stable wirings are optimized to such great extent that even non-selfish newcomers can extract near-optimal performance through naïve wiring strategies. To capitalize on the performance advantages of optimal neighbor selection strategies and the emergent global wirings that result, this thesis presents EGOIST: an SNS-inspired overlay network creation and maintenance routing system. Through an extensive measurement study on the deployed prototype, results presented in this thesis show that EGOIST’s neighbor selection primitives outperform existing heuristics on a variety of performance metrics, including delay, available bandwidth, and node utilization. Moreover, these results demonstrate that EGOIST is competitive with an optimal but unscalable full-mesh approach, remains highly effective under significant churn, is robust to cheating, and incurs minimal overheads. This thesis also studies selfish neighbor selection strategies for swarming applications. The main focus is on n-way broadcast applications where each of n overlay user wants to push its own distinct file to all other destinations as well as download their respective data files. Results presented in this thesis demonstrate that the performance of our swarming protocol for n-way broadcast on top of overlays of selfish users is far superior than the performance on top of existing overlays. In the context of service provisioning, this thesis examines the use of distributed approaches that enable a provider to determine the number and location of servers for optimal delivery of content or services to its selfish end-users. To leverage recent advances in virtualization technologies, this thesis develops and evaluates a distributed protocol to migrate servers based on end-users demand and only on local topological knowledge. Results under a range of network topologies and workloads suggest that the performance of the distributed deployment is comparable to that of the optimal but unscalable centralized deployment.
Resumo:
Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks assume that the nodes forming the network are either under a single authority, or else that they would be altruistically forwarding data for other nodes with no expectation of a return. These assumptions are unrealistic since in ad-hoc networks, nodes are likely to be autonomous and rational (selfish), and thus unwilling to help unless they have an incentive to do so. Providing such incentives is an important aspect that should be considered when designing ad-hoc routing protocols. In this paper, we propose a dynamic, decentralized routing protocol for ad-hoc networks that provides incentives in the form of payments to intermediate nodes used to forward data for others. In our Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol, game-theoretic approaches are used to calculate payments (incentives) that ensure both the truthfulness of participating nodes and the fairness of the CSR protocol. We show through simulations that CSR is an energy efficient protocol and that it provides lower communication overhead in the best and average cases compared to existing approaches.
Resumo:
Although cooperation generally increases the amount of resources available to a community of nodes, thus improving individual and collective performance, it also allows for the appearance of potential mistreatment problems through the exposition of one node's resources to others. We study such concerns by considering a group of independent, rational, self-aware nodes that cooperate using on-line caching algorithms, where the exposed resource is the storage at each node. Motivated by content networking applications -- including web caching, CDNs, and P2P -- this paper extends our previous work on the on-line version of the problem, which was conducted under a game-theoretic framework, and limited to object replication. We identify and investigate two causes of mistreatment: (1) cache state interactions (due to the cooperative servicing of requests) and (2) the adoption of a common scheme for cache management policies. Using analytic models, numerical solutions of these models, as well as simulation experiments, we show that on-line cooperation schemes using caching are fairly robust to mistreatment caused by state interactions. To appear in a substantial manner, the interaction through the exchange of miss-streams has to be very intense, making it feasible for the mistreated nodes to detect and react to exploitation. This robustness ceases to exist when nodes fetch and store objects in response to remote requests, i.e., when they operate as Level-2 caches (or proxies) for other nodes. Regarding mistreatment due to a common scheme, we show that this can easily take place when the "outlier" characteristics of some of the nodes get overlooked. This finding underscores the importance of allowing cooperative caching nodes the flexibility of choosing from a diverse set of schemes to fit the peculiarities of individual nodes. To that end, we outline an emulation-based framework for the development of mistreatment-resilient distributed selfish caching schemes. Our framework utilizes a simple control-theoretic approach to dynamically parameterize the cache management scheme. We show performance evaluation results that quantify the benefits from instantiating such a framework, which could be substantial under skewed demand profiles.
Resumo:
In a typical overlay network for routing or content sharing, each node must select a fixed number of immediate overlay neighbors for routing traffic or content queries. A selfish node entering such a network would select neighbors so as to minimize the weighted sum of expected access costs to all its destinations. Previous work on selfish neighbor selection has built intuition with simple models where edges are undirected, access costs are modeled by hop-counts, and nodes have potentially unbounded degrees. However, in practice, important constraints not captured by these models lead to richer games with substantively and fundamentally different outcomes. Our work models neighbor selection as a game involving directed links, constraints on the number of allowed neighbors, and costs reflecting both network latency and node preference. We express a node's "best response" wiring strategy as a k-median problem on asymmetric distance, and use this formulation to obtain pure Nash equilibria. We experimentally examine the properties of such stable wirings on synthetic topologies, as well as on real topologies and maps constructed from PlanetLab and AS-level Internet measurements. Our results indicate that selfish nodes can reap substantial performance benefits when connecting to overlay networks composed of non-selfish nodes. On the other hand, in overlays that are dominated by selfish nodes, the resulting stable wirings are optimized to such great extent that even non-selfish newcomers can extract near-optimal performance through naive wiring strategies.
Resumo:
Existing theories explain why operons are advantageous in prokaryotes, but their occurrence in metazoans is an enigma. Nematode operon genes, typically consisting of growth genes, are significantly upregulated during recovery from growth-arrested states. This expression pattern is anticorrelated to nonoperon genes, consistent with a competition for transcriptional resources. We find that transcriptional resources are initially limiting during recovery and that recovering animals are highly sensitive to any additional decrease in transcriptional resources. We provide evidence that operons become advantageous because, by clustering growth genes into operons, fewer promoters compete for the limited transcriptional machinery, effectively increasing the concentration of transcriptional resources and accelerating recovery. Mathematical modeling reveals how a moderate increase in transcriptional resources can substantially enhance transcription rate and recovery. This design principle occurs in different nematodes and the chordate C. intestinalis. As transition from arrest to rapid growth is shared by many metazoans, operons could have evolved to facilitate these processes.
Resumo:
The problem of topology control is to assign per-node transmission power such that the resulting topology is energy efficient and satisfies certain global properties such as connectivity. The conventional approach to achieve these objectives is based on the fundamental assumption that nodes are socially responsible. We examine the following question: if nodes behave in a selfish manner, how does it impact the overall connectivity and energy consumption in the resulting topologies? We pose the above problem as a noncooperative game and use game-theoretic analysis to address it. We study Nash equilibrium properties of the topology control game and evaluate the efficiency of the induced topology when nodes employ a greedy best response algorithm. We show that even when the nodes have complete information about the network, the steady-state topologies are suboptimal. We propose a modified algorithm based on a better response dynamic and show that this algorithm is guaranteed to converge to energy-efficient and connected topologies. Moreover, the node transmit power levels are more evenly distributed, and the network performance is comparable to that obtained from centralized algorithms.