Análise de impacto regulatório no direito ambiental : limites e possibilidades

A regulação ambiental carece de maior transparência. Os órgãos de proteção do meio ambiente, em regra, apenas publicam as versões finais das medidas elaboradas, sem explicitar as justificativas técnicas que as embasaram, as alternativas consideradas e as possíveis contribuições decorrentes de participação social, entre outras questões. Em consequência, tem-se um cenário desfavorável à realização de controle pelos mais diversos atores. Para superá-lo, a análise de impacto regulatório é apresentada como instrumento apto a agregar clareza, objetividade e eficiência ao processo decisório ambiental. A incorporação da ferramenta, no entanto, deve ser realizada com cuidado especial, tendo em vista a existência de três principais peculiaridades do direito do meio ambiente. Primeiro, o setor lida não só com situações de risco, mas também com casos de incerteza, em que a ausência de informação impossibilita o cálculo de probabilidade de ocorrência de possíveis resultados. Em segundo lugar, a regulação ambiental recai sobre bens não transacionados em mercados, o que dificulta a obtenção de seu valor de troca, aspecto relevante para a análise de custo-benefício como tradicionalmente conhecida. Por fim, o meio ambiente apresenta desenho regulatório absolutamente fragmentado, composto por variados órgãos normatizadores, deliberativos e fiscalizadores em todos os níveis da federação, o que eleva o risco de deficiências na formação técnica das autoridades reguladoras.

El Capítulo de Inversiones en el Acuerdo de Asociación Transpacífico:¿Una Posibilidad de Cambio y Convergencia?

Spanish Abstract: El presente trabajo analiza los posibles efectos que generaría en la regulación internacional de la inversión extranjera, el acuerdo de un capítulo de inversiones en el Acuerdo de Asociación Transpacífico (TPP), actualmente en negociaciones, sobre la base de la información disponible a la fecha. El artículo aborda cuatro aspectos que presentan especial importancia dada la divergencia de intereses entre algunos de los Estados negociadores: el ámbito de protección de la inversión extranjera; las normas sobre transparencia de los regímenes de inversión y sus disputas; la irrupción de entidades estatales como inversionistas extranjeros; y la solución de controversias a través del arbitraje inversionista-Estado. El autor concluye que en comparación a la actual fragmentación regulatoria de la que dan cuenta los acuerdos internacionales de inversión suscritos por los países negociadores del TPP, la incorporación de un capítulo de inversiones en ese Acuerdo es una oportunidad para avanzar en la convergencia de la regulación sobre inversión extranjera, tanto en materia de estándares sustantivos de protección de la inversión como en la mejora del arbitraje inversionista-Estado como mecanismo de solución de controversias.

Global law in pieces fragmentation, regimes and pluralism

The idea that life undergoes a process of functional differentiation, and that, as a consequence, law becomes increasingly specialized – and maybe even transforms in its very nature – is now widespread. The specialized clusters of law or regulation are very often called regimes, in the international arena, international or transnational regimes. This paper deals, first, with three strong representations of international regimes and discusses some of their problems. It argues that, in order to make a good use of the category, it is necessary to keep in mind the differentiation between law and non-law in the wider context of governance. It then turns, firstly, to the notion of regimes as fragments of a unified and coherent public international law order and, secondly, as meeting points of regulations emerging from different legal orders as well as from other non-legal sources. Within public international law, regimes are seen as related to what is called the double fragmentation of that legal order. As clusters of regulation within a wider global regulatory order, regimes are put in relation to two types of legal or regulatory pluralism.

The Structure of Financial Supervision: Consolidation or Fragmentation for Financial Regulators?

This research was designed to answer the question of which direction the restructuring of financial regulators should take – consolidation or fragmentation. This research began by examining the need for financial regulation and its related costs. It then continued to describe what types of regulatory structures exist in the world; surveying the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses. This research analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools: Game-Theory, Institutional-Design, and Network-Effects. The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory mandates will behave in two different states of the world (where they can stand to benefit from regulating and where they stand to lose). The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world. The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five using tools from institutional design. The idea is based on the need for the right kind of information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to predict, mitigate or stop a financial crisis from occurring. Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed in Chapter Six which applied the literature referring to network effects in general in an attempt to conclude whether consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global level might also yield other positive network effects. Returning to the main research question, this research concluded that in general the fragmented model should be preferable to the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used.

Labour Migration, Trade and Investment: From Fragmentation to Coherence

Trade, investment and migration are strongly intertwined, being three key factors in international production. Yet, law and regulation of the three has remained highly fragmented. Trade is regulated by the WTO on the multilateral level, and through preferential trade agreements on the regional and bilateral levels – it is fragmented and complex in its own right. Investment, on the other hand, is mainly regulated through bilateral investment treaties with no strong links to the regulation of trade or migration. And, finally, migration is regulated by a web of different international, regional and bilateral agreements which focus on a variety of different aspects of migration ranging from humanitarian to economic. The problems of institutional fragmentation in international law are well known. There is no organizational forum for coherent strategy-making on the multilateral level covering all three areas. Normative regulations may thus contradict each other. Trade regulation may bring about liberalization of access for service providers, but eventually faces problems in recruiting the best people from abroad. Investors may withdraw investment without being held liable for disruptions to labour and to the livelihood and infrastructure of towns and communities affected by disinvestment. Finally, migration policies do not seem to have a significant impact as long as trade policies and investment policies are not working in a way that is conducive to reducing migration pressure, as trade and investment are simply more powerful on the regulatory level than migration. This chapter addresses the question as to how fragmentation of the three fields could be reme-died and greater coherence between these three areas of factor allocation in international economic relations and law could be achieved. It shows that migration regulation on the international level is lagging behind that on trade and investment. Stronger coordination and consideration of migration in trade and investment policy, and stronger international cooperation in migration, will provide the foundations for a coherent international architecture in the field.

The herpes simplex virus major regulatory protein ICP4 blocks apoptosis induced by the virus or by hyperthermia.

Cells infected with herpes simplex virus 1 (HSV-1) undergo productive or latent infection without exhibiting features characteristic of apoptosis. In this report, we show that HSV-1 induces apoptosis but has evolved a function that blocks apoptosis induced by infection as well as by other means. Specifically, (i) Vero cells infected with a HSV-1 mutant deleted in the regulatory gene alpha 4 (that encodes repressor and transactivating functions), but not those infected with wild-type HSV-1(F), exhibit cytoplasmic blebbing, chromatin condensation, and fragmented DNA detected as a ladder in agarose gels or by labeling free DNA ends with terminal transferase; (ii) Vero cells infected with wild-type HSV-1(F) or cells expressing the alpha 4 gene and infected with the alpha 4- virus did not exhibit apoptosis; (iii) fragmentation of cellular DNA was observed in Vero cells that were mock-infected or infected with the alpha 4- virus and maintained at 39.5 degrees C, but not in cells infected with wild-type virus and maintained at the same temperature. Wild-type strains of HSV-1 with limited extrahuman passages, such as HSV-1 (F), carry a temperature-sensitive lesion in the alpha 4 gene and at 39.5 degrees C only alpha genes are expressed. These results indicate that the product of the alpha 4 gene is able to suppress apoptosis induced by the virus as well by other means.

Identification of human granzyme B promoter regulatory elements interacting with activated T-cell-specific proteins: implication of Ikaros and CBF binding sites in promoter activation.

Granzyme B serine protease is found in the granules of activated cytotoxic T cells and in natural and lymphokine-activated killer cells. This protease plays a critical role in the rapid induction of target cell DNA fragmentation. The DNA regulatory elements that are responsible for the specificity of granzyme B gene transcription in activated T-cells reside between nt -148 and +60 (relative to the transcription start point at +1) of the human granzyme B gene promoter. This region contains binding sites for the transcription factors Ikaros, CBF, Ets, and AP-1. Mutational analysis of the human granzyme B promoter reveals that the Ikaros binding site (-143 to -114) and the AP-1/CBF binding site (-103 to -77) are essential for the activation of transcription in phytohemagglutinin-activated peripheral blood lymphocytes, whereas mutation of the Ets binding site does not affect promoter activity in these cells.

Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/08, July 2014

From the Introduction. In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life to concepts originating from academic debates of the 1970s such as “regulatory capture” and “financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, often allowing financial interests to hijack political, regulatory and supervisory processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good1. An opposite view has instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of some of its participants2

Colombian society in the 1990s: Fragmentation, legitimacy, and efficiency

During the nineties, Colombia experienced a two-fold process of restructuring. First, the political system underwent a process of constitutional reform in order to strengthen the state and increase its legitimacy, surpass the exclusionary character of the political regime, and achieve greater equity in the distribution of social resources. Second, the economy made the transition from a Keynesian development strategy to a strategy of “opening” or liberalization and internationalization of the economy, in order to increase the economic efficiency by reducing the “size” of the state and its regulatory role. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the interplay and contradictions of economic and political factors in the restructuring of the Colombian politico-economic system. ^ The main finding of this dissertation is that the simultaneous adoption of a neoliberal economic strategy and of the Political Constitution of 1991, have had a contradictory relationship: while the “political opening” has produced favorable conditions for fostering programs of democratization and social integration, the “economic opening” has counteracted that possibility given that it implies a social exclusionary process. This tension has aggravated the problems of political and social integration that have traditionally characterized Colombian society. ^ This crucial tension has also been characteristic of Latin America in the nineties. However, it has been neglected and undertheorized in most of the democratization studies of American comparative politics. Most of them lack consideration of structural aspects. According to those studies, the cause of regime change is determined by the strategic elections of actors. Contrary to these approaches, I develop a structural perspective. I consider that social phenomena are partly determined by structural factors, and scientific research should assign them decisive importance, since a fundamental basis for social action and transformation is to be found in the dynamics of relationships between individuals and structures and the development of contradictions within structures. ^