877 resultados para Protection of minority shareholders


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This paper studies the payout policy of Italian firms controlled by large majority shareholders (controlled firms). The paper reports that a firm’s share of dividends in total payout (dividends plus repurchases) is negatively related to the size of the cash flow stake of the firm’s controlling shareholder and positively associated with the wedge between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights. These findings are consistent with the substitute model of payout. One of the implications of this model is that controlled firms with weak corporate governance set-ups, in which controlling shareholders have strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, tend to prefer dividends over repurchases when disgorging cash.

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“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.

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A tanulmány a magyar kis- és középvállalkozások társasági formájában a Kft-ben elemzi az individuális és csoportos jogokat. Az optimális társasági jogi szabályozásban két egymással ellentétes elvnek egyszerre kell érvényesülni. Érvényesülni kell annak az elvnek, amely szerint a nagyobb tőkével rendelkező nagyobb kockázatot vállalók nagyobb befolyással rendelkeznek a társaság ügyeiben, de érvényesülni kell annak az elvnek is, hogy a kisebb tőkével rendelkező társasági tagok nem kerülhetnek kiszolgáltatott helyzetbe. A kisebb tulajdonosok megfelelő védelme elősegíti a társaságok tőkevonzó képességét. A tanulmány földolgozza az individuális és kisebbségi jogok bírósági gyakorlatát. ----- The paper examines individual and group rights in small and medium-sized enterprises (Ltds). In case of an optimal business law regulation two contradictory principles should be considered in the same time. The first principle states that members who take more risk by investing more capital should have more influence over the company’s affairs. However, according to the second principle, minority shareholders can not suffer unfair prejudice. Proper protection of minority shareholders may facilitate the company’s capital-attractive ability. The paper reviews court practice routines on individual and minority rights.

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"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en Droit (LL.M) Option Droit des Affaires"

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Le Canada accepte des demandes d’asile sur la base de l'orientation sexuelle depuis plus de 20 ans. Quoi qu’il en soit, cette recherche permet de douter du fait que les demandes sur la base de l’orientation sexuelle déposées par des femmes soient traitées de façon adéquate. Pour garantir l’accès à la protection des femmes appartenant à des minorités sexuelles, une analyse du risque de persécution fondé sur l'orientation sexuelle doit incorporer des considérations de genre ainsi que divers autres facteurs d’ordre social et culturel. À partir d’une étude de cas de demandes du statut de refugié déposées par des femmes sur la base de l’orientation sexuelle et rejetées par la Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié entre 2010 et 2013, cette recherche identifie des procédés décisionnels problématiques qui font obstacle au droit d’asile de ces femmes. Les résultats de cette étude révèlent qu’une analyse intersectionnelle, laquelle prend acte des formes variées et multiples de l’oppression dans un contexte social donné, est d’importance cruciale pour une évaluation éclairée et non tronquée des risques de persécution pour les minorités sexuelles féminines. À la lumière de ces résultats, ce mémoire propose qu’une analyse intersectionnelle accompagne une nécessaire formation pour les membres de la Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada sur des questions particulières à des minorités sexuelles.

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For the past two centuries, nationalism has been among the most influential legitimizing principles of political organization. According to its simple definition, nationalism is a principle or a way of thinking and acting which holds that the world is divided into nations, and that national and political units should be congruent. Nationalism can thus be divided into two aspects: internal and external. Internally, the political units, i.e., states, should be made up of only one nation. Externally each nation-state should be sovereign. Transnational national governance of rights of national minorities violates both these principles. This study explores the formation, operation, and effectiveness of the European post-Cold War minorities system. The study identifies two basic approaches to minority rights: security and justice. These approaches have been used to legitimize international minority politics and they also inform the practice of transnational governance. The security approach is based on the recognition that the norm of national self-determination cannot be fulfilled in all relevant cases, and so minority rights are offered as a compensation to the dissatisfied national groups, reducing their aspiration to challenge the status quo. From the justice perspective, minority rights are justified as a compensatory strategy against discrimination caused by majority nation-building. The research concludes that the post-Cold War minorities system was justified on the basis of a particular version of the security approach, according to which only Eastern European minority situations are threatening because of the ethnic variant of nationalism that exists in that region. This security frame was essential in internationalising minority issues and justifying the swift development of norms and institutions to deal with these issues. However, from the justice perspective this approach is problematic, since it justified double standards in European minority politics. Even though majority nation-building is often detrimental to minorities also in Western Europe, Western countries can treat their minorities more or less however they choose. One of the main contributions of this thesis is the detailed investigation of the operation of the post-Cold War minorities system. For the first decade since its creation in the early 1990s, the system operated mainly through its security track, which is based on the field activities of the OSCE that are supported by the EU. The study shows how the effectiveness of this track was based on inter-organizational cooperation in which various transnational actors compensate for each other s weaknesses. After the enlargement of the EU and dissolution of the membership conditionality this track, which was limited to Eastern Europe from the start, has become increasingly ineffective. Since the EU enlargement, the focus minorities system has shifted more and more towards its legal track, which is based on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe). The study presents in detail how a network of like-minded representatives of governments, international organizations, and independent experts was able strengthen the framework convention s (originally weak) monitoring system considerably. The development of the legal track allows for a more universal and consistent, justice-based approach to minority rights in contemporary Europe, but the nationalist principle of organization still severely hinders the materialization of this possibility.

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Les actionnaires sont au centre du gouvernement des entreprises. Bien qu'une certaine passivité leur soit parfois reprochée, simultanément, des craintes existent qu'une démocratie des actionnaires ne limite excessivement la gestion quotidienne des entreprises. Loin d'être incompatibles, ces deux remarques reflètent la diversité des actionnaires. En pratique, leurs attentes et leur comportement dépendent fortement de deux éléments : la part du capital ou des voix qu'ils détiennent de même que leur identité. Notre recherche porte sur la protection des actionnaires minoritaires dans le cadre d'opérations de prises de contrôle de sociétés publiques. Le sujet soulève une problématique d'une grande actualité dans le contexte canadien, contexte caractérisé par une concentration de l'actionnariat des sociétés publiques. Le sujet fait la conjonction de deux problèmes d'actualité. D'une part, la multiplication des prises de contrôle s'est accrue lors des dernières décennies et ce phénomène semble, plus que jamais, promis à un brillant avenir. D'autre part, le problème de la protection des actionnaires minoritaires se pose de façon toujours plus aiguë, dans le cadre des sociétés par actions de plus en plus importantes où leur rôle tend à s'amenuiser.

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The dissertation contains five parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter starts from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial development literature. The commonly used methods in these cross-sectional analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments. Hence, the model uncertainty becomes a salient problem. The Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. The second Chapter looks into the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance regime on entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current literature focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur's control. As a result, the entrepreneur trade-offs the costs of monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection improves. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using panel data and GMM-sys estimator. The third Chapter investigates the corporate law and corporate governance reform in China. The corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the interests of stakeholders, which is inefficient. The Chapter combines the recent development of theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory and the property rights theory, to solve such problem. The enlightened shareholder value, which emphasizes on the long term valuation of the firm, should be adopted as objectives of listed firms. In addition, a move from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the default regime, is proposed.