Testing for bubbles in indirect property price cycles

Speculative bubbles are generated when investors include the expectation of the future price in their information set. Under these conditions, the actual market price of the security, that is set according to demand and supply, will be a function of the future price and vice versa. In the presence of speculative bubbles, positive expected bubble returns will lead to increased demand and will thus force prices to diverge from their fundamental value. This paper investigates whether the prices of UK equity-traded property stocks over the past 15 years contain evidence of a speculative bubble. The analysis draws upon the methodologies adopted in various studies examining price bubbles in the general stock market. Fundamental values are generated using two models: the dividend discount and the Gordon growth. Variance bounds tests are then applied to test for bubbles in the UK property asset prices. Finally, cointegration analysis is conducted to provide further evidence on the presence of bubbles. Evidence of the existence of bubbles is found, although these appear to be transitory and concentrated in the mid-to-late 1990s.

Comparative study of amine solutions used in CO2 absorption/desorption cycles

Trabalho Final de Mestrado para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Química

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

ITEM : An Integrated Transport Economy Model - Price Elasticities of Freight Transport Demand in Canada : Three Canadian Markets and Four Commodities.

Rapport de recherche

Common trends and common cycles in stock markets

In this paper we examine the role of permanent and transitory shocks in explaining variations in the S&P 500, Dow Jones and the NASDAQ. Our modeling technique involves imposing both common trend and common cycle restrictions in extracting the variance decomposition of shocks. We find that: (1) the three stock price indices are characterized by a common trend and common cycle relationship; and (2) permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in stock prices over short horizons.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Differential efficacy of three cycles of CMF followed by tamoxifen in patients with ER-positive and ER-negative tumors: long-term follow up on IBCSG Trial IX

The benefit of adjuvant chemotherapy in postmenopausal patients with estrogen receptor (ER)-positive lymph node-negative breast cancer is being reassessed.

Business Cycles of Non-mono-cultural Developing Economies: The Case of ASEAN Countries

Based on analyses of actual data, we reveal that many Asian developing economies own economic structural features of "non-mono-cultural economy" and the "large primary good sector", which have not been discussed in developing economies RBC literature. We also examine the input-output tables to develop a model reflecting actual developing economies' structures. Referring to the analyses, we construct RBC models of ASEAN countries. Based on the model, we find that approximately half of GDP volatility is attributable to domestic productivity shocks, and the remaining half is attributable to price shocks.

Analogous Cycles with Lagged Co-movement: U.S. and East Asian Business Cycles

In selected East Asian economies, the behavior of detrended macroeconomic variables was found to be similar to that observed in the postwar U.S. economy. Consumption and investment are highly procyclical while the balance of trade and the price level are counter-cyclical in most of them. Labor productivity is procyclical in general. The high coherence between U.S. GDP and that of the East Asian economies suggests that business cycles in terms of frequency are also similar between the United States and East Asia. However, the GDP and consumption of East Asian countries do not necessarily co-move well with current U.S. and Japanese GDP and consumption, while East Asian consumption tends to co-move more with lagged U.S. and Japanese consumption.

The role of national culture in advertising's sensitivity to business cycles:an investigation across continents

The authors conduct a systematic investigation into the cyclical sensitivity of advertising expenditures in 37 countries, covering four key media: magazines, newspapers, radio, and television. They show that advertising is considerably more sensitive to business-cycle fluctuations than the economy as a whole. Advertising behaves less cyclically in countries high in long-term orientation and power distance, but it is more cyclical in countries high in uncertainty avoidance. Furthermore, advertising is more sensitive to the business cycle in countries characterized by significant stock market pressure and few foreign-owned multinational corporations. The authors provide initial evidence on the long-term social and managerial losses incurred when companies tie ad spending too tightly to business cycles. Countries in which advertising behaves more cyclically exhibit slower growth of the advertising industry. Moreover, private-label growth is higher in countries characterized by more cyclical advertising spending, implying significant losses for brand manufacturers. Finally, an examination of 26 global companies shows that stock price performance is lower for companies that exhibit stronger procyclical advertising spending patterns.