Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.

Politics in extraordinary times : a study of the reaction of political parties and elites to terrorism

Cette thèse porte sur le comportement des élites politiques durant les périodes de crise nationale et plus particulièrement sur leurs réactions aux attentats terroristes. Elle démontre que les crises terroristes sont tout comme les conflits militaires ou diplomatiques propices aux unions nationales et notamment aux ralliements des partis d’opposition auprès du gouvernement. L’analyse statistique d’actes terroristes s’étant produits dans cinq états démocratiques (Allemagne, Espagne, États-Unis d’Amérique, France et Royaume-Uni) entre 1990 et 2006 révèle que l’ampleur d’un attentat en termes de pertes humaines ainsi que la répétition de ces attentats influencent dans une large mesure la réaction des élites politiques. Ainsi plus l’ampleur d’un attentat est élevée, plus la probabilité d’un ralliement est grande. En revanche, la multiplication des attentats augmente la possibilité de dissension entre l’opposition et le gouvernement. Par ailleurs, l’opposition est plus susceptible de se rallier au gouvernement lorsque l’attentat est perpétré par des terroristes provenant de l’étranger. L’analyse quantitative indique également que l’existence d’un accord formel de coopération dans la lutte antiterroriste entre le gouvernement et l’opposition favorise l’union des élites. Enfin, les données analysées suggèrent que la proportion des ralliements dans les cinq pays est plus importante depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. Une analyse qualitative portant exclusivement sur la France et couvrant la période 1980-2006 confirme la validité des variables identifiées dans la partie quantitative, mais suggère que les élites réagissent au nombre total de victimes (morts mais aussi blessés) et que la répétition des actes terroristes a moins d’impact lors des vagues d’attentats. Par ailleurs, les analyses de cas confirment que les élites politiques françaises sont plus susceptibles de se rallier quand un attentat vise un haut-fonctionnaire de l’État. Il apparaît également que les rivalités et rancœurs politiques propre à la France (notamment suite à l’arrivée de la gauche au pouvoir en 1981) ont parfois empêché le ralliement des élites. Enfin, cette analyse qualitative révèle que si l’extrême gauche française soutient généralement le gouvernement, qu’il soit de gauche ou de droite, en période de crise terroriste, l’extrême droite en revanche saisit quasi systématiquement l’opportunité offerte par l’acte terroriste pour critiquer le gouvernement ainsi que les partis de l’establishment. La thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier chapitre suggère que le comportement des élites politiques en période de crises internationales graves (guerres et conflits diplomatiques) est souvent influencé par la raison d’État et non par l’intérêt électoral qui prédomine lors des périodes plus paisibles. Le second chapitre discute du phénomène terroriste et de la littérature afférente. Le troisième chapitre analyse les causes du phénomène d’union nationale, soumet un cadre pour l’analyse de la réaction des élites aux actes terroristes, et présente une série d’hypothèses. Le quatrième chapitre détaille la méthodologie utilisée au cours de cette recherche. Les chapitres cinq et six présentent respectivement les résultats des analyses quantitatives et qualitatives. Enfin, le chapitre sept conclut cette thèse en résumant la contribution de l’auteur et en suggérant des pistes de recherche.

Political Parties and Foreign Aid

The influence of partisan politics on public policy is a much debated issue of political science. With respect to foreign policy, often considered as above parties, the question appears even more problematic. This comparison of foreign aid policies in 16 OECD countries develops a structural equation model and uses LISREL analysis to demonstrate that parties do matter, even in international affairs. Social-democratic parties have an effect on a country's level of development assistance. This effect, however, is neither immediate nor direct. First, it appears only in the long run. Second, the relationship between leftist partisan strength and foreign aid works through welfare state institutions and social spending. Our findings indicate how domestic politics shapes foreign conduct. We confirm the empirical relevance of cumulative partisan scores and show how the influence of parties is mediated by other political determinants.

Civil Society and Political Parties in the Period of Transition

The major aim of Mr. Marada's project was to investigate the role of political parties on the one hand, and various institutional forms of civil society on the other, in the process of establishing mechanisms of political decision-making and policy-formation in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, after November 1989. Mr. Marada wanted to examine what consequences the interplay and tensions between political parties and institutions of civil society had on the status and practical understanding of citizenship and civil society. At the beginning of his research Mr. Marada found that, while the sphere of the political was relatively clearly defined, the phenomenon of civil society required a conceptual clarification. He devoted a great deal of time to analysing the emergence, development, and disintegration of Civic Forum as the major agent of the regime change and subsequent political reforms. Alongside this analysis is a commentary on Czech society in general, drawing on established research to show how, as yet, a kind of civic incompetence reigns within the country, and how this situation has its roots in the belief, promoted by politicians themselves, that politics is an activity for experts only. The final outcome of his research took the form of a series of articles, in English, totalling 40 pages.

In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Corruption and the Electoral Support of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.