L'éthique et sa place dans la nature

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.

L'éthique et sa place dans la nature

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel.

On the institution of the moral subject: on the commander and the commanded in Nietzsche's discussion of law

The article discusses how Nietzsche understands the institution of law and morals in distinction to Kant and the Christian tradition. It argues that Nietzsche to a large extent is inspired by the paradigm-shift toward a evolutionary biological thinking introduced by several of his peers in the late 19th century, among else F. A. Lange, who sees this shift as a sobering scientific-materialistic alternative to Kant. In Nietzsche, the Kantian moral imperative is replaced with a notion of a morality emerging thanks to historical, or pre-historical, civilizational processes, imposed on a feebleminded human without any inherent rational dispositions to obey Law. It is also a process, which rather than universalizing the human, splits it in a duality where one part obeys old immediate self-interests and another part obeys new 'commands,' having been shouted 'into the ear' by a so-called 'commander.' The compliance with law takes two radically different forms in Nietzsche: servile and mediocre individuals need to be exposed to discipline and punishment in order to adopt Law; while so-called 'sovereign' individuals are able to impose law upon themselves. The figure of the 'sovereign' has consequently been an issue for vigorous debate in especially the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Nietzsche research, since his apparent 'respect for law' and 'sense of duty' reiterate typical Kantian qualities. Relating to these discussions, I suggest that Nietzsche's 'sovereign' (in one context) is identical his 'commander' (in other contexts). When the 'sovereign' as such imposes law upon himself and others, his act is conventional and arbitrary (like language in Saussure), and is rather irrational than rational as in Kant. His will is not a good will, nor a rational will with a vision of human autonomy. His command of himself and others is a performative, thus without truth-value (like illocutionary speech-acts in Austin and Searle).

Faussetés imaginaires

Les récits de fiction comportant une moralité déviante posent parfois problème quant à la détermination de ce qui est « vrai dans l’histoire ». Si par exemple on a aucune difficulté à considérer comme vrai dans le monde imaginaire que « Giselda a tué son bébé », les choses sont différentes lorsqu’il s’agit d’imaginer une situation dans laquelle nos valeurs morales sont remises en question. Confronté à un récit comportant l’énoncé « Giselda a fait la bonne chose en tuant son bébé, après tout, c’était une fille », on aura tendance à questionner l’autorité de l’auteur : celui-ci peut bien penser que l’infanticide féminin est moralement justifié, mais en fait c’est faux, même dans l’histoire. Les conditions qui donnent lieu au phénomène ont été articulées de diverses façons, l’objectif étant habituellement de parvenir à une formulation qui dépasse le cadre plus étroitement moral. On invoque par exemple une distinction plus générale entre l’évaluatif et le descriptif. Après avoir caractérisé plus précisément les notions d’imagination et d’imaginabilité, j’examinerai brièvement la littérature sur le sujet et défendrai une solution reposant sur les règles de modification de l’extension et de l’intension des prédicats imaginaires. D’après cette analyse, ce qui se produit dans les récits moraux déviants s’explique par un principe plus général qui s’applique autant à l’évaluatif qu’au descriptif.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

An Analysis of Capacities, Moral Hierarchies, and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Animal Rights Work

The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the pernicious impact that moral hierarchies have on our perception and subsequent treatment of non-human animals. Moral hierarchies in general are characterized by a dynamic in which one group is considered to be fundamentally superior to a lesser group. This thesis focuses specifically on the moral hierarchies that arise when humans are assumed to be superior to non-human animals in virtue of their advanced mental capabilities. The operative hypothesis of this thesis is essentially that moral hierarchies thwart the provision of justice to non-human animals in that they function as a justification for otherwise impermissible actions. When humans are assumed to be fundamentally superior to non-human animals then it becomes morally permissible for humans to kill non-human animals and utilize them as mere instrumentalities. This thesis is driven primarily by an in-depth analysis of the approaches to animal rights that are provided by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione. Each of these thinkers claim that they overcome anthropocentrism and provide approaches that preclude the establishment of a moral hierarchy. One of the major findings of this thesis, however, is that Singer and Regan offer approaches that remain highly anthropocentric despite the fact that each thinker claims that they have overcome anthropocentrism. The anthropocentrism persists in these respective approaches in that each thinkers gives humans Regan and Singer have different conceptions of the criteria that are required to afford a being moral worth, but they both give preference to beings that have the cognitive ability to form desires regarding the future.. As a result, a moral hierarchy emerges in which humans are regarded to be fundamentally superior. Francione, however, provides an approach that does not foster a moral hierarchy. Francione creates such an approach by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests in a consistent manner. Moreover, Francione argues that mere sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being eligible and subsequently receiving moral consideration. The upshot of this thesis is essentially that the moral treatment of animals is not compatible with the presence of a moral hierarchy. As a result, this thesis demonstrates that future approaches to animal rights must avoid the establishment of moral hierarchies. The research and analysis within this thesis demonstrates that this is not a possibility, however, unless all theories of justice that are to accommodate animals abandon the notion that cognition matters morally.

Non-thermal transitions in a model inspired by moral decisions

This work introduces a model in which agents of a network act upon one another according to three different kinds of moral decisions. These decisions are based on an increasing level of sophistication in the empathy capacity of the agent, a hierarchy which we name Piaget's ladder. The decision strategy of the agents is non-rational, in the sense they are arbitrarily fixed, and the model presents quenched disorder given by the distribution of its defining parameters. An analytical solution for this model is obtained in the large system limit as well as a leading order correction for finite-size systems which shows that typical realisations of the model develop a phase structure with both continuous and discontinuous non-thermal transitions.

Writing Violence: the legal, moral and aesthetic Implications of creative non-fiction.

This essay began as a hybrid critical/creative paper that was presented as part of an all-female panel discussing the intersections between writing and extreme violence. My own paper was on the relationship between my creative nonfiction novel The Museum of Atheism and the real life murder of six-year-old beauty queen, JonBenet Ramsey. This essay is an attempt to represent the writing process of the creative nonfiction author, and to consider the ways in which critical theory can be used to highlight, or conversely obscure, fictional writing. In addition to considering the effect of using a real story, a true crime, as the basis for a semi-fictional work, this essay will also consider the relationship I had as a writer to my publisher, editor and agent, and their interventions in the writing process to ensure that facts were deliberately skewed or warped in order to avoid litigation. Finally, I will consider my own relationship to the material, and the impact that this had on the writing process.

Moral e Ética: uma leitura psicológica

Após um século de reflexões e investigações, como era de se esperar, a Psicologia Moral apresenta sinais de esgotamento de seus referenciais teóricos clássicos. Consequentemente, novas perspectivas se abrem, entre elas a abordagem teórica que leva o nome de 'personalidade ética', cuja tese é: para compreendermos os comportamentos morais (deveres) dos indivíduos, precisamos conhecer a perspectiva ética (vida boa) adotadas por eles. Entre os invariantes psicológicos de realização de uma 'vida boa', está a necessidade de 'expansão de si próprio'. Como tal expansão implica ter 'representações de si' de valor positivo, entre elas poderão estar aquelas relacionadas à moral. Se estiverem, o sujeito experimentará o sentimento de dever, do contrário, a motivação para a ação moral será inexistente ou fraca.

Factors associated with the donation and non-donation of embryos for research: a systematic review

Background: Systematic knowledge on the factors that influence the decisions of IVF users regarding embryo donation for research is a core need for patient-centred policies and ethics in clinical practice. However, no systematic review has been provided on the motivations of patients who must decide embryo disposition. This paper fills this gap, presenting a systematic review of quantitative and qualitative studies, which synthesizes the current body of knowledge on the factors and reasons associated with IVF patients’ decisions to donate or not to donate embryos for research. Methods: A systematic search of studies indexed in PubMed, ISIWoK and PsycINFO, published before November 2013, was conducted. Only empirical, peer-reviewed, full-length, original studies reporting data on factors and reasons associated with the decision concerning donation or non-donation of embryos for research were included. Eligibility and data extraction were performed by two independent researchers and disagreements were resolved by discussion or a third reviewer, if required. The main quantitative findings were extracted and synthesized and qualitative data were assessed by thematic content analysis. Results: A total of 39 studies met the inclusion criteria and were included in the review. More than half of the studies (n ¼ 21) used a quantitative methodology, and the remaining were qualitative (n ¼ 15) or mixed-methods (n ¼ 3) studies. The studies were derived mainly from European countries (n ¼ 18) and the USA(n ¼ 11). The proportion of IVF users who donated embryos for research varied from 7% in a study in France to 73% in a Swiss study. Those who donate embryos for research reported feelings of reciprocity towards science and medicine, positive views of research and high levels of trust in the medical system. They described their decision as better than the destruction of embryos and as an opportunity to help others or to improve health and IVF treatments. The perception of risks, the lack of information concerning research projects and the medical system and the conceptualization of embryos in terms of personhood were the most relevant motives for not donating embryos for research. Results relating to the influence of sociodemographic characteristics and reproductive and gynaecological history were mostly inconclusive. Conclusions: Three iterative and dynamic dimensions of the IVF patients’ decision to donate or not to donate embryos for research emerged from this review: the hierarquization of the possible options regarding embryo disposition, according to the moral, social and instrumental status attributed to embryos; patients’ understanding of expectations and risks of the research on human embryos; and patients’ experiences of information exchange and levels of trust in the medical-scientific institutions.