The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Interventions : A Pragmatic Examination of Humanitarian Intervention with Special Reference to Kosovo

Kansainvälisen oikeuden alaan kuuluvassa tutkielmassa käsitellään humanitaarisen intervention oikeutusta ja laillisuutta. Tutkimuskysymyksenä on, missä määrin humanitaarisilla näkökohdilla perusteltuja sotilaallisia toimia tai niillä uhkaamista voi pitää kansainvälisoikeudellisesti hyväksyttävänä ja millainen painoarvo ennakkotapauksena olisi annettava NATO-maiden Kosovossa toteuttamalle väliintulolle. Tutkielmassa perehdytään ihmisoikeusajattelun tiettyjen taustaoletusten kritiikkiin. Tarkastelun kohteena ovat erityisesti kannanotot, joiden mukaan ihmisoikeuksia ei voi pitää luonteeltaan universaaleina, sekä kyseiseen kritiikkiin liittyvät väitteet siitä, että ns. hegemonisessa asemassa olevat valtiot hyödyntävät ihmisoikeusargumentteja oikeuttaakseen voimankäyttönsä. Universaalisuuskritiikkiä voidaan pitää pitkälti perusteltuna, mutta nykyinen kansainvälinen yhteisö tarvitsee kuitenkin tietynlaisia yleismaailmallisia normeja voidakseen toimia tehokkaasti. Kritiikin ei voikaan katsoa pätevän humanitaarisen intervention kannalta keskeisiin ihmisoikeusnormeihin kuten kansanmurhan kieltoon, sillä kyseiset velvoitteet suojaavat kansainvälisen yhteisön toimivuutta ja uskottavuutta. Humanitaarisiin argumentteihin liittyy kuitenkin muita ongelmia: niillä on esimerkiksi aika ajoin pyritty oikeuttamaan sotilaallisia toimia, joissa ihmisoikeusnäkökohdat eivät välttämättä ole olleet etusijalla. Ihmisoikeuksille ei ole syytä antaa kansainvälisessä oikeudessa asemaa universaaleina "superargumentteina", jotka eivät olisi kyseenalaistettavissa. YK:n peruskirjan ja kansainvälisen tapaoikeuden näkökulmasta humanitaarisen intervention kaltaiseen voimankäyttöön vaaditaan turvallisuusneuvoston hyväksyntä, jota ei Kosovo-operaatioon saatu. Interventiota voi tässä suhteessa pitää yksiselitteisesti laittomana, sillä sen tueksi esitetyt oikeudelliset argumentit eivät ole vakuuttavia. Tapaukseen liittyvät ihmisoikeusnäkökohdat ovat kuitenkin siinä määrin merkittäviä, että ongelmaan ei ole perusteltua suhtautua tiukan legalistisesti. Operaation hyväksyminen moraaliargumenttien nojalla voisi kuitenkin johtaa nykyisten voimankäyttörajoitusten marginalisoitumiseen, mikä olisi yllä käsitellyn kritiikin valossa ongelmallista. Tutkielmassa nostetaan suositeltavaksi ratkaisuksi lähestymistapa, jossa Kosovon tapaus ymmärretään yksittäisenä oikeudenvastaisena mutta samalla oikeudenulkoisena poikkeustapauksena. Tällöin peruskirjan mukainen voimankäytön sääntely säilyy entisellään ilman että humanitaariset näkökohdat jäisivät tyystin huomiotta. Ratkaisu ei sulje pois mahdollisuutta suhtautua positiivisesti Kosovo-operaation mahdollisesti luomaan "poliittiseen normiin": suuren mittakaavan ihmisoikeusloukkaukset eivät jää Euroopassa seurauksitta. Ilman turvallisuusneuvoston suostumusta toteutettaviin humanitaarisiin interventioihin liittyvien käytännöllisten ja kansainvälisoikeudellisten riskien vuoksi niihin on kuitenkin aihetta suhtautua suurella varauksella.

Humanitarian intervention and the issue of state sovereignty in the discourse of legal experts between the 1830s and the First World War

This article discusses the tensions between the principle of state sovereignty and the idea of a "humanitarian intervention" (or a intervention on humanitarian grounds) as they resulted from the debate of leading legal scholars in the 19th and early 20th century. While prominent scholars such as Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Gustave Rolin Jaequemyns or Aegidius Arntz spoke out in favour of a form of "humanitarian interventions", others such as August Wilhelm Heffter or Pasquale Fiore were much more critical and in many cases spoke out in favour of absolute state sovereignty.

Responsibility to protect or Trojan Horse? The crisis in darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq

What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a "responsibility to protect" more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies "abused" humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the "responsibility to protect" inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as "norm carriers" has been significantly undermined. Second, while the "responsibility to protect" has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.

The UN Security Council and the question of humanitarian intervention in Darfur

This article explores the different moral and legal arguments used by protagonists in the debate about whether or not to conduct a humanitarian intervention in Darfur. The first section briefly outlines four moral and legal positions on whether there is (and should be) a right and/or duty of humanitarian intervention: communitarianism, restrictionist and counter-restrictionist legal positivism and liberal cosmopolitanism. The second section then provides an overview of the Security Council's debate about responding to Darfur's crisis, showing how its policy was influenced by both normative concerns and hard-nosed political calculations. The article concludes by asking what Darfur's case reveals about the legitimacy and likelihood of humanitarian intervention in such catastrophes and the role of the UN Security Council as the primary authorising body for the use of international force. The authors argue that this case demonstrates that for the cosmopolitan/counter-restrictionist case to prevail pivotal states need to put humanitarian emergencies on the global agenda and express a willingness to act without Council authorisation, though the question of how to proceed in cases where the Council is deadlocked remains vexed.

Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World Summit

At the 2005 World Summit, the world's leaders committed themselves to the "responsibility to protect", recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world's most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world's states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN's High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

China's "Responsible Protection" concept : re-interpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and military intervention for humanitarian purposes

This article assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes, and should therefore be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing’s current stance on R2P. More broadly, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance.

The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty

Wheeler, Nicholas. 'The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty', In: Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.29-51 RAE2008