Odin: a service for gamification of learning activities

Existing gamification services have features that preclude their use by e-learning tools. Odin is a gamification service that mimics the API of state-of-the-art services without these limitations. This paper describes Odin, its role in an e-learning system architecture requiring gamification, and details its implementation. The validation of Odin involved the creation of a small e-learning game, integrated in a Learning Management System (LMS) using the Learning Tools Interoperability (LTI) specification.

Object-oriented development of client / server application: case study of service control software

Tässä työssä on esitetty sen ohjelmiston kehittämisen prosessi, joka on tarkoitettu annettavien palveluiden valvottavaksi käyttäen prototyyppimallia. Raportti sisältää vaatimusten, kohteisiin suunnatun analyysin ja suunnittelun, realisointiprosessien kuvauksen ja prototyypin testauksen. Ohjelmiston käyttöala – antavien palveluiden valvonta. Vaatimukset sovellukselle analysoitiin ohjelmistomarkkinoiden perusteella sekä ohjelmiston engineeringin periaatteiden mukaisesti. Ohjelmiston prototyyppi on realisoitu käyttäen asiakas-/palvelinhybridimallia sekä ralaatiokantaa. Kehitetty ohjelmisto on tarkoitettu venäläisille tietokonekerhoille, jotka erikoistuvat pelipalvelinten antamiseen.

“The impact of online ratings on video game sales”

Online third-party reviews have been grown over the last decade and they now play an important role as a tool for helping customers evaluate products and services that in many cases offer more than tangible features. This study intends to quantify the impact online ratings have over video game sales by conducting a linear regression analysis on 300 titles for the previous console generation (PlayStation® 3 and Xbox® 360) using a data from the video game industry to understand the existing influence on this particular market. The findings showed that these variables have a weak linear relationship thus suggesting that quality of a title explains little the commercial success of a video game and instead this should cover a wider range of factors. Afterwards, we compare results to previous ones and discuss the managerial implications for upcoming gaming generations.

La gestion des services environnementaux: entre règles et régulation négociée. Six études de cas de services forestiers pour la production d'eau potable dans trois pays

Cette thèse est construite en quatre parties : trois annexes qui présentent six études de cas (env. 800 pages), précédées par une analyse transversale, plus synthétique (env. 150 pages), dont traite ce résumé. Chaque annexe contient une synthèse détaillée des études de cas. Cette thèse aborde la « gestion des ressources naturelles » en affirmant d'emblée que l'appellation est inappropriée, car ce ne sont pas les ressources qui sont gérées, mais leurs usages. Il s'agit donc d'identifier et d'analyser ce qui influence les comportements humains en lien avec la ressource. Cette affirmation fonde la perspective des sciences sociales sur la gestion des ressources naturelles, dans laquelle s'inscrit cette thèse. L'approche néo-institutionnaliste considère que les usages sont influencés par des institutions, qui sont elles-mêmes influencées par les usagers. Ces institutions sont des constructions humaines qui composent le contexte institutionnel dans lequel les acteurs décident de leurs usages (abattre un arbre, prélever de l'eau, etc.). Les usages des ressources ne sont donc jamais libres et il s'agit de comprendre comment ces règles du jeu influencent les pratiques. Elles sont nombreuses, interdépendantes et forment la trame sur laquelle se décident les usages. Pour saisir cette complexité, l'auteur applique le cadre d'analyse des régimes institutionnels des ressources (RIR) qui se limite à l'analyse de deux types de droits d'usages : ceux issues des règles de la propriété (titres de propriété, servitudes, etc.) et ceux issus des politiques publiques (lois, ordonnances, etc.). Le RIR permet d'identifier un « régime institutionnel », spécifique à la ressource étudiée, dont les évolutions peuvent être comparées dans le temps ou entre plusieurs lieux. Dans cette recherche, ce cadre d'analyse a été appliqué au même objet - la gestion forestière dans les zones de captage d'eau souterraine destinée au réseau public - dans trois pays : en France, en Suisse et en Indonésie. Trois années de recherche de terrain ont permis à l'auteur de s'intéresser non seulement aux règles prédéterminées (la réglementation), mais aussi aux règles effectivement activées sur le terrain (la régulation) par les acteurs rencontrés. Les études de cas montrent que les règles prévues sont inégalement activées et que les acteurs privilégient parfois la négociation directe pour résoudre leurs rivalités d'usages, à la place d'invoquer leurs droits acquis. Ce constat conduit l'auteur à proposer un élargissement de la focale du RIR, qui constitue le coeur de sa thèse. On ne s'intéresse plus seulement à ce qui « est » régulé, mais aussi à ce qui ne l'« est pas » et qui échappe à l'application classique du RIR. Ce renversement de perspective est crucial pour comprendre les usages concrets des ressources dans les régimes peu intégrés, où les pratiques s'expliquent davantage par la marge de manoeuvre laissée aux acteurs que par les règles prédéterminées. Cette relecture, testée avec succès dans cette thèse, permet d'intégrer la marge de manoeuvre à l'analyse au moyen du RIR. Elle se concrétise par l'identification des lacunes et incohérences dans les régimes institutionnels étudiés. Le champ d'application du RIR s'en trouve élargi et sa vulgarisation pour des non-spécialistes est facilitée, notamment pour les environnementalistes. La complémentarité entre les approches s'en trouve renforcée. Les résultats montrent deux choses : premièrement les acteurs disposent toujours d'une marge de manoeuvre pour négocier des régulations ponctuelles, qui sont autant d'alternatives à l'application des règles prévues. Deuxièmement, la conclusion d'accords issus de la négociation bi-/multilatérale dépend directement de la marge de manoeuvre laissée par le contexte institutionnel. Ceci explique pourquoi la négociation entre les propriétaires forestiers et les exploitants de captages s'imposent en Indonésie, est envisageable en France, mais n'aboutit pas en Suisse. Les nombreuses tentatives infructueuses de mise en oeuvre de solutions négociées, notamment sous forme de paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE), trouvent ici une explication. - This thesis (written in French) is built in four parts: three annexes that present six case studies (approx. 800 pages), preceded by a transverse, more conceptual analysis (approx. 150 pages), which this summary is about. Each annexe contains a detailed summary of the case studies. 'Natural resource management' is an inappropriate designation because it is not the resources that are managed but the uses made of them, therefore this thesis addresses the identification and analysis of the influences on human behaviour in relation to the resource. This statement roots the social sciences perspective on the management of natural resources, in which this thesis fits. A neoinstitutionalist approach considers that the uses are influenced by institutions, which are themselves influenced by users. These institutions are human constructions that form the institutional context in which the actors decide on the use of resources (felling a tree, collecting water, etc.). Thus, the uses of resources are never independent from institutional influences and it becomes necessary to understand how these rules of the game affect practices. They are numerous, interrelated and form the basis for the uses of resources. To understand this complexity, the author applies the institutional regime resource framework (IRR) which limits the analysis to two types of use rights: those resulting from the property rights (deeds, easements, etc.) and those from public policies (laws, ordinances, etc.). The IRR identifies an 'institutional regime', specific to the resource, from which developments can be compared over time or between several places. In this research, this analytical framework has been applied to the same topic - forest management in the recharging areas of groundwater piped for public supply - in three countries: France, Switzerland and Indonesia. Three years of field research allow the author to look not only at predetermined rules (rules), but also at regulations that are actually activated on the ground (rules-in-use). The case studies show that the predetermined rules are unevenly applied and that sometimes actors favour direct negotiation to resolve their rivalry of uses, instead of invoking their vested rights. From this observation the author proposes an enlargement of the IRR's scope, forming the core of his thesis. The interest covers not only what 'is' regulated, but what 'is not' and so is beyond the classical application of the IRR. This shift in perspective is crucial to understand the concrete uses of resources in poorly integrated regimes, where practices are explained by the margin of manoeuvre left to the actors rather than predetermined rules. This reinterpretation, tested successfully in this research, allows the margin of manoeuvre to be integrated in the analysis using the IRR and is made concrete by the identification of gaps and inconsistencies in the investigated institutional context. The new interpretation of the IRR in this thesis complements and enhances its classical application. In particular, its use and understanding by non-specialists, especially environmentalists, is facilitated. The results show two things: first the actors always have leeway to negotiate ad hoc regulations, which are alternatives to the application of the predefined rules. Second, the conclusion of bi/multilateral negotiated agreements depends directly on the leeway left by the institutional context. This explains why the negotiation between forest owners and operators of water catchments is needed in Indonesia, is possible in France, but does not succeed in Switzerland. This offers an explanation for many unsuccessful attempts to implement negotiated solutions, notably payments for environmental services (PES).

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones. CEPS Working Document No. 402/January 2015

Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the start of the conflict in the Donbass region, the EU has introduced three waves of restrictive measures against Russia, which are regularly updated. Having thus expanded from measures targeting individuals to entire sectors, the current EU sanctions policy impacts Russia’s financial markets, energy sector and defence industry. On top of this, new bans affect EU investments, services and trade in Crimea and Sevastopol. While they hurt the Russian economy, the EU sanctions also have a boomerang effect, especially in conjunction with the countersanctions imposed by the Kremlin on EU food imports. In this lose-lose situation, the usefulness of the EU sanctions has been called into doubt, in particular in those EU member states that are the most economically intertwined with Russia. How successful has the EU been so far in pushing its case with the Kremlin and what moves are left for the two main actors in the sanctioner-sanctionee ‘Game of Thrones’? This Working Document offers a SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and identifies the Strengths for the EU to cultivate, Weaknesses to minimise, Opportunities to seize and Threats to counteract.

The Services Dimension of TTIP. Paper No. 6 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’ and CEPS Special Report No. 106, 8 May 2015

This CEPS Special Report examines the main facets of the debate about TTIP and services. First, it looks at the political and economic context and the various alternatives in terms of political support, stressing that only a partnership that ensures substantial economic gains will attract the support of the top policy-makers. Second, the paper makes the point that large economic gains in services require deep discussions on regulatory issues, and third, such discussions cannot rely on the negotiating techniques normally used for goods. There is thus a need to adopt a new approach, based on the mutual recognition and equivalence of regulations enforced in the services concerned, preceded by a mutual evaluation to grant such equivalence – all measures to be carried out by the regulatory bodies concerned, not by trade negotiators. This new game is a complex one but it has huge side benefits: it induces each TTIP partner to review the quality of their own regulations; it is at ease with the notion of a ‘living’ (evolving) agreement; and it can easily be open to third countries. All these benefits should reassure a general public that is fearful of a hastily baked deal.

Harry Kipke, Bill Fleming, Wally Teninga in Michigan Stadium press box, 1958 Iowa game

[Kipke, recently elected to the College Football Hall of Fame, is interviewed by Fleming and his assistant Teninga. Kipke and Teninga were two of greatest punter in U-M history. (summary of note on negative sleeve)]