955 resultados para Executive remuneration


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The study is undertaken by the researcher with the object of examining the remuneration pattern of executive personnel in the manufacturing public enterprises in Kerala so as to find out whether there is any rationale or criteria involved in remunerating executives. It is also envisaged to find out the pattern of executive remuneration in the various categories of industries and inter—industry disparities among the public sector enterprises. This is considered to be a very fruitful area for investigation, particularly in view of the generally prevailing notion that public sector executives in Kerala are not remunerated properly and glaring inequalities and disparities are existing among the various categories of industries and within the same industry. Therefore the study is to explore the criteria used for the determination of executive remuneration and the relative weightage of various factors such as size of the firm, rate of return sales volume etc of the organisation and various other factors such as qualification, experience, level of job and functions of executives. Further the study is extended to find out the role of 'pay' towards motivation and efficiency of the executive personnel

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This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

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The regulatory framework for corporate governance, both in Australia and internationally, shifts between rules based regimes and principles based approach. The rules based regimes are typified by legislation that imposes mandated compliance based rules, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Other regimes, such as Australia’s CLERP 9 and the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s principles, have opted for a disclosure approach. This paper examines these approaches in the context of the non-binding vote rule, which arguably combines aspects of both. The study’s methodology empirically considers evidence relating to actual voting patterns as well as case study examples of the non-binding vote’s effectiveness. Significantly, our analyses show that from its inception, the non-binding vote was effective in motivating management to change the remuneration package to one they perceived as more acceptable to shareholders and that the non-binding vote is an effective regime to manage CEO remuneration (and by extension) executive remuneration.

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This study provides evidence that after several decades of fighting for equal pay for equal work, an unexplained gender pay gap remains amongst senior executives in ASX-listed firms. After controlling for a large suite of personal, occupational and firm observables, we find female senior executives receive, on average, 22.58 percent less in base salary for the period 2002–2013. When executives are awarded performance-based pay, females receive on average 16.47 percent less in cash bonus and 18.21 percent less in long-term incentives than males. The results are robust to using firm fixed effects and propensity-score matching. Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition results show that the mean pay gap cannot be attributed to gender differences in attributes, including job titles. Instead, the results point to differences in returns on firm-specific variables, in particular firm risk.

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Purpose – This paper seeks to make the case for new research into the perceived fairness and impact of executive pay. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the literature regarding executive compensation and corporate performance and examines the evidence that a more egalitarian approach to pay could be justified in terms of long-term shareholder value. Findings – There would appear to be no evidence to suggest that the growing gap between the pay of executives and that of the average employee generates long-term enterprise value, and it may even be detrimental to firms, if not the liberal capitalist consensus on which the corporate licence to operate is based. Research limitations/implications – The paper outlines a new approach to tracking income differentials with corporate performance through the development of a corporate Gini coefficient “league table”. Social implications – The proposed research is expected to point towards better practice in executive remuneration, and support the growing momentum for a sustainable and enlightened approach to business, in which the key goal is long-term enterprise value based on a fair distribution of the rewards of business. Originality/value – In producing a deeper understanding of the impact of widening income differentials, the paper should be of interest to senior executives in publicly quoted companies as well as press commentators, government officials and academics.

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Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar se a remuneração dos executivos afeta o valor e desempenho das empresas. Em geral, a literatura sugere que companhias que melhor remuneram seus administradores tendem a apresentar um valor e desempenho superior. Utilizando dados inéditos no Brasil, este trabalho procura testar essa hipótese. A análise de 420 companhias abertas brasileiras no período de 2002 a 2009 indica que existe uma relação positiva e significativa entre remuneração executiva e valor da empresa (price-to-book), ou seja, empresas que pagam mais a seus executivos possuem maior valor de mercado. Por outro lado, não existe evidência significativa que empresas que melhor remuneram seus executivos apresentam um melhor desempenho operacional (retorno sobre ativos e crescimento de vendas).

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O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar a relação entre a remuneração dos executivos e o desempenho financeiro nas empresas brasileiras. O sistema de remuneração é uma das principais formas de alinhar os interesses entre o principal (acionista) e o agente (executivo). Para isso, analisaremos a evolução histórica e teórica dos principais assuntos relacionados ao tema. Contudo, o nosso foco será em estudar como a remuneração dos executivos se comporta em relação a eventos esperados, mas ainda não realizados. Usaremos, para isso, a metodologia proposta por Leone et al. (2004), juntamente a base de dados disponibilizada pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa (IBGC) com dados sobre a remuneração dos executivos de 316 empresas. Esses dados de remuneração abrangem informações do exercício de 2011 a 2013. Usaremos também uma segunda base de dados, formada pelo setor financeiro e de materiais básico, montada através dos formulários de referência, para analisarmos o efeito separadamente na remuneração paga em dinheiro e em ações. Como variável independente usaremos indicadores financeiros e contábeis das empresas. Os resultados fornecem evidencias empíricas de assimetria na remuneração total dos executivos em relação ao desempenho contábil. Enquanto que em anos de bom desempenho em bolsa há uma relação positiva entre desempenho contábil e remuneração de executivos, nos anos em que o desempenho em bolsa é ruim observa-se que uma boa performance contábil não –é acompanhada de uma variação positiva na remuneração dos executivos.

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Directors’ and executives’ remuneration, including levels of pay, accountability and transparency, is controversial. Section 250R of the CLERP (Audit Reform & Disclosure) Act 2004 that was not greatly anticipated, requires the holding of a non-binding resolution on board remuneration at companies’ annual general meetings. The reform has been criticised on the basis that, inter alia, it blurs the respective roles of shareholders and directors. This article identifies possible motivations for the imposition of the non-binding resolution in Australia. These are evaluated with reference to sources of corporate governance policy and the current state of Australia’s relevant corporate governance structures. We speculate that the non-binding vote will not amount to a substantive addition to the corporate governance regime.

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Across time, companies have increasingly made public commitments to sustainable development and to reducing their impacts on climate change. Management remuneration plans (MRPs) are a key mechanism to motivate managers to achieve corporate goals. We review the MRPs negotiated with key management personnel in a sample of large Australian carbon-intensive companies. Our results show that, as in past decades, the companies in our sample have MRPs in place that continue to fixate on financial performance. We argue that this provides evidence of a disconnection, or ‘decoupling’, between the sustainability-related rhetoric of the sample companies, and their ‘real’ organisational practices and priorities.