995 resultados para Early retirement incentives
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Title from cover.
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Title from cover.
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Contains the funding alternatives identified by the Commission and provides its recommendations on the alternative that should be used to fund the 2002 SERS ERI liability.
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[cat] El progrés tecnològic afecta a la jubilació anticipada a través de dues forces oposades. Per una banda, augmenta el salari real i, per tant, crea incentius per posposar la jubilació. Per altra banda, causa l’erosió de les habilitats dels treballadors, el qual augmenta la probabilitat de jubilació anticipada. En aquest article reexaminem l’efecte del progrés tecnològic en la jubilació anticipada tenint en compte que, al principi de la vida laboral, els individus es distribueixen en diferents sectors segons la seva habilitat. Obtenim dos resultats principals: 1) per petits (grans) canvis tecnològics, l’efecte salari (erosió) domina, i 2) els individus més capaços resisteixen millor l’efecte erosió.
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[cat] El progrés tecnològic afecta a la jubilació anticipada a través de dues forces oposades. Per una banda, augmenta el salari real i, per tant, crea incentius per posposar la jubilació. Per altra banda, causa l’erosió de les habilitats dels treballadors, el qual augmenta la probabilitat de jubilació anticipada. En aquest article reexaminem l’efecte del progrés tecnològic en la jubilació anticipada tenint en compte que, al principi de la vida laboral, els individus es distribueixen en diferents sectors segons la seva habilitat. Obtenim dos resultats principals: 1) per petits (grans) canvis tecnològics, l’efecte salari (erosió) domina, i 2) els individus més capaços resisteixen millor l’efecte erosió.
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The institutionalisation of early retirement has become a universal feature of postwar industrial economies, though there are significant cross-national variations. This paper studies the impact of different types of welfare regimes, production systems and labour relations on early exit from work. After an analysis of the main trends, the paper discusses the costs and benefits of early retirement for the various actors — labour, capital and the state — at different levels. The paper outlines both the "pull” and "push” factors of early exit. It first compares the distinct welfare state regimes and private occupational pensions in their impact on early retirement. Then it looks at the labour-shedding strategies inherent to particular employment regimes, production systems and financial governance structures. Finally, the impact of particular industrial relations systems, and especially the role of unions is discussed. The paper finds intricate "institutional complementarities” between particular welfare states, production regimes and industrial relations systems, and these structure the incentives under which actors make decisions on work and retirement. The paper argues that the "collusion” between capital, labour and the state in pursuing early retirement is not merely following a labour-shedding strategy to ease mass unemployment, but also caused by the need for economic restructuration, the downsizing pressures from financial markets, the maintenance of peaceful labour relations, and the consequences of a seniority employment system.
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close toretirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the extensiveprior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, bymodeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneousmanner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is particularlyimportant in Spain). Second, by considering the influence of unobserved heterogeneity inthe estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.Using administrative data, we find that, when properly defined, economic incentives have astrong impact on labour market decisions in Spain. Unemployment regulations are shown to be particularlyinfluential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked tothe pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers reemploymentdecisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, however,is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omissionleads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a finding thathas clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We confirm theimportance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of earlyretirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach tomeasure the behavioural reaction to this change, finding a large overestimation when unobservedheterogeneity is not taken into account.
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Includes bibliography
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Cover title.
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Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.
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"September 1999."
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Bibliography: p. 287-288.
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Part 1, Early retirement: the decision and the experience, published separately in 1969. Part 2, The automobile worker and retirement: a second look, published separately in 1970.